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This PhD thesis is a result of the author’s research on the development of anti-dumping law 
and policy of Vietnam in the light of its ongoing economic reforms and recent successful 
accession to the WTO multilateral trading system. It investigates the theoretical and practical 
implication of anti-dumping law with regards to promotion of trade liberalization, fair 
competition and economic development for Vietnam. During the study this author tries to 
assess critically the existing rules governing the Vietnamese anti-dumping system from the 
competition and economic efficiency perspective. Overall, the thesis seeks to provide some 
contributions to the stock knowledge concerning anti-dumping law and policy in Vietnam and 
provide suggestions for development of the national anti-dumping system.  
The thesis begins with an introductory Chapter I, which presents theoretical discussions on 
the economic rationales of dumping and the law against dumping. In particular, this chapter 
introduces an analysis on the contradiction and linkage between anti-dumping and 
competition policies in the context of current development of international trade. The analyses 
help to identify the problems of anti-dumping rules as well as to determine the possibilities of 
improving and strengthening the rules.  
Chapter II offers to illustrate the economic, political and legal developments in Vietnam 
during the last two decades under the “Doi Moi” Policy. In particular it considers the 
Vietnamese political and legal infrastructure within which anti-dumping law and policy is 
designed and developed. This helps to give a broad overview of the objective and subjective 
problems of Vietnamese anti-dumping system as well as the possibility of improvement. 
Chapter III seeks to provide a succinct review of the Vietnam’s anti-dumping system, 
including its development rationales, underline objectives, and historical developments. It also 
examines whether or not, and to which degree, the Vietnamese government takes into account 
the economic efficiency and competition policy considerations while designing and 
developing the national anti-dumping system. It then proposes some strategic considerations 




Chapter IV and Chapter V concentrate on the substantive and procedural issues of the 
Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation. Existing anti-dumping rules are analyzed and compared 
with relevant analogue legislation of other countries in the world and particularly with the 
regulations of the ADA. Chapter IV reserves a special focus on the analysis of development 
of an effective public interest assessment mechanism in Vietnam because it is believed that 
this mechanism will help best to balance the interests of domestic producers and that of 
consumers in anti-dumping proceeding.  
Finally, Chapter VI concludes the thesis by summarizing the principal findings of the studies 
and proposing some recommendation for development of a pro-competitive anti-dumping 
system in Vietnam. Certain features for a reform in the area of anti-dumping in the long-run 
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Since its inception, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has already 
authorized signatories to apply anti-dumping measure in the form of special duties to offset 
dumping when it causes or threatens to cause material injury to its domestic industry. Anti-
dumping laws are considered as an essential element of national foreign trade policies of 
countries supporting trade liberalization and open international trade. National anti-dumping 
legislation dates from well before the GATT. The first anti-dumping law was enacted by 
Canada in 1904. Many other western countries, including Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, and the United States adopted a similar law over the following two decades. 
Nowadays, over 98 countries in the world have already adopted the anti-dumping law and are 
ready for action against dumping in defence of their domestic industry.1 Vietnam is among the 
newest member of the anti-dumping cohort after the adoption of its first anti-dumping 
legislation – the Anti-dumping Ordinance, in 2004. 
                                                 
 
1  Zanardi, M., “Anti-dumping: a problem in international trade”, Paper for Conference: 100th Annivesary of 
Anti-dumping Regulations, Leverhulme Center for Research on the Globalization and Economic Policy 




Despite their longstanding popularity, anti-dumping laws are frequently subject to sharp 
criticism, especially from academic economists. The criticisms often attack the methods and 
principles of anti-dumping for their lack of economic rationale while accessing the issue of 
dumping. It is further argued that anti-dumping laws actually do not protect fair competitive 
market but rather they are to protect domestic producers against international competition. 
The misuse of anti-dumping laws for the purpose of protectionism can be quite detrimental to 
economic development as national resources will be misallocated and substantial interests will 
be vested in the wrong industries.  
This Chapter, therefore, focuses on analyzing the theories on dumping and anti-dumping 
policy. The first part of this Chapter concentrates on the review of arguments - economic, 
social and political – to the desirability of countries, especially those of developing 
economies, in designing and developing anti-dumping regime. It is believed that to decide 
whether anti-dumping measures provide beneficial economic outcomes for the country, one 
must assess the economic theory on dumping and anti-dumping and contrast the results of 
such system with that of a market without any competition. The political economic theory of 
anti-dumping laws will also help to explain the rationale of these trade remedy instrument.   
The second part of this Chapter includes the analysis of anti-dumping measure versus 
competition policy. Since one of the main arguments of anti-dumping measure is that this 
trade remedy instrument serves to (temporarily) counter unfair competition arising from 
international price discrimination, anti-dumping laws should also be assessed in the light of 
the general theory of competition policy. This analysis will help to determine the possibilities 




1.2. DUMPING AND THE LAW AGAINST DUMPING 
1.2.1.  The Notion of Dumping 
The origin of the word “dumping” is uncertain. According to Richard Dale, its usage was 
recorded in the early 19th century, with the meaning of the act of getting rid of something 
unwanted in a lump or mass. 2 At the beginning of 20th century, the term began to be used in 
English trade-literature to describe the situation in which products were sold cheaply in 
foreign markets,3 the implication being that the products were unwanted in their country of 
origin and were exported only to get rid of them. John Jackson, meanwhile, relates that Adam 
Smith was the first to use the word dumping, but in reference to situations approximately to 
the extent of the nowadays term of “export subsidy”.4 Today, the word dumping is used 
internationally to signify the practice of price discrimination in international trade, which 
includes a pejorative connotation. Dumping is usually associated with “unfair” and 
“undesirable” trade practices. 
As such, the word ‘dumping’ is commonly regarded as unfair or abusive merchandise activity 
and it is an arguable point of view that much of the supposedly remedial legislation in this 
area is derived from moral opprobrium attached to dumping rather than from any objective 
damage it may cause.5
 
                                                 
 
2  Dale, R., “Anti-dumping law: in a liberal trade order”, Trade Policy Center, London, (1980), p. 1. 
3  Ibid. 
4  Jackson, J., “Dumping in International Trade: Its Meaning and Context”, in Jackson, J. and Vermulst (eds.) 
“Anti-dumping Law and Practice”, University of Michigan Press, (1991), pp. 4-5    




1.2.1.1. Economic Definition of Dumping 
The most traditional economic definition of dumping, which was first suggested by Jacob 
Viner, is price discrimination between national markets.6 This situation occurs when firm sell 
products to the importing country at a price below that which it sells like products in its 
domestic market. Efforts to quantify whether dumping was occurring, however, led to the use 
of criteria for determining the “domestic price” by omitting domestic sales which are below 
cost of production.7 Thus, the term dumping has been understood also as a transnational “sale 
below cost”. Economic theories of dumping nowadays have paralleled these developments. 
According to the classic theory of price discrimination, the merchandise practice of price 
discrimination occurs only when different units of the same products are sold at different 
market for different price for reasons not associated with differences in costs. Such behavior 
automatically implies some departure from the ideal of perfect competition. Deardoff 
explained that situation as follows “… a perfectly-competitive firm would always try to sell its 
products in the market with the higher price [to maximize profit]. If instead a firm cannot sell 
                                                 
 
6  Viner, J., “Dumping: A Problem in International Trade”, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, (1923). 
Ever since Viner published his classic economic study in 1923, economists have characterized dumping as 
cross-border price discrimination. See, e.g., Dam, K., “The GATT: Law and International Economic 
Organization”, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, (1970) pp.168-169 (analyzing Viner's work and 
discussing dumping as international price discrimination); Barcelo III, J., “Anti-dumping Laws as Barriers 
to Trade - The United States and the International Anti-dumping Code”, Cornell L. Rev., 57, (1972) pp. 
491-560 (analysis of Viner's Work). See also: Bierwagen, R., “GATT Article VI and the Protectionist Bias 
in Anti-Dumping Laws”,  Kluwer Law Int., The Hague, (1990), p.171; Boltuck, R., “An Economic Analysis 
of Dumping”, J. World Trade L., Vol. 21, (1987), p. 45; Boltuck, R., Reply to Professor Lazar's Comment 
on "An Economic Analysis of Dumping”, J. World Trade L., Vol. 22, (1988), p. 129; Lazar, F., 
Structural/Strategic Dumping: A Comment on Richard Boltuck's "An Economic Analysis of Dumping", J. 
World Trade L., (1988), pp. 91-93; Deardorff, A., “Economic Perspectives on Anti-dumping Law”, in 
Jackson, J., and Vermulst, E., (eds.) “The Multilateral Trading System”, (1989), pp. 23-40; Marceau, G., 
“Anti-dumping and Anti-trust Issues in Free Trade Areas”, Clarendon Press, Oxford, (1994), pp. 11-18; 
Bhala, R., and Kennedy, K., “World Trade Law: the GATT-WTO System, Regional Arrangements, and U.S. 
Law”, Lexis Law Pub., Charlottesville, (1998). 




as much as it wishes in a given market within a specific period of time at a given price, then it 
must set the price that it will charge based in part on how much it will then be able to sell. Its 
pricing decision will depend on a variety of factors, and it would be only a coincidence if 
these factors were to lead it to charge the same price in two different markets. If it does so, 
then it is engaging in price discrimination”.8  
The price discrimination can not have taken place if the two markets were not separated. This 
market separation can be social, political, geographical, cultural or legal. In the modern 
context, economists often refer to the legal factors, i.e. high import tariffs, import restrictions 
or technical standards, as examples which cause market isolation in international trade. 
Without the separation of markets, consumers in one market would always come to the other 
market with the cheaper price to buy the products or they might buy the cheap products in one 
market and re-sell them in the other. In either case, the firms could not succeed in maintaining 
a higher price in one of the two markets.  
The other presupposition of price discrimination is that one of the two markets should be less 
elastic than the other. The condition of low “elasticity” of demand in one separate market is 
significant because it enables the firm to charge a higher price for the products without fear 
that their sales volume will drop because of the price differences. If costs for supplying the 
two markets are the same, then the larger markup will also result in a higher price. It is to say 
if all the cost for supplying goods in the two markets is similar, but one of the markets is less 
elastic than the other, than the sale price in the market with less elastic demand will be higher. 
                                                 
 




In the context of international trade, the price discrimination is termed as dumping only when 
the sales price of the products in home country is higher than the export price of the products. 
From an economic perspective, the market condition is an essential element but not sufficient 
to bring about price discrimination. There are still two preconditions for a firm to engage in 
international price discrimination.  First, the firm should have a strong monopolistic - or at 
least oligopolistic - position in its home market. It is assumed that firms can only manipulate 
the price in both home market and foreign market when they possess sufficient market power 
in their home market. Without such power, any price differential for merchandise products in 
at least one of the markets would not be within their control.  Second, firms must be also 
protected from foreign competition at home-market by certain kinds of trade barriers. Only in 
such circumstances, firms would face less elastic demand for its products in its home market 
than abroad and will respond to that discrepancy by charging a higher markup at home than 
abroad. If the extra costs of foreign sales are not too high, the actual price firms charge will be 
lower in foreign market and this is regarded as dumping. 
It is also necessary to differentiate between dumping and the granting of official export 
subsidies. Although both practices may cause certain distortions in price order in the market 
of importing country, they are distinct in the sense that dumping relates only to private 
initiative to discriminate the price between markets. Export subsidies are related to 
government support in the form of export bounties for exporters. Besides, the export subsidies 
need not necessarily result in price discrimination even though the final result often does. The 
two practices are usually regulated by separate legislation. Within the WTO framework, the 
terminology of the measure in response to export subsidies is countervailing duty as distinct 




Beside the international price discrimination, dumping is also defined as exporting of products 
at a price below cost of production. The exports below costs must be subsidized with other 
sales above cost either at other times or in the other market (usually in the home market) or 
otherwise firms would be conducting their operations at a loss. On the surface this condition 
for transnational sale-below-cost is not much different from international price discrimination. 
Hence, the sale- below-costs is often associated with unfair business practices because the 
incentive of competitive firms is profit maximization. They cannot maintain unprofitable sale 
without purpose. The sale-below-cost is considered as self-evidence that the exporting firms 
will raise its price in the future after eliminating competitors in the targeted market and thus 
achieving market dominance in order to recover their costs. This predatory business practice 
is not healthy for competition.  
1.2.1.2. Legal Definition of Dumping 
Dumping has become subject of national legislation since 1904 with the introduction of the 
first statute aimed specifically at dumping by Canada. 9  However, at the early stage of 
development this term was defined differently in each national jurisdiction. Some countries, 
i.e. Canada (1904), New Zealand (1905), Australia (1906) and South Africa (1920) defined 
dumping as the case where merchandise was lower than its fair market value in the exporting 
countries.10  While the US Anti-dumping Act 1916 defined it as a criminal action of importer 
to sell the imported merchandise at prices less than their actual market value in the country of 
                                                 
 
9  Viner, J., “Dumping”, supra note 6, p. 192; see also Dale, R., “Anti-dumping law”, supra note 2, p. 12 




production with the predatory intent of destroying or injuring the local industry.11 Many 
countries, i.e. Canada and UK, during the inter-war period (prior to the Second World War), 
even associated dumping with a situation in which a country increased its export 
competitiveness through an effective depreciation of its currency – so called “exchange-
dumping”.12 This kind of dumping is not at all related to the price discrimination or dumping 
in the economic sense.13  
Only after the Second World War, the legal definition of dumping has become gradually 
standardized, a result of the negotiation between nations over the establishment of a post-war 
international trade arrangement. It was against this background that in 1948 the General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) took up the subject matter and formulate the first 
international definition on dumping.  
After the establishment of the World Trade Organization, the international community has 
accepted that the standard legal definition of dumping is contained in Article VI of the GATT 
and Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT (commonly known as the Anti-
dumping Agreement).14
                                                 
 
11  US Anti-dumping Act 1916, (15 U.S.C. § 72): “It is unlawful to any person … to import, sell or cause to be 
imported … articles within the United States at a price substantially less than the actual market value or 
wholesale price of such articles, at the time of exportation to the United States, in the principal markets of 
the country of production, or of other countries to which they are commonly and systematically 
exported…[if] such act or acts be done with the intent to destroying or injuring an industry of the United 
States”.  See also Dale, R., supra note 2, p. 12 
12  Dale, R., “Anti-dumping law”, supra note 2, p. 13 
13  Ibid. 
14  With the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1994, all the member countries are required to 
bring the national legislations to conform to the relevant multilateral agreements of the organization. To that 





Article 2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement (ADA) outlines the legal concept of dumping, 
stipulated as follows: “A product is to be considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the 
commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported 
from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the 
like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country. 
…When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic 
market of the exporting country or when, because of the particular market situation or the low 
volume of the sales in the domestic market of the exporting country, such sales do not permit 
a proper comparison, the margin of dumping shall be determined by comparison with a 
comparable price of the like product when exported to an appropriate third country, provided 
that this price is representative, or with the cost of production in the country of origin plus a 
reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits”. 
This definition implies that dumping is an action of selling products to the importing country 
at a price (export price) lower than the normal value of the products. The bases for 
determination of the export price and normal value depend on the particular situation 
prevailing in the country of origin or exporting country and the importing country. “Normal 
value”, in the primary sense of Article 2.1 of the ADA, is equivalent to domestic market price 
of the product in the country of origin or exporting country, or the supplier’s export price to a 
third country or the cost of production in the country of origin. The comparison between this 
price and export price conforms to the economic definition of dumping. The legal definition 




Overall, the legal definition provided in Article 2 of the ADA is fairly similar to the economic 
definition of dumping discussed in the previous sub-section. It implies that the legal concept 
of dumping can be assessed through the economic analysis. 
1.2.2. Economic Analysis on Dumping 
1.2.2.1. Price Discrimination 
In order to facilitate the economic analysis of dumping, economists usually propose motives 
or rationales which support the dumping practices. Accordingly, there are various business 
motives that encourage firms to maintain for certain period of time two different prices in two 
different markets: 
First, firms may consider applying dual price system in two markets for promotion purpose. 
For instance, when they want to enter a new foreign market (separated with its home market 
divided by certain trade barriers) where their product has no reputation, they may choose a 
strategy to maintain a lower than normal price in the new market (but still at a profitable 
level) for certain period to make the product known to consumers in the new market. This 
motive of dumping has no intention to eliminate competition in the new market. Similarly, 
when the exporting firms have no information about the new markets, this situation may lead 
firms to make decisions on price in contracts before export costs are fully known. The 
relevant prices may end up lower the than the normal selling price in the home market or even 
lower than the variable costs, however this situation represents a wrongful evaluation of the 
costs rather than a decision not to cover the marginal costs. This sale price is presumably not 




Second, the price discrimination may be applied in order to achieve economies of scale. If 
prices of the products are controlled (by private monopolistic power or by government 
intervention) in the domestic market, the reduction of price occasioned by increased output 
may take place only in the foreign market. In that case, the exporter applies two different 
prices for the products on the assumption that his action will have negligible effect on other 
companies’ sales prices.  
Third, exporting firms may also decide to maintain price discrimination when they are already 
in the market. Such behavior may be facilitated by the fact that price of the products in the 
home market is regulated by either private cartel or governmental influence but it need not be. 
Fourth, another motivation of the firms to apply dumping is when they face a surplus in 
production. In that case they may try to maintain domestic price, by disposing or exporting 
surplus production to a foreign market, while continuing to produce at full capacity. Again, 
the business behavior can be considered as normal if the export price is still slightly higher 
than the marginal cost or over all lower than the average cost.  
Finally, firms may cut prices for their exports in order to establish market power in a foreign 
market. An exporting firm with sufficient market power in the home market may utilize 
profits reaped in the domestic market to finance (cross-subsidization) export sales at abnormal 
low–prices with a view to eliminate competitors in the importing  country so as to  eventually 
gain the monopolistic profits there. This strategy is known as “predatory pricing”.  
For most of the above mentioned hypotheses, the business rationales of firms are quite 
acceptable standard for competition among firms. Economists only strongly condemn 




competition and welfare of the society. However, according to economic analyses, successful 
predation only can take place when the predatory firm has sufficient market power to 
withstand the price-cutting losses in the initial stages of predation to recover it at a later stage. 
It is also held that predation is not possible in a situation of liberal market without import 
barriers. These difficult conditions make a predation extremely difficult nowadays. However, 
neither information nor market structure is perfect all over the world. Thus, trading states 
should be aware of international predatory pricing in order to act against it. 
Again, the problem in the above mentioned patterns are not based on the fact that there is a 
difference in prices between the two markets itself, but rather the condition in the market is of 
less elasticity and high level of concentration. It is the highly protected exporting market that 
creates favorable condition for price discrimination. 
1.2.2.2. Sale-Below-Cost 
In order to facilitate the economic analysis of dumping as sale-below-cost it is important to 
first distinguish various definitions of cost. The most important distinction, from the 
economic theory, is between “average-cost” and “marginal-cost”. Average cost, also known 
as fully allocated cost, includes all costs incurred by the firm divided by number of units it 
produces. Economists might further classify the average cost into “average-fixed-cost” and 
“average-variable-cost”. Variable-costs are said to be those which vary with output, 
meanwhile, fixed-costs are those which do not. Marginal cost refers to extra costs needed to 
produce an extra unit of production. 
From the economic point of view the common formula of business activities of firms is to 




yield at least the extra costs of producing that extra product (marginal costs of production). As 
marginal costs are covered, producing at a price where at least some of the fixed-costs are 
recouped can be considered a rational business practice. Otherwise, firms would engage in an 
abnormal business practice which can distort market order and thus should be condemned and 
restricted. 
Although, in theory, it seems fairly easy to explain such behavior, in practice, the assessment 
of business behavior of firms is a highly complex issue, especially in the context of 
international trade. It is mainly because structure and allocation of costs vary with different 
countries, management models, accounting methods, social institutions, culture, and 
legislation. Moreover, in a multi-product, multi-national company, the identification of such 
costs becomes even more difficult.  
It is submitted that in order to make an even-handed assessment of the issue of sale-below-
cost in the international setting, it is highly significant to have a proper adjustment made to 
the national differences. However, that is not an easy task because it requires a deep 
knowledge and information about the cost of production, manufacturing process and business 
tradition of a foreign country. Finally, the proper level of costs which is rational to derive at 
when setting a price is also very problematic. There is no consensus between economists as to 
which cost must be taken as criteria or parameter for what constitutes “cost of production” in 
order for one to determine whether a price really covers its costs of production.15 Some 
                                                 
 




economists would refer to sales below marginal costs, while others would insist that average 
costs should be covered.16
Provided the above mentioned technical issue is settled, the other concern of the economic 
analysis on sale-below-cost dumping is the economic rationale behind this private 
merchandise practice. Economists suggest some rationales for sale-below-cost in international 
trade: First, the prices can fall below-average cost when the exporting country undergoes a 
recession. Under that situation firms can charge prices that do not fully absorb fixed costs nor 
incorporate a profit margin (as firms will produce as long as prices are high enough to pay for 
all variable costs and recover part of the fixed costs). Of course price can also fall below 
production cost when an aggressive firm engages in predatory pricing in order to establish 
monopoly position in a foreign market. However, as mentioned in the above section, 
predatory pricing is rarely practiced nowadays in international trade.17  
Second, firms might aim at achieving market shares in importing country instead of getting 
profits (therefore selling below total variable costs) without any intention of eliminating local 
competitors. The purpose of this sale is to make their products known to consumers with the 
assumption that the sale price will soon change to cover the full costs. It is widely accepted as 
common business promotional activity of firms both in domestic and international settings. 
However, the duration for such sale should be short otherwise it will eliminate domestic 
producers and thus turns into predation. 
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Third, the sale-below-cost might also happen due to reason of demand compensation. As 
production is planned in advance (by contract) and fixed costs are either unchangeable or 
capacities may be difficult to adjust, firms may decide to compensate for a temporary 
reduction of demand on the domestic market by increasing exports. In the presence of 
fluctuations in demand, it is reasonable to assume that it will make no sense for firm to adjust 
the capacities. 
Fourth, firms with high fixed costs might seek to bring down these costs on a per unit basis by 
spreading costs over the largest volume of sales they can capture. When the market in the 
country of export goes through a downturn, this phenomenon tends to be more pervasive, as 
firms use export sales to compensate for the drop in domestic sales and hence keep average 
fixed costs under control.  
There are thus a variety of economic rationales explaining the sales-below-cost even in 
perfectly competitive environment. Economists generally agree to rationales of most cases of 
dumping, except predatory dumping,18 which are economically sound and are thus acceptable 
business behavior among competitors. It is argued that if price discrimination or sale-below-
cost under certain conditions is acceptable in competition between domestic firms, such 
behavior should be considered as normal between domestic and foreign firms as well. Thus, 
to brand dumping in general as “unfair” practices and to remedy it with anti-dumping 
measures is actually to protect domestic firms from natural competition, which is undesirable 
from the economic perspective. 
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 1.2.3. Welfare Impact of Dumping 
Dumping as an international business phenomenon should be distinguished from the normal 
price discrimination practice within national boundary for two reasons: first, international 
trade creates special opportunities for discriminatory pricing; and second, the welfare 
implications of dumping are different in that it is customary to regard each country rather than 
the world as a whole or a single welfare unit.19
Therefore, to examine the welfare effects of dumping, it is necessary to consider the matter 
first of all from the point of view of the importing country and subsequently from the point of 
view of the exporting country. In doing so, it is easier to observe the effects of dumping on 
income distribution, output and competition (although in the case of the importing country 
effect on output is not of much relevance). 
1.2.3.1. Impact of Dumping on Importing Country 
It is often said that the problem of dumping for the importing country revolves mainly around 
the conflict of interests between competing local producers and local consumers generated by 
redistributive effects of low-priced imports.20 Dumped products like any other low-price 
imports directly benefit the consumers. They can enjoy cheaper products. From this angle 
dumping can improve the condition and the saving of consumers. On the other hand, dumping 
practice can also contribute to reduction of output and profitability of local competing 
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manufacturers. 21  It subsequently will lead to a decrease of investment flows into those 
affected industries as shareholders will forfeit their dividends. If the domestic producers are 
forced to lay off their plants their workers might become unemployed. Thus, dumping not 
only affects local industry but also contributes to a number of economic and social problems 
to importing country.  
The main emphasis of the analyses of the impact of dumping should, however, be vested in 
the context of competition. The conventional economic view of dumping, which was 
proposed by Jacob Viner, considers that dumping can benefit the importing country when it is 
continuous or permanent, but is potentially injurious to competition as well as net welfare of 
importing country when it is discontinuous or of relatively short period. Accordingly, short-
run (intermittent) dumping is damaging to direct competitors and to the importing country as 
a whole because it may lead to the misallocation of resources in adapting to a situation 
incorrectly considered to be permanent.22 Viner wrote in regard to this matter as follows: “… 
short-run dumping, whatever its objective, may result in serious injury to or even total 
elimination of the domestic industry. The gain to the consumers may not be nearly great 
enough to offset the damage to the domestic industry… The dumping will be especially likely 
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manufacturers. This is, however, no more an argument against dumping than it is again free trade”. 
22   Viner quoted a passage from William Smart to demonstrate that benefit of cheap imports caused by 
intermittent dumping to consumers is much less than the detriment to the producers and his employees: “… 
at any moment, a manufacturer may be put on short time, because a good line is snatches from his fingers 
by foreign firm which wishes to get rid of its surplus. But as the dumping is intermittent, employers do not 
sacrifice their fixed capital and change their trade. They hang on, hoping that it will stop. They go on short 
time – which means waste of fixed capital, waste of organization, waste of labor… Our manufacturers may 
deserve well of the community. They may have done all that men can do; kept profits low and prices low. 
They does not seem healthy that, for no fault of theirs, they should now and then be thrown idle”, Viner J., 




to result in a net loss to the importing country it serves in which it brings about later the 
establishment of abnormally high prices.” 23
While Viner’s argument has greatly contributed to the analysis of dumping it misses one 
important element for economic evaluation – the comparative efficiency of firms. It is natural 
that discrimination against rivals at primary-line of competition24 will lead to the elimination 
of some competitors. However, from the economic perspective, the elimination of less 
efficient competitors is quite desirable for society. Regarding this issue, Richard Dale argued 
that international price discrimination, even when intermittent, will only eliminate inefficient 
competitors: “If domestic producer is forced to idle his plant, however, this must mean that 
his short run marginal cost is above the price of the dumped imports, while if we assume that 
the foreign importers is a profit maximiser / loss-minimiser then his export price must be at or 
above his own short-run marginal cost. Accordingly, the domestic producer’s short-run 
operating costs are above those of his foreign competitor and, so long as there is excess 
capacity in the industry, the foreign exporter must be regarded as more efficient of the two”.25 
He further added: “if… foreign exporter is not maximising profits / minimising losses, but has 
priced his exports below short-run marginal cost, then his behavior may be viewed as 
predatory”.26 Thus, it is the price discrimination with predatory intention of firms that harms 
the competition. 
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24  Economists categorize the competition between firms into two levels: (i) Primary-line competition refers to 
competition between the competitors at the same level of trade, who sell the products to the same category 
of consumers and (ii) Secondary-line competition refers to competition between competitors, who are 
beneficiary of the sale prices of the products. See also Dale, R., “Anti-dumping law”, supra note 2, p. 23-27;  
25   Dale R., “Anti-dumping law”, supra note 2, p. 29. 




Various aspects of this simple evaluation, however, remain difficult to concede. For instance, 
it is quite hard to say exactly what an efficient competitor is? What is efficiency? How to 
identify when domestic firms are as efficient as the foreign dumpers? How long the 
competitor is supposed to cope with reduced prices? Is the concept of “short-run cost” 
appropriate to identify efficiency of competing firms or “long-run cost”? How to distinguish 
the merits of competition from predation? Some scholars propose to apply predatory tests 
used in domestic competition law to solve the problem since they claimed to be able to 
distinguish non-efficient competitors from efficient competitors. However, this solution is not 
very efficient because of the difficulties in the application of such tests in the context of 
international trade (a more detail discussion on this issue will be discussed in later section of 
this Chapter). Since the effects of dumping on primary-line competition are difficult to 
determine and controversial it deserves a specific assessment in each situation.  
Hence, in the international context dumping seems to be beneficial to the secondary-line of 
competition27 located in the importing country. The presence of low-price imports of certain 
products, such as raw materials or intermediate goods can promote the business of domestic 
producers that are using them (downstream producers). As a consequence, downstream 
producers in the importing country will have the advantage over their competitors in the 
exporting country, and possibly elsewhere. In history, this beneficial aspect of dumping was 
shown in numerous cases.28  
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dumped European beet sugar; (ii) the prosperity of the Dutch shipbuilding, machinery industries prior to the 




An important conclusion to be drawn from the above mentioned welfare implications of 
dumping for the importing country should not be assessed solely from the position of 
competing industries. There are other groups in the importing country that can benefit from 
greater choices and lower prices. Even if it were to be accepted that dumping prices are 
presumptive evidence of temporary cheapness, it should by no means follows that all 
dumping should be condemned and prohibited. Temporary cheapness which reflects natural 
competitive behavior may well be beneficial to the importing country. 
1.2.3.2. Impact of Dumping in Exporting Country 
As it was analyzed earlier, exporting firms can conduct international price discrimination only 
when they can sell their products in the home market at high price in order to compensate for 
the low exporting price.29 Countries with less elastic market and of international pattern of 
price discrimination, the less elastic market or the market which market power concentration 
is restrictive of business practices, would tend to support higher prices, although this is 
obviously to the adverse effect of local consumers and industrial users.30 It is because the 
main idea of keeping a ‘secure’ market is to encourage local firms to pursue aggressive 
production and expansion decision. Naturally, with a strong guarantee of home profits, firms 
are encouraged to dump abroad in order to expand their market. By expanding the export 
market, they ensure a certain increase of output and greater investments. Moreover, by using 
dumping strategy firms can depress the profit margins of competitors in foreign market and 
reduce their funds available for investment in research and development (R&D) and 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
advantage conferred on the Welsh tin-plate industry at the turn of the century by the dumping of steel by the 
United State Steel Corporation.  
29  See Chapter I, Section 1.2.1.1 




marketing. All this factors eventually will lead to the promotion of industrial and economic 
development in exporting country. In this sense, the benefits to the producing industry by 
dumping will exceed the losses to consumers.  
It will be advantageous for competing firms of exporting country to form an export cartel in 
order to exploit their collective monopoly power in foreign markets and thereby secure an 
improvement in the exporting country’s terms of trade. There are numerous cases where such 
national export cartels are encouraged and supported by the national governments during 
certain period of development. For instance, before 1995 Japanese automobile producers 
faced almost no import competition in the home market due to a range of public and private-
sector trade barriers. According to Mastel, throughout the period of 1985-1995 the level of 
import in Japan as a percentage of total Japanese automobile sales remained in the low single 
digit.31 The market power in the home market was a strong rear for Japanese automobile 
companies to expand their export markets. A similar approach has been taken by Korean and 
Taiwanese government with regards to memory chips manufacturing during the late 1980s - 
early 1990s.32
The main objection to dumping from exporting country’s position is that it originates in and 
therefore signifies the existence of monopoly power in the home market. But this objection 
may be weak if this monopoly can create favorable basis for industrial and economic 
development of a state. It explains why the governments of exporting country are not 
interested in destroying the export cartels and restricting dumping initiated by their firms.  
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 1.2.3.3. Concluding Remarks on the Welfare Impact of Dumping 
Overall, it can be concluded from the above analysis that dumping is not totally irrational and 
unfair business behavior as it is often condemned by some trade authorities and politicians. 
There are various rational reasons that explain why firms may choose to discriminate price 
between two markets or sell below full cost of production. Besides, the economic analyses of 
price discrimination show that these practices in some cases would contribute to the increase 
of overall welfare of the importing country. However, dumping can well distort the market 
balance in importing country and hurt the business of local firms and consumers under certain 
circumstances. More importantly, it creates negative effects on the resource allocation and 
condition for fair competition in both importing and exporting countries. Thus, this practice 
should be controlled. Therefore, it is important to have a balanced view towards the trade 
policy against dumping in order to maximize the welfare implications of the measures in 
connection with trade liberalization and economic development. 
1.2.4. Rationales of Anti-Dumping Laws 
Considering the above economic analysis on dumping, which shows that dumping is not 
altogether “unfair” but also has positive impact on the welfare of the economy, it is necessary 
to ask why WTO legal system contains restrictions on dumping. Why are there so many 
jurisdictions out there in the world in support of anti-dumping laws? Obviously there should 
be reasons for such widespread adoption of laws which do not comply with the economic 




1.2.4.1. Economic-Efficiency Arguments 
The most frequently offered justification for anti-dumping laws is the prevention of predatory 
effect of dumping. This argument is based on the premise that dumping might drive out from 
the market all the domestic competitors and thus helps the foreign producers to establish 
international monopolies, which permit them to charge inflated prices without fear of 
competition. Predation involves short-term gains to the consumers but leads ultimately to the 
failure of domestic producers and exposes the consumers to monopolistic prices.  
However, the major problem with predation is that there is no unified definition, both 
nationally and internationally, for what would constitute such a behavior. Sale-below-cost is 
usually mentioned as a proof of predation. However, as it was mentioned earlier in the 
economic analysis of dumping, selling below-cost is not per se predatory. Besides, a firm 
needs not have a sale-below-cost to have predatory intent. A number of experts have 
expressed their doubt on the likelihood of predatory dumping in the modern world.33 There 
are several inter-related reasons to argue against the successful predatory dumping: first of all, 
there should be trade barriers segmenting the markets and imperfect competition structure in 
the markets, otherwise firms cannot prevent consumer stockpiling products during the 
predatory pricing phase as well as they cannot exclude the re-entry of other international 
competitors in the later period when they raised the price. There should be an imperfect 
domestic market characterized by high degree of market power concentration also because 
only under this condition firms can charge higher prices in domestic markets and use that 
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rents for price discrimination internationally. Other difficulty for successful predatory pricing 
in international market includes the need for the dumped product to exhibit high inelastic 
demand in order to prevent consumers from simply switching to a substitute product.34  
Finally, predator firms must have and be able to maintain strong market power. Since predator 
firms have to take losses on all current sales in the hope of uncertain profits in the future, they 
should have very strong dominant position not only in their home market but also in the 
global market in their industry. Otherwise, third country competitors will move in and bring 
down the prices again upon post-predation period. Overall, international predation is a costly 
strategy and therefore may be difficult to be a popular choice of firms.  
Although such situations are rare but they might still take place. A potential problem that one 
can refer to is when exporting firms are able to take losses on this product by "cross-
subsidizing" from other profitable lines. An example which one can refer to is the practice of 
Japanese keiretsu, whereby large business conglomerate often seem to sell certain lines at 
below-cost (however defined) over the medium to long-term. Mastel wrote: “As they begin to 
enter export market, Japanese industries almost universally begin to export at prices 
substantially below the prices charged in the home market… This is a fair summary of Japan’ 
actions in a number of sectors…, including semiconductors, photographic film, bearings, 
steel, and automobiles”.35 The business behavior of Japanese keiretsu, definitely, cannot be 
explained by the standard economic rationales. The fact that large corporations or 
conglomerates use the strategy of pouring money from profitable products into other products 
to expand the market share can be reason to believe the firms have predation intent. Although 
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this might be theoretically true, it is extremely difficult to produce evidence of a situation 
where predation at the international level has succeeded. 
While the argument on predatory impacts of dumping is disputable, some commentators 
suggest that dumping can still adversely affect the national economy in other ways. Anti-
dumping measures are necessary not to fight against international predation, but against the 
harm caused by sporadic or intermittent dumping.36 Sporadic dumping occurs when the price 
discrimination by the foreign exporters is not done on sustained basis. The exporters may 
enter the foreign market from time to time with their dumped products. As a consequence 
they create a situation whereby they sell products at dumped price for a few months at a time, 
and intermittently, then begin again afterwards. During periods of such kind of dumping, 
domestic producers are forced to exit the market temporarily or adjust their price to the level 
of price offered by the dumped products in order to keep their presence in the market until the 
dumper leaves the market. Although foreign firms engaging in sporadic dumping may not 
intend to eliminate competitors from the market, their practice still brings about adverse 
effects to the market. Because of the domestic producers’ higher costs for retraining, the 
expansion of production facilities will be passed on to the consumer once the dumper exits the 
market. 37  Thus, sporadic dumping is harmful not only to domestic producers but also 
consumers, as the later may end up purchasing the product at a higher price in the long run. 
To that end the anti-dumping measures can be justified. 
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Trebilcock and Howse wrote: “An argument could be made that sporadic dumpers who 
would ordinarily be able to compete with domestic manufacturers might choose not to do so 
to purposely hurt domestic producers. If the foreign producer has deeper pockets than the 
domestic producer, it could successfully do so. In these circumstances, the foreign producer 
benefits not because it has a better product, nor because it is more efficient, but simply 
because it has access to more resources than does the domestic producer. In these quasi-anti-
trust circumstances, a stronger argument can be made for using anti-dumping legislation to 
restrict sporadic dumping”.38
However, these commentators consider the success of sporadic dumping dependent on the 
dumper’s ability to “substantially disrupt domestic production,” and on the existence of a 
consumer group that willingly substitutes foreign products for domestic products as the ebb 
and flow of sporadic dumping occurs.39 Critics have dismissed these phenomena as being 
fairly unlikely.40
Besides, it is also argued that sporadic dumping is motivated by rational business strategies. 
Foreign firms might charge low prices for their products only as a strategy of “learning by 
doing” when they enter a foreign market.41 The exporter’s rationale for such pricing strategy 
is to promote their products and not to maximize the market share. Besides, exporters might 
want to maintain economies of scale by operating at full capacity even in times of slack 
home-market demand. It maintains full capacity by dumping its excess output into its export 
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market.42 Accordingly, since sporadic dumping is motivated by rational business strategies, 
their practice should not be condemned. The commentators raise a question on why the 
practice, which is considered legitimate within the context of domestic competition, can be 
seen as an unfair in the context of international trade.  
In this regard Ross Denton explained: “The reasons why firms dump and why nations might 
wish to react are not necessarily connected. This might help explain why nations persist in 
bringing anti-dumping actions even though the alleged dumper is acting in an economically 
rational manner… [the] fact that firms dump to reduce inventory or to expand total output 
may be irrelevant from the point of view of the importing country.” 43
It can be said that most national legislations would only concentrate on protection of the 
interests of their nationals (e.g. protect domestic industries from possible injury or preserve 
domestic employment). How or why foreign firms decide to apply the price discrimination 
may be of the least concern of the law.  
1.2.4.2. Protection of Comparative Advantage 
It is also argued that anti-dumping law is necessary to maintain comparative advantage over 
foreign dumping. Foreign dumping creates an artificial rather than a true comparative 
advantage, in the sense that the low sale price of the product does not necessary result from 
cost-efficiency. The result is the distortion of the market signals to domestic producers 
because the prices suggest that adequate returns will not be achieved for the dumped product. 
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As a result the countries with a real comparative advantage will lose the capacity and 
capability to produce such products.  
Addressing this issue, Steward Terence wrote: “Left unchecked, the "false signals" which 
occur in cases of price discrimination or sales below cost can have a "snowball" effect on 
other producers’ decisions, creating a veritable avalanche of inefficiency in the market. If 
selling below cost is allowed to continue, other competitors (and potential competitors) will 
make business decisions based on this initial false market signal. They will fail to enter a 
product market, fail to expand capacity, fail to improve productivity, and fail to use all other 
resources efficiently, based on the other company’s ability to price below cost. There can be, 
and often are, multiple levels of economic inefficiency caused by these false signals. And 
although competitive pricing (and efficient resource allocation) may return at a later date, 
this only occurs after substantial loss in total economic growth, as companies in the 
competing industry and other affected downstream businesses disinvest and then reinvest 
more efficiently”.44  
This argument, however, can be argued from two positions: First, to start the argument with 
the assumption that low-price does not result from cost-efficiency is quite subjective and 
arbitrary. Dumping may result from price discrimination with both export and domestic prices 
well above cost of production. Secondly, if dumping is long-term, it is true that adequate 
returns cannot be achieved, that is to say it is not a distorted suggestion. In fact, the 
comparative advantage theory does not argue in terms of fair competition, but in terms of 
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aggregate welfare. As such, dumping practice may reduce the economic welfare, but it is the 
welfare of exporting country not the importing country.  
A more practical defense of anti-dumping law in the context of comparative advantage is 
suggested by Clarice Morgan45. According to her dumping may cause the fall of price in the 
market of importing country which is lower than the prevailing world market price and if the 
consumers in the market are price takers, “the prevailing price signals in the market will be 
distorted so as to stimulate overproduction of the exportable goods and underproduction of 
importable goods”.46 To that end the anti-dumping measures would be necessary to restore 
relative pricing to prevailing world market conditions, restoring efficient resource allocation. 
In other words, the anti-dumping law serves as “guarantor” for the true reflection of 
prevailing world market price on the domestic market.  
1.2.4.3. Social Consideration 
Another rationale of anti-dumping law, parallel to the above mentioned, is based on social 
considerations. It is argued that in the modern world governmental economic policies should 
not just be based solely on economic concerns, but also shared concerns for social welfare. 
Hutton and Trebilcock describe this perspective of the anti-dumping law as focusing on “the 
private non-pecuniary costs of the community and individual disruption which ensues when 
domestic production is displaced by low-priced foreign goods. The theory recognizes that 
personal identity derives in large part from various social and community attachments. To 
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disturb too many of these attachments, or to radically alter the nature of a community, may 
impair the welfare of individuals as social beings. In our modern, rapidly-changing society, 
individuals are often left with comparatively few traditional attachments to institutions such 
as family and religion, and job displacement may be particularly traumatic to the individuals 
and communities concerned.”47  
The harmful effect of the collapse of a domestic industry because of foreign dumping is not 
limited only to workers of that particular industry who lost their jobs after the employers have 
been bankrupted, but the entire communities can be devastated by the loss of those jobs. Since 
unemployed workers no longer have income to purchase goods and services from local 
industries, the worker’s family will also be affected by their unemployment (even if it is only 
temporary). The countries which pursue the socialist orientation in the development policy, 
such as Vietnam, this aspect of the law can play an important role. In short, to confine the 
analysis of anti-dumping law to concerns of economic efficiency alone without taking into 
accounts these less tangible values is not appropriate. 
1.2.4.4. Maintenance of Fair Competition 
It is also argued that the anti-dumping laws are there to ensure a fair-competitive-market 
place. In this context, protecting free competition should lead to similar outcomes as 
competition law. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the latter sub-section of this 
Chapter. 
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The concept of fair competition in anti-dumping law is related to the idea that competition is 
enhanced by dumping only if it is non-injurious and results in an extra supplier being added to 
the market. Therefore, dumping is harmful only if it undermines the productive capability of 
the domestic industry.  
As such, there are controversial arguments whether the objective of anti-dumping action is to 
be restricted to protect what is “fair” for domestic producers in competition with foreign 
imports or it should also be extended to consumers. Often the economic criticism against anti-
dumping law is about the lack of emphasis on the protection of fairness for all participants in 
the market. 
Still it is argued that anti-dumping system is necessary to restrict unfair commercial practices 
distorting competition. In this context, "unfair commercial practices" could have more than 
one meaning. It could, for example, refer to the practices of a foreign firm that is able to dump 
because it is protected from competition in its domestic market. Alternatively, "unfair 
commercial practices" might refer to the business conduct of overseas exporters in a more 
general sense. If, for example, it means anti-competitive practices, then some form of 
government intervention can be justified.  
It could also be argued that fair-competitive-market place should also provide the chance for 
more competitors to enter the market so that there would be more competition and lower 
prices with more suppliers in a market. This argument has merit if:  
• The elimination of domestic producers would eventually lead to the domestic market 




• The local industry is internationally uncompetitive (because they are newly 
established or under the process of restructuring) but, if given some time to adjust, 
could become competitive.  
The main reasoning of this argument on the rationale for anti-dumping regime in the context 
of fair competition is no different from the reasoning against "international predation” 
discussed above. The remaining reasoning is more relevant to the discussion of national 
industrial policy than protection of fair competition. However, if the domestic producers can 
survive only because of the protection valve of the anti-dumping measure then the prices of 
their products are likely to be less competitive. Consumers and the economy would be better 
off by allowing market forces to prevail, even if that led to a reduction in the number of 
suppliers. In any event, in most jurisdictions the imposition of anti-dumping duties is based on 
injury to competitors not injury to competition, and in the absence of an appropriately 
elaborated public interest assessment mechanism, it is unlikely that this situation will change.  
1.2.4.5. Political Economic Rationale 
Another widely accepted rationale for the establishment of anti-dumping regime is the 
political role of this legal instrument in promoting the liberal trading policy. The existence of 
anti-dumping law can be an important element fostering national trade reform in various 
countries.  
Current development of world economy shows that trade liberalization is of great significance 
to all countries. Nevertheless, the process of diminishing the traditional trade barriers in order 
to establish an open-market is not necessarily supported unanimously. Trade liberalization 




international competition. Government of countries that have undergone substantial trade 
liberalization reforms knows well the obstacles that they should overcome when the reforms 
affected the interests of domestic producers who have strong political influence. In many 
countries with transitional economy, including Vietnam, this situation is even more critical 
since they still have a lot of state-owned enterprises which are closely related to ministries and 
government agencies. Those business entities therefore can have strong influence towards the 
government’s policy. 
Thus, from the political economic position, by introducing and maintaining trade remedy 
instruments, like anti-dumping, within the national legal system, government can persuade 
conservative political groups that their interests are guarded and protected against 
contingencies arising out of liberalization and tariff reduction. Besides the original function as 
a trade remedy instrument in response to foreign imports distorting the national market, anti-
dumping policy can be used to mitigate the socio political pressure from opponents of trade 
reform. In this sense, the existence of anti-dumping law and its functions are of great 
importance to trade liberalization reform policy. 
Hence, there is a strong criticism that the intensive application of anti-dumping measures 
during the last two decades is self evidence of the argument that anti-dumping law is 
equivalent to disguised means of protectionism to promote the liberalization process.48 Jorge 
Mirinda in this regards commented that “assuming, for the sake of argument, that this 
assertion is true, it is interesting to note that there is no substantial evidence as to whether 
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this alleged reversion of trade reform is very extensive, if measured in terms of import value 
affected by anti-dumping duties.” 49 Meanwhile, some empirical researches have shown that 
the total amount of imports affected by anti-dumping duties represented a very small fraction 
and seldom amounting to higher than 1 % of total import value.50 There is also evidence that 
the increase use of anti-dumping measure in some countries goes abreast with successful trade 
reform and economic development.51 Thus, the assumption that the increase use of anti-
dumping measures is tantamount to reversion of protectionism is not necessary substantive.  
In summary, anti-dumping law might have some drawbacks from the economic and 
competition allocation perspective, however, it is quite certain that anti-dumping measures 
cannot be modeled as if they were old ‘across-the-board’ tariff protection. At the same time 
anti-dumping regime can be used as an instrument to protect the domestic market against 
contingencies arising out of trade liberalization. Thus, it helps to mitigate the opposition of 
economic integration and trade liberalization policy. From the political-economic analysis the 
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role of anti-dumping law is extremely important as it can be a safety valve for trade 
liberalization, which would otherwise not be accomplished due to objections of the 
bureaucratic political fraction supported by some industrial sectors. Anti-dumping regime not 
only responds to critical economic needs but also helps to preserve political support for free 
trade. 
1.2.5. WTO Anti-Dumping Rules and Some Critical Issues Arising From National Anti-
Dumping Practices 
The regulations of the Article VI of the GATT and the Anti-dumping Agreement (ADA) 
creates an exception of the general principles of non-discrimination of the system by allowing 
the member countries to utilize special trade defense measure in the form of anti-dumping 
duties to offset foreign dumped imports in certain circumstances. However, it is important to 
note that the WTO does not prohibit dumping as such (it only condemns the dumping practice 
that causes or threatens to cause material injury to a domestic industry of the importing 
country). Furthermore, WTO also does not require member countries to have anti-dumping 
laws in their legal system. They are free to regulate or not regulate on all dumping practices 
that take place in their territory. Nevertheless, multilateral regulations on dumping agree that 
if member countries choose to take action against dumping, such action must be consistent 
with the requirement of the ADA. The regulating pattern of the anti-dumping law should 
include three main elements: (i) a dumping practice, (ii) an injury caused in the importing 






1.2.5.1. The Determination of Dumping and Dumping Margin 
As mentioned earlier in Section 1.2.1.2 of this Chapter, dumping can be defined by reference 
to a comparison between export price of the subject products and their normal value, which 
roughly means the price of like products in exporting country market. Hence, where the 
subject products are not sold in the exporting country or the sale is too little to use as basis of 
assessment of the normal value, the export prices can be compared with the selling prices 
found in other countries (third markets) or to “constructed” normal value composed of an 
evaluation of cost of production plus reasonable profits and administrative costs. 
Although ADA defines a number of criteria for identification of dumping, the national 
authorities are still given a wide discretion in determining the dumping and the dumping 
margin. This leads to a situation where national authorities intentionally manipulate the anti-
dumping rules in order to establish dumping.  
Dumping margin can be distorted when national anti-dumping authorities compare weight-
average of the normal value to the export (dumping) prices determined on a transaction-to-
transaction basis for the period of investigation. Until recently, one of the most criticized 
discretions by the national anti-dumping authorities in this regards is the use of the method 
called “zeroing” dumping margin determination. This method is to average the foreign price 
and compare the average price with the prices of individual sale in the importing market. 
However, only export prices below the average foreign price is used to determine the overall 




determination of dumping brought about several disputes at the WTO in recent years.52 A 
more detailed discussion on the issue will be analyzed in the context of the Vietnamese anti-
dumping legislation in Chapter IV of this thesis.   
The determination of dumping margin can also become extremely complex whenever the 
national anti-dumping authorities decided to construct the normal value of the subject 
products. The rules on assessment of “cost of production” are largely based on the concept 
and practice of Western countries. Meanwhile, cost allocation is a management decision 
which might be affected by various factors such as economic conditions, legal system, 
corporate culture and traditions. It is quite natural that the cost structure varies from firm to 
firm and from country to country. The cost of labor, the cost of direct and indirect 
manufacturing materials, expenses for sales and administration, expenditure for research and 
development (R&D) or discoveries, and the various modes of depreciation etc. can all mislead 
outsiders examining the costs of a firm for different purpose. Thus the standardizing formula 
for calculation of the cost allocation may not reflect the commercial reality and thus the 
outcome of the assessment can be arbitrary.  
An example of the limitation of the standardized method of calculation of cost is the case of 
calculation of labor costs in Japan and the United States and Europe. In the United States 
salaries for employees are variable cost, but in Europe, where laying off an employee cost two 
or three years worth of salary, the same type of expenses are considered semi-variable. 
                                                 
 
52  See EC - Anti-dumping Duties on Cotton-Type Bed linen imported from India, (EC-Bed Linen), Appellate 
Body Report, WT/DS141/AB/R, (01 June, 2001); United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology For 
Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), (US-Zeroing (EC)), Appellate Body Report, WT/DS294/AB/R 
(18 April, 2006); US — Measures relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, (US-Zeroing (Japan),  Appellate 




Meanwhile, in Japan salaries are considered as fixed cost since the large Japanese 
corporations have a tradition of lifetime employment for their workers.53 They are usually 
reluctant to lay off workers even when the demand is low. Japanese firms therefore would 
continue production and keep exporting their products at prices that producers in US or 
Europe considered as lower than the necessary variable costs.  
Is this Japanese business practice irrational? The finding now totally depends on the 
approaches of anti-dumping authorities conducting the investigation. From a particular point 
of view these Japanese firms are not predating because they do not sell under their variable 
costs. What is happening is that their sales reciprocate in tandem with their higher fixed costs. 
Pricing decision and cost of production can be influenced by many external and internal 
variables. Differences in accounting rules, social institutions and legal framework have a 
tremendous impact on the allocation of costs and on the decision to sell at a certain level of 
price. These differences are legitimate and thus should be included when comparing prices 
and costs of production However, the national anti-dumping authorities often ignore those 
facts when constructing the cost. Moreover, for the “convenience” of determination of 
dumping, the anti-dumping authorities usually prefer to use the so called “best available 
information which often means the information is given by their domestic producers. It is not 
surprising that the highest average dumping margin is produced when the “best information 
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available” rule is used as this information is frequently taken from the original petition.54 
Thus, the dumping margin calculation by national anti-dumping authorities is often inflated. 
1.2.5.2. Dumping Causation Determination 
As mentioned above, the principal concept of the anti-dumping system is that dumping can be 
subjected to trade remedy if it causes harm to the importing country. Article 2 of the ADA 
regulates that importing countries can impose anti-dumping duties only when they are able to 
identify that dumping causes or threaten to cause injury to their domestic industry. The level 
of injury has to be material. Experts at the time of the adoption of Article VI of the GATT 
seemed to have different opinions of the meaning of “material”. As such, in practice the 
material injury appeared to be of lesser degree than serious injury, which is the standard for 
the Escape Clause authorized by Article XIX of the GATT.55  
WTO anti-dumping rules require that determination of injury be based on positive evidence 
evaluated after consideration of the increase, even in relative terms, in the volume of imports, 
their effect on prices, and their impact on domestic producers.56 This means that although the 
volume of imported products subjected to dumping investigation might not increase, but if 
production volume of domestic producers decrease and thus creates the change in the balance 
between foreign imported and domestic products, national anti-dumping authorities might 
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curb the increase of market share of imported products on the ground of potential 
injury.57There is also strong criticism against the ADA injury determination requirement 
which focuses only on the interests of direct competing producers (first-line competition) in 
the importing country, and not that of consumers and industrial users of the like products. 
Article 3 of the ADA also does not, however, require the national legislation to take into 
account factors related to competition in the domestic market. The “threat of material injury” 
required is also criticized because it might serve as a means to prove dumping is injurious 
when evidence is lacking or insufficient to point to any level of material injury. The “threat” 
issue may represent a frustrating but insoluble problem within the WTO anti-dumping 
framework. 
In assessing causation, the ADA requires petitioners to demonstrate before the anti-dumping 
authorities that material injury to domestic industry is caused directly by dumped imports and 
not by other factors such as: contraction in demand, changes in the patterns of consumption, 
development in technology, export performance and productivity of domestic industry and the 
inefficiency caused by restrictive business practices in domestic industry or competitiveness 
of domestic producers. Most national anti-dumping laws, however, do not refer to restrictive 
business practices as a consideration when assessing injury. In addition, national anti-
dumping laws usually require the exporters and the importers (not the petitioners) to bear the 
burden of proving that injury to domestic industry is due to some other causes. 
Another issue of the injury determination regulation is the cumulation provision under Article 
3.3 and 5.8 of the ADA. This phenomenon is related to the practice of cumulative assessment 
                                                 
 





of injuries caused by multiple sources on the subject domestic industry. It is often criticized 
that under this cumulation method, countries with negligible export volumes, which by 
definition of Article 5.8 of the ADA would not be found sufficient to cause injury to domestic 
industry, are pooled together with other countries and eventually all of them become target of 
anti-dumping measures. The cumulation brings about a significant affirmative-finding bias to 
injury determination conducted by anti-dumping authorities. According to an empirical 
research done by Prusa, cumulation provision increased the probability of protection by about 
30%.58 A similar analysis by Tharakan on European Community cases disclosed an even 
higher probability of an affirmative decision as a consequence of cumulation to 42%.59  
Without cumulation, the outcome would have changed from a positive to negative injury 
finding by 50%.60 More importantly both researches revealed that cumulation has particularly 
negative effects on countries with import of small market shares.  
Despite the fact that ADA has tried to strengthen the regulations on the determination of 
injury, there are still many loopholes in the system which allow for certain arbitrary 
discretions by the national anti-dumping authorities.  
1.2.5.3. Anti-dumping Duties 
When all the previous conditions prevail – dumping and injury caused to domestic industry – 
the ADA allows the application of anti-dumping duties against the dumped imports.61 Since 
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the anti-dumping duties is a trade defense measure, which also has a function to promote 
trade, rather than a punitive measure the Article 9.1 suggests the member countries to impose 
the anti-dumping duties at a rate less than the margin of dumping, where a lesser duty is 
sufficient to remove injury. However, that requirement is not compulsory which meant 
member countries can also choose to apply the duty in full compared to dumping margin. 
Some countries have included the public interest provision, which allows the anti-dumping 
authorities to consider the reduction of the anti-dumping duty rate when assessing its impact 
on the economy and domestic industry before making the final determination of the anti-
dumping duty. However, in many other countries, such as the United States, the anti-dumping 
laws specifically requires that the dumping duty must be equal to the dumping margin once 
the injury has been assessed.  
Anti-dumping duties are said to be a remedy for financial injury caused by products found to 
have been dumped. For the same reason, countries are required to terminate anti-dumping 
duty as soon as they are no longer needed and to review the situation when an interested party 
requests and proves such a need. The anti-dumping duty is only a temporary measure to offset 
foreign imports; therefore, under the Article 11 (3) of the ADA they should be phased out 
automatically after 5 years. Member country can apply for a shorter period if they have such 
desire. Nonetheless, the ADA allows an exception whereby the anti-dumping duties can be 
extended beyond the 5-year period based on the sunset reviews of the anti-dumping 
authorities of importing country, which concluded that the expiry of the duty would likely 
lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. This exception is subject to some 
criticism as it creates room for anti-dumping authorities to extend discretionarily the term of 




Imposing anti-dumping duties is a unilateral act of the state taken without prior consultation 
and directed against private firms and domestic importers. The duties should be imposed to all 
similar goods of any firms coming from the relevant country. Once a finding of dumping is 
established, the only recourse of exporters is to raise their export price in agreement to 
undertaking with the importing country trade authorities, to cease to export, or to have their 
own state initiate conciliation on a dispute settlement procedure. 
 
1.3. ANTI-DUMPING AND COMPETITION POLICY 
Many governments with anti-dumping mechanisms in place hold the assumption that they are 
pro-competition and promote a level playing field for all competitors. The Vietnamese 
government upon designing the anti-dumping legislation also asserted that its anti-dumping 
regulations should be used to preserve fair competitive market.62 Competition law and policy 
has greatly assisted national governments in preserving the fair competition in their home 
market. Thus, it is quite significant to see how anti-dumping regime in the development of 
pro-competitive anti-dumping system in Vietnam, using it as a trade remedy instrument 
against foreign imports to protect competition, might relate it to  national competition policy.  
1.3.1. Competition Policy: Objectives and Scope 
Competition policy or sometimes is referred to as anti-trust policy, includes all laws and 
administrative regulations that promote competition, deals with issues covering monopoly or 
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abuse of dominance, restriction of trade practices and other anti-competitive agreements, and 
regulation of combinations such as mergers, acquisitions, and buyouts.  
The concrete objectives of competition policies of countries in the world might be very 
different. The US competition policy has at various times sought to protect small and 
medium-sized enterprises against the expansion of trusts and cartels or, as political and 
economic trends change, to pursue a pure goal of economic efficiency. In the European 
Community, competition policy is concerned not only with promoting efficient production but 
also achieving the establishment of a single community market. In transitional economies like 
Vietnam, where the competition policies are being developed during the decentralization and 
transformation to market economy, the objective of competition policies is mainly to 
discipline the disorderly competition arising out of the abuse of government power by state 
officials to protect local interests or favored sectors or state-owned companies from 
competition (administrative monopoly) rather than market dominance of private firms. 
Nonetheless, most national competition policies would aim to protect consumer interests by 
ensuring contestable market and restricting economic concentration.  
Protecting market processes and rights to engage in business and trade were also accorded a 
high priority in national competition policies, as the following quotation from the joint World 
Bank and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study points 
out: “While many objectives have been ascribed to competition policy during the past one 
hundred years… The most common of these objectives is the maintenance of competitive 
process or of free competition, or protection of effective competition. There are seen as 
synonymous with striking down or preventing unreasonable restraints on competition. 




markets.”63 This quotation suggests that protecting economic freedom and the competitive 
process as well as ensuring the fairness in the market have historically been seen as objectives 
of national competition policies. 
Competition policies often emphasize the protection of competitive process as it will help to 
promote efficient resource allocation and thereby maximize the national economic welfare. It 
has been accepted widely that the most beneficial structure for any market is that of perfect 
competition, whereby firms should always aim at improving the productive efficiency in order 
to stay in the market. In a market without competition or lack of competition, such as with 
monopoly or oligopoly, the firms will be able to set a price far above its costs and have no 
incentive to improve the product. Therefore, if any firm or group of firms is founded to 
engage in an inappropriate degree of market power or anti-competitive practice, government 
can decide to utilize competition policies to address their anti-competitive behavior.64
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Generally speaking, national competition policies are frequently regarded as the state 
instrument to discipline domestic competition. The scope of national competition policy is 
only limited to domestic market and competition between domestic firms. The issue of 
territoriality limits the application of competition law in international market. National 
competition system does not provide legal ground for competition authorities to apply legal 
actions against the price undercutting practice of foreign based firms. At this point, some 
commentators argue that in the absence of competition policy measures against foreign firms, 
governments approach the anti-dumping measures as a convenient alternative to address the 
issue of unfair export practice of foreign firms distorting the competition in the national 
market.65 In other words anti-dumping should be regarded as a “hybrid of traditional tariff 
ideas and price discrimination theories of anti-trust law”66 was created partly to protect 
competition. However this assumption is debatable. 
1.3.2.  Anti-dumping Laws vs. Competition Laws  
Competition laws form the backbone for national competition policies. They lay down the 
rules for competitive rivalry in the national market. More specifically, the competition laws 
are the set of rules and disciplines maintained by the governments relating either to agreement 
between firms that restrict competition or to the abuse of a dominant position (including 
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attempts to create a dominant position through merger).67 As earlier mentioned, anti-dumping 
laws are the principal trade remedy instrument of the foreign trade policy of nations to 
discipline the private unfair trading practices (international price discrimination and 
transnational sale below cost) that distort the competition in the national market.  
Therefore, there is a perception that competition and anti-dumping laws share a common goal 
- to protect a fair competitive process in the market place. The original theoretical rationale 
for anti-dumping laws is to prevent predatory dumping by foreign exporters. Competition 
laws also discipline the predatory pricing of firms. However, unlike anti-dumping laws, which 
restricted the test on unfair business practices to pricing strategy of firms, competition laws’ 
test is based on conduct of firms. The concept of competition laws is that the price 
undercutting of rivals is only one of the important indications of predation. It is argued that 
the price difference may simply be the result of differences in productive efficiency. In such 
circumstances, the competition is healthy and in the overall interests of the economy, despite 
the negative impact on the less efficient firm. Therefore, it is required that the investigation 
against firms should target at distinguishing between intense price competition and true intent 
of predation, as only the latter warrants intervention. 
The interface between anti-dumping and competition laws is nowadays even far from 
showing complementary characteristics. As above mentioned national competition laws aim 
at promoting competition in the market place and ensuring that consumers are not harmed by 
private trusts and cartels. They are targeting primarily collusion, price-fixing, and other 
restrictive business practices. Anti-dumping laws and practices, on the other hand, are shaped 
                                                 
 
67  Hoekman, B. and Holmes, P., “Competition Policy, Developing Countries and the WTO”, World Economy, 




by other economic and political motives. They are designed to protect domestic industries 
from international price discrimination practice arising out of trade liberalization. To that end, 
the idea of “fairness” advocated under the anti-dumping laws may be very different from that 
of the competition policy. 
As a result of different objective and approach toward the issue of protective competition, the 
two legal systems have evolved along separate paths for more than half a century. Nowadays 
actual policies, substantive rights, and procedural standards of anti-dumping laws 
substantially differ from those of competition laws.   
The supporters of anti-dumping measure hold the notion of “fairness” as the foundation of 
anti-dumping system. However, the measure focuses mainly on protection of domestic 
producers’ interests damaged by foreign “unfair” trade practice rather than prevention of 
abuse of market dominance. Competition laws, instead, are designed to ensure that firms do 
not undercut the benefits of market integration by collusive behavior. Protection of the 
economic efficiency and the consumer interests are the main emphasis of the competition 
policy, whereas these factors are largely ignored by current anti-dumping laws. 
As a matter of fact, when a government has both anti-dumping and competition laws in place, 
they share an uneasy relationship in regulating a single market. Anti-dumping is a trade 
remedy for industries sustained by import competition. In contrast, the final goal of 
competition laws is to promote consumer welfare and productive efficiency, which in part 
depends on market contestability, wherein import competition often plays a role.68 In addition, 
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anti-dumping laws are more inclined to protect competitors (domestic competing industries) 
instead of competition. Thus, they may contradict the objective of preserving competition 
because protection of competition does not always call for the same policy as the protection of 
competitors. If the government intends to promote efficiency and prevent monopoly, the 
competition laws and policies would clearly be the superior instruments.  
Anti-dumping laws not only fail to supplement competition law, but on many occasions they 
may even facilitate certain practices which are supposedly disciplined by competition law. 
One of the clear examples of the conflict between the two legal instruments is the undertaking 
provision under anti-dumping laws. 
The undertaking is an agreement between the national anti-dumping authorities and exporters 
or importers of the subject products, whereby the later agree to raise prices or limit export 
volume in order to avoid anti-dumping duties. Although undertaking is often considered by 
national trade authorities as efficient approach to eliminate the dumping and beneficial to all 
parties concerned in the proceeding, it might well contradict fundamental concepts of 
competition because it results in increase of prices or restrain the volume of sales. The price 
undertakings, in particular, are argued to have similar effects as private price-fixing 
agreements, which should be subject to strict discipline under the competition laws. 
Anti-dumping, therefore, may facilitate collusion among exporters or between home and 
foreign firms. Many anti-dumping petitions in the US and EU are withdrawn before the anti-
dumping authorities complete their anti-dumping investigations. Prusa argues that anti-




into a collusive agreement exonerated from antitrust concerns because of U.S. trade laws.69 
Zanardi suggests that the decision to withdraw a petition depends on two key parameters: the 
coordination cost and the bargaining power of domestic and foreign industries. 70 . He 
constructs a model and employs econometric analysis with findings consistent with the 
hypothesis that the anti-dumping law is used as a collusive device.71  
Certain close relationship of anti-dumping and cartel can be seen from cases in jurisdictions 
with established anti-dumping and competition systems, such as the EC and US. According to 
Messerlin, nearly thirty of the EC anti-cartel cases initiated in the 1980s dealt with products 
that had also been involved in anti-dumping cases, which represented 25 % all anti-dumping 
cases initiated during this period.72 To a certain extent, Messerlin’s work shows that firms 
have been able to capture the EC anti-dumping system to protect their dominance position in 
the market against foreign imports. 73  It was shown that anti-dumping procedures were 
captured by the firms in four major steps: (i) the definition of the market, (ii) the 
determination of dumping, (iii) the determination of injury, and (iv) the duration of the 
measures.74 The work concluded that the EC anti-dumping actions were crucial to the survival 
of some cartels, with careful price and quantity control on imports, and the allowance of 
necessary time needed to enhance their capacity to generate stronger and more stable cartels. 
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1.3.3.  Summary 
Merely saying anti-dumping is a pro-competitive or anti-competitive device does not 
accurately describe the entire picture across time and jurisdictions. Given the above 
discussion, it is safe to say that anti-dumping laws play different roles in different ages and 
scenarios. Anti-dumping may functions to correct market distortion by foreign firms but it 
also can turns into a protectionist tool to hide domestic producers from international 
competition.  
Nowadays, in many countries, the major rationale to justify the use of anti-dumping measures 
is the political economic factor. Competition promotion seems no longer the main goal of 
anti-dumping mechanisms. Whether or not it promotes fairness is also questionable. It is 
evident that under certain circumstances anti-dumping can help domestic market powers 
survive and has the ability to facilitate cross-border collusion between domestic firms and 
foreign exporters. In this regard, anti-dumping mechanisms could be anti-competitive. Thus, 
there should be active measures to make the anti-dumping system become more competition 
friendly. 
1.3.4. Perspectives of Development of the Legal Regime against Dumping 
To correct the aberrant direction of anti-dumping law and practice some solutions have been 
introduced, as academics, economists, and lawyers address the issue vigorously. 
1.3.4.1. Replacement of Anti-Dumping Laws with Competition Laws 
Since the anti-dumping laws are not as efficient as the competition law in assessing and 




system which has extra-territorial effect. This requires each country to enforce the domestic 
laws to address harmful market structure and any restricted business practices irregardless 
whether those practices had taken place in its own market or abroad. This system works only 
when all members of the international community apply the law even-handedly, predatory 
pricing would no longer exist, and market forces would be allowed to determine competitive 
winners and losers in all markets. To ensure that such system work properly there should also 
be a strong organization to facilitate international competition, which would help the 
respective country adopt national competition laws and supervise the enforcement of the law. 
However, to develop an international unified competition code is quite difficult because each 
nation would pursue different competition policy. The WTO has tried to address this issue but 
without success. 
Without a global competition framework it is impossible to use the competition policy 
instruments in international economic relations. There are a number of reasons for such 
failure:  First of all, exporting countries will be reluctant to enforce competition laws on their 
own producers with the view of making producers in an importing country better off. 
Theoretically, active enforcement of competition policy might be both necessary and salutary 
for the exporting country (the elimination of monopolistic or oligopolistic position of business 
entity (ies) in the national market would help consumers in the exporting country to pay for 
the products at competitive and lower prices); however, in practice many dominant positions 
would originate from internal regulatory measures. Of course, these measures can be repealed, 





Secondly, since the importing country facing dumped imports cannot enforce competition 
laws in the exporting country, it has to rely on the latter to do this. The problem with this 
approach is that there is no worldwide consensus on competition rules and principles. As it 
was mentioned in the earlier section, the concrete objective of national competition policies 
might differ depending on the country’s specific economic reality and strategic development 
phase. Therefore, competition laws can be significantly different from one country to another. 
Given these differences, the authorities of exporting country may have different opinion with 
the importing country’s counterpart. The exporting firms may not be found enjoying dominant 
position or operating in acceptable competitive manners within the scope of the competition 
law and policy of the exporting country. Faced with this kind of reply, there is not much an 
importing country could do. This is a situation where both countries have competition laws 
and they are actually willing to apply them. Hence, it is evident that some major exporting 
countries do not have competition laws at all or very weak enforcement thereof. 
Thirdly, the realm of action of competition laws is limited also because of the fact that in most 
countries there is always a number of politically influential groups, which are able to succeed 
in obtaining a special exemption from such laws in the segments of the economy where they 
operate. Arguably, the special wavers provided for those special interest groups would mean 
high costs on consumers, but these welfare losses are taken as politically unavoidable. In 
other words, these exemption rules in competition laws can be seen by the state policy makers 
as a sort of "sunk cost" that permits the rest of the economy to remain open to competition 
laws (much as anti -dumping laws may allow trade liberalization to take root). One may find 
that the exemptions in competition law are provided on different bases and for different 




others they are applied for steel and mining industries. This suggests that any substitution of 
competition laws for anti-dumping laws can only be partial. Conceivably, one could end up 
with a two-track practice, where certain sectors of the economy are regulated through 
competition laws and others through anti-dumping laws. This branching is evocative of the 
one between the trade regime governing the special sector under exemption and the trade 
regime governing all others, and would run squarely against the efforts to treat all sectors 
under uniform rules.  
Furthermore, competition laws are a "poor man's" substitute for additional trade liberalization 
cum internal deregulation.75 If in fact the domestic market of the exporting country has been 
rendered uncompetitive by trade barriers and internal regulations, then one can argue that 
removing these measures is the most direct way to eliminate their effects. The application of 
competition laws appears to be a roundabout method, potentially fraught with serious 
problems of its own. Of course, in certain instances (e.g., natural monopolies), it is possible 
that further trade liberalization cum internal deregulation fails to bring about a greater degree 
of contestability in the home market. However, in these cases competition laws do not seem to 
be any more effective. One should emphasize that trade liberalization is prima facie a more 
viable option for improving the contestability of markets than competition laws. This is so 
simply because trade liberalization generally takes place as a result of negotiations. In this 
context, no country ever loses in net terms, since the "losses" arising from the elimination of 
barriers to imports are compensated through the "gains" coming from improved market access 
for export. By contrast, there is a good chance that an exporting country applying competition 
                                                 
 




laws on behalf of an importing country will perceive itself as an unambiguous loser since its 
enforcement of competition measures will not be matched in any way by the trading partner 
requesting such measures. 76  
The application of a cross-border competition system requires a high level of market 
integration whereby there are no more trade borders between countries and therefore not 
necessary to use any protectionist device. Under this circumstance, countries will likely agree 
to leave competition policies to deal with their intra-state-trade and competition issues. At this 
moment, such kind of economic integration can be found under the framework of regional 
trade arrangements. The best example is the European Union, followed by some free-trade 
agreements, such as New Zealand - Australia and Chile - Canada. However, the application of 
these models globally would probably be nearly as difficult as establishing an international 
competition authority with capacities to supervise the competition policy of individual 
countries and enforce sanctions against parties violating competition rules in each country.77
1.3.4.2. Establishment of a Filter System for Anti-Dumping Regime 
If the anti-dumping laws cannot be replaced or recast by the competition laws, the alternative 
solution is to introduce certain competition approaches into anti-dumping regime. It is in the 
opinion of author that the most practical solution for improvement of efficiency of the 
national anti-dumping system is to introduce certain filters to anti-dumping proceedings so as 
to reduce the discretion by anti-dumping authorities.  
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In regards to dumping and injury determination, it is proposed that some of practices that 
clearly give rise to much criticism should be strongly regulated. For instance, the anti-
dumping system should restrict the calculation of production costs based upon extraneous 
fixed factors and prescribes that the calculation of the dumping margin by way of comparing a 
weighted average normal value against individual export prices can only be done under very 
well-defined circumstances. In addition, the anti-dumping law should establish a sufficiency 
test that makes it relatively easy to determine normal value on the basis of the prices of 
domestic sales in the country of export even if such sales are very small in quantity. The 
prohibition of utilization of zeroing method of calculation of dumping can also positively 
contribute for improvement of efficiency of the anti-dumping system.  
Certain improvement could be done with regards to the concept of injury in anti-dumping 
proceeding. If anti-dumping law is to promote competition in the national market dumping 
should be found to be a negative impact on competition, not just on competitors. One way to 
pursue this goal is to use the tests that competition authorities would use in the national 
competition system to determine whether private business strategy of price discrimination or 
selling below cost is anti-competitive and violates the competition law. Indeed national 
competition authorities could be given the mandate to undertake such an investigation. 
Alternatively, competition authorities should have the right to be involved in deciding this 
issue because their expertise in implementation of competition policies can definitely help to 
evaluate the degree of effect on dumping and anti-dumping measures on competition in the 
domestic market. 
In addition, the national anti-dumping system should pay special attention to the development 




factor to reduce the discretion of national anti-dumping authorities. The review system will 
make it hard for anti-dumping authorities to sustain inappropriate decisions. 
Furthermore, national anti-dumping legislation may introduce a higher standard for anti-
dumping investigation. Many of the critics lose track of the fact that the ADA, while 
providing a common regulatory framework for all member countries conducting 
investigations, represents only a set of minimum applicable requirements. Hence, nothing 
prevents individual countries from establishing higher standards as long as they conform to 
the general rules provided in the ADA. For instance, these standards should not create extra 
burden for interested parties to participate and present their arguments during the anti-
dumping proceeding. This course of action provides more immediate benefits than seeking a 
multilateral upgrade of anti-dumping rules through  re-establishing the currently existing legal 
framework under the ADA 
Finally, the abuse of national anti-dumping law can be restricted by way of establishment of 
strong public interest test requirement in the anti-dumping investigation. From the economic 
analysis of the previous section of this Chapter it was found that the result of an anti-dumping 
duty is to transfer income from the rest of the community to domestic producers of the 
charged goods. Since consumption often exceeds output for an imported good, consumers 
lose more than producers are eligible to gain.78 In competition policies the consumer’s benefit 
is the main concern that can be extended to the anti-dumping system by incorporating a 
“public interest” clause into anti-dumping law. This would reintroduce competitive 
considerations into the anti-dumping process and change the general mode of practice of the 
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national anti-dumping authorities. Contrary to anti-dumping supposed primary objective of 
protecting producers, the “public interest” clause is interpreted as covering for user and 
consumer interests, thus causing the protectionist element of anti-dumping actions to decline. 
A firm implementation of this clause could cause governments imposing anti-dumping duties 
to favor the broader interests of the economy. Therefore, introducing, extending, and 
reinforcing considerations of public interest would render anti-dumping determinations much 
more competitive.  
Ross Denton wrote in support of this approach as follows: “The "public interest" system 
avoids the issue of whether reacting against the economically rational decision of firms is 
itself rational. As noted above, nations probably do not care why firms dump, but care, for 
example, very much about the effects that such actions have on the level of employment in 
domestic industry, or the long-term effect on the industrial base. By making the imposition of 
anti-dumping duties dependent on a closer examination of national interests at stake, the 
"public interest" system sidesteps the issue of whether dumping is or is not objectively 
harmful.” 79 
The underlying rationale of the public interest clause is to induce an impetus on the national 
anti-dumping authorities to act against dumping only when the country suffers a net loss. 
Establishment of an effective public interest mechanism within the national anti-dumping 
system can contribute most to the improvement of the efficiency of the anti-dumping regime 
without breaking the structure of this legal institution.  
 
                                                 
 





It can be seen from the issues mentioned in this Chapter that both pros and cons of the anti-
dumping law should be taken into account for the benefit of a pro-competition economic 
reform. But it is submitted that the criticisms of anti-dumping system are not the argument to 
deny the significance of this international trade remedy instrument, but merely conditions to 
ensure that the design and development of the regime is a successful and not a failure. These 
are also not reasons for non-adoption of anti-dumping law, just for the implementation it 
appropriately correspond to the national economic interests. It is submitted that anti-dumping 
measures can prevent foreign price discrimination practices in the domestic market and thus 
contribute to the progress of trade liberalization reforms and economic development. Hence, it 
is also evident that anti-dumping measures can be easily abused/ misused to protect inefficient 
domestic producers. Thus, in order to develop a pro-competition anti-dumping regime there 
should be both political commitment of the government and suitable institutional structures.  
The Government of Vietnam is concerned about the economic efficiency of the anti-dumping 
regime so to promote development of a fair competitive market, but it also interested in 
developing the strength of national manufacturing industries. It has developed a national anti-
dumping legislation corresponding with the latest development of the multilateral regulations 
on anti-dumping of the WTO. However, there are still a number of problems to be solved to 
make the system works consistently with the designed goals.  
This Chapter has sought to examine the theoretical controversies relevant to the economics of 
anti-dumping law as well as the relation of anti-dumping law and competition policy. These 
will serve as a theoretical ground for analysis of the anti-dumping regulations of Vietnam in 









The last two decades have been an extraordinary period for Vietnam. The country has 
undergone a dramatic transformation from a centrally planned economy to a “socialist-
oriented market economy”80 under the umbrella of the Doi Moi Policy. Importantly, after a 
long period of self-isolation, Vietnam has openly recognized the importance of international 
economic cooperation. The development of market economy together with proactive 
economic integration policy has resulted in a rapid economic growth in the country for the last 
decades. In the context of the booming national economy, the legal system must have self-
adjusted and developed to catch up with the emerging requirements of the situation. 
Meanwhile, the economic integration and participation in a number of international economic 
arrangements have both facilitated and forced the development of various trade-related laws 
in Vietnam. 
This chapter aims to introduce the background: historical, political and economic 
development in Vietnam since the “Doi Moi” (Renovation) reforms, to consider the political 
infrastructure within which anti-dumping law and policy, as an instrument to counteract 
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against unfair foreign practices and to protect competition in the national market, are 
developed and to reveal some problems in the system. This chapter will assist in better 
understanding the various realities within the Vietnamese legal system. It will contain a 
general commentary concerning the administration of the foreign trade law and an 
explanation of the domestic and international policy considerations that motivated the 
Government to develop and strengthen the unfair-trade regulatory system.  
 
2.2. THE “DOI MOI” POLICY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION  
2.2.1. Economic Reforms  
After the re-unification of the country in 1975, Vietnam began a “trial-and-error” process to 
find a suitable path of development. The Vietnamese policy-makers chose a Soviet-inspired 
centrally-planned model that resulted in underdevelopment of Vietnam’s economy. Under this 
system, the state and collective sectors, which were highly subsidized by the state budget, 
were the foundation of the economy. The private sector was totally ignored and isolated from 
economic activities. This system proved to be inefficient and costly, which lead to budget 
deficits and increasing foreign debt in the mid-1980s. The economic crisis reached its 
pinnacle in 1986, when the annual inflation rate reached a level of more than 774%81, and 
foreign debt reached more than USD 10 bil.82 During 1983-1986, Vietnam, an agricultural 
nation, had to rely on substantial imports to make up for the shortage of rice and other foods. 
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During the same period the economic aids from the Soviet Union, which formed an important 
part of the Vietnamese economy, was significantly reduced due to its own economic 
difficulties.83
In the end, the government was forced to adopt economic reforms to bring the national 
economy out of the crisis. The market-oriented reforms, known under the name of “Doi Moi” 
(Renovation) Policy, were adopted by the VI National Congress of the Communist Party of 
Vietnam (Party Congress) in 1986. Although there were some skeptical views against the 
reforms within the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) because of the 
recognition of market-value in the socialist economic policy, the reforms were still 
implemented and quickly brought positive changes in the economy. The Doi Moi reform 
policy has lead to the promulgation of a new constitution in 1992, in which “a multi-
component commodity economy functioning in accordance with market mechanisms under the 
management of the State and following a socialist orientation”84 has been recognized as the 
foundation of economic system of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.  
There are three principles which Doi Moi Policy is based on and which continue to guide the 
reform process currently, namely (i) a transition from a centrally-planned to a socialist 
market-oriented economy - aiming at modifying the economic structure by acknowledging the 
existence of many economic components, including the private sector and foreign ownership, 
and giving enterprises an active role and self-responsibility for their business efficiency, (ii) 
the democratization of social life, with the aim of developing the rule of law in a socialist 
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state of the people, by the people, and for the people, and (iii) the implementation of the open-
door policy and the promotion of cooperation and relations for peace, independence and 
development with all countries.85  
It is worth noting that the “Doi Moi” Policy has made a direct impact on economic 
development, especially the economic growth in Vietnam (see Figure 1). A look at Figure 1 
shows that the Vietnamese economy expanded by high and stable growth rates during the last 
two decades. More specifically, in 1986, the annual GDP growth rate was 2.84 %, but in 
1995, the economy had been improved considerably with a rather high GDP growth rate of 
9.54 % per year. Only during the period of 1997 – 2000, economic growth of Vietnam 
decreased to less than 5 % per year due to the impact of the Asian economic crisis. It should 
be noted, however, that during that period most economies within the region were seriously 
affected and the growth rate in some countries was even below zero. Since 2001, the economy 
had achieved a more stable development with an average GDP annual growth rate of 7.5 %.86  
In terms of macroeconomic stability, inflation has been reduced and fiscal deficits have been 
contained to acceptable levels. For instance, inflation rate was 774.7% in 1986, 4.5% in 1996 
and -0.6% in 2000 (see Figure 1). 
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 Source: Author’s, based on data from Vietnam’s GSO and World Bank (2007) 
Strikingly, Vietnam has been recognized as one of the most attractive places for foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in region. In 2006, real FDI capital in Vietnam accounted for around USD 
10 bil. There are now over 100 multinational corporations investing and doing business in 
Vietnam, playing an important role in widening the market, transferring technology, 
increasing export ability and increasing the economy’s effectiveness and competitiveness. The 
FDI sector has become a true part of Vietnam’s economy. According to recently released 
survey of the UNCTAD, Vietnam is ranked 6th among the world most attractive countries for 
FDI by factors favoring investment (2007-2009) after China, India, US, Russia and Brazil.87
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 Source: Author, based on the data from Ministry of Planning and Investment (2007) 
The economic performance of Vietnam in the period 1995-2005 was much better than that of 
any other transition countries. 88  It is also one of the most successful nations in Asia 
eliminating poverty. According to a report of the World Bank, during the period 1995-2005, 
the poverty rate fell from 57% to around 20%.89  
2.2.2 Doi Moi in Foreign Trade Policy  
One of the main bases of the success of Doi Moi Policy is the change in foreign trade policy. 
Right at the VI Party Congress, Nguyễn Văn Linh, the then VCP General Secretary and also 
the mastermind of the Doi Moi Policy, stated that reforms in foreign trade policy are among 
the “things that must be done immediately” (những việc cần làm ngay) by the government.90  
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The reforms in foreign trade policy, which were initiated in early 1989, had two main 
objectives. The first objective of the trade reform was to make the transition from a centrally-
planned to a market-based economy by: (i) liberalizing domestic prices so that they could 
correspond to the world prices, and thus play a progressive role in resource allocation; (ii) 
abolishing quantitative restrictions on import/exports and eliminating the state monopoly in 
foreign trade area by granting trading rights to private business entities; (iii) developing trade 
policy instruments such as tariffs, quotas and licenses; and (iv) removing exchange rate 
distortions. These reforms of the trading system were inextricably linked to reform of the 
enterprise sector to allow indirect regulation through market-determined prices to replace 
direct regulation of enterprise outputs. The second objective was to promote exports by: (i) 
developing export-oriented industries – through redressing the anti-export bias embodied in 
the protectionist regime while simultaneously improving the capacity and competitiveness of 
the manufacturing sector developed during the centrally-planned era; (ii) expanding and 
diversifying the export markets – through switching the focus from the traditional 
COMECON91 markets to other export market in the region and in the world. 
With adoption of the Doi Moi Policy, the changes in foreign trade policy have been 
remarkable. The core measures that have been taken under the trade reform policy include: (i) 
liberalization of the traditional trade restrictions on import-export activities to allow private 
sectors to participate in trade.92 (As a result of this reform, the number of foreign trade 
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companies has been increased significantly from about 30 in 1988 to over 1,200 by the end of 
1994 and 16,200 in 200293); (ii) introduction of trade policy instruments which meet the 
international standards followed by a gradual significant liberalization, with a gradual 
reduction in import barriers and improvements in export incentives; and (iii) liberalization of 
foreign exchange regime.  
After 10 years of the open-door trade reforms, the Vietnam’s foreign trade regime has been 
improved significantly. Quantitative restrictions, which were the main trade instrument of the 
foreign trade policy under the centrally planning system, have been progressively eliminated. 
By early 2003, most quantitative restrictions on imports were abolished with the exception of 
some strategic import products that have great impact on the economy, such as petroleum 
products. Although the Government might decide to suspend the import of some 
commodities94 from time to time due to special economic situations but this practice has 
become rare since 2000. Generally speaking, quantitative restriction is no longer favored trade 
instrument of Vietnam. The main trade instrument of country has gradually become the 
tariff 95 . The tariff rates have also been gradually reduced with the country’s trade 
liberalization program. The maximum level of tariff rates was brought down from 200 % in 
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94  Those commodities were mainly the strategic products for consumption, which included automobiles (under 
12-seats), cement, some types of steel, paper and other items. 
95  The current tariff structure has three sets of tariff rates: (i) Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rates 
applicable to imports from countries with which Vietnam enjoys MFN status (about 83 % of imports in 
2005); (ii) Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) rates applicable to imports from ASEAN countries 
(about 35 % of imports in 2005 of which about half benefits from CEPT rates following the country-of-
origin rule); and (iii) General rates (50 % above MFN rates) applicable to imports from countries that do not 




1997 to 120 % in 2001 and further to 110 % in 200596. By then, less than one hundredth of 
tariff lines, accounting for around one twentieth of all import value was subject to tariff rates 
above 50 %. There has also been a reduction in the dispersion of tariffs, mainly through a 
compression at the low end of the distribution. For instance, the number of tariff lines in the 
range of 1 to10 % declined from about one quarter of the total in 1995 to 13% in 2005.97 
During the WTO accession negotiation, the Vietnamese government has committed to lower 
its average bound tariff rate on industrial and consumer goods to 20% upon successful 
accession to the multilateral trading system.98 However at the moment, the actual weight 
average tariff rate is recorded at around 14.5%.99  
The above mentioned changes have fostered significantly the development of foreign trade of 
Vietnam.  The volume of foreign trade of Vietnam grows steadily by more than 19% annually 
in average during the last 15 years. By 2004, the total revenue from import-export activities of 
Vietnam has already exceeded the annual gross domestic products (GDP) indicator. Imports 
have reached USD 44.4 bil. in 2006; while exports recorded  USD 39.6 bil. (see figure 3).  
                                                 
 
96  Ministry of Finance (MOF), “Danh mục và thuế suất đối với hàng hóa xuất, nhập khẩu 2005” (List tariff and 
tariff rates on import, export commodities in 2005), Finance Publishing House, Hanoi, 2006; see also World 
Bank, “Vietnam Development Report 2006”, pp.114 -116 
97  Ibid.  
98  WTO, Working Party Meeting Report on Vietnam Accession,, WT/ACC/SPEC/VNM/1/Rev. 2, 
(14/10/2003)  
99  Kane, T., Holmes, K. et al, “2007 Index of Economic Freedom”, The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage 
Foundation, New York, (2007), p. 391.  




 Source: Author’s, based on data of GSO (2007) 
2.2.3. Economic Integration – More outside Pressures on Trade Reforms  
During the last decade, the reform measures in Vietnam have also been driven by the 
country’s commitments upon acceding to international economic and trade arrangements. 
With the goal to integrate into the world economy, the Vietnamese government has openly 
admitted the importance of liberalization of the national economy and is committed to 
international trade. The Resolution adopted at the VII Communist Party Congress (1996) 
stated that Vietnam reform policy should “further promote process of integration into the 
regional and world economy”’ based on “the principles of active and constructive penetration 
of international market”.100  
Pursuing this goal, the government has been working hard to become a part of international 
trading networks. In July 1995, Vietnam became a member of the Association of South East 
                                                 
 






Asian Nations (ASEAN), and with that participated in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). 
The key commitment undertaken by Vietnam upon joining the AFTA is to reduce tariffs on 
intraregional trade under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT).101 Two years 
later, Vietnam also became an official Member of the Forum on the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC).  
Vietnam also negotiated and concluded bilateral agreements with many trading partners, 
including major economic powers like the US, EU, Japan, China, Australia and Korea. The 
conclusion of a bilateral trade agreement (BTA) with the United States in 2000 was highly 
significant for Vietnam. It not only paved the way for access of Vietnamese exports to the US 
market and opened opportunity for goods, services and investment from the US come into 
Vietnam but also gave direct impetus to Vietnam foreign trade reforms. The BTA is the most 
comprehensive bilateral trade agreement ever negotiated by the United States, which deals 
with a wide range of trade topics including trade in goods and services as well as investment 
and intellectual property rights. The BTA requires Vietnam to undertake a broad range of 
reforms, which fundamentally change how Vietnam conducts business. The implementation 
of the BTA, nonetheless, has helped Vietnam bringing the national legal framework on 
                                                 
 
101   In accordance with Vietnam’s obligations under CEPT Scheme, tariff rates since 2000 have been reduced 
for 4230 categories of products. Tax cuts have been applied since then to a further 1,900 categories. In an 
effort to accelerate on its commitments related to AFTA, since 2003 Vietnam has also further increased the 
number of commodities under which tariffs is reduced to 0-5% to 2,250 commodities, including 750 that 
had been on the Temporary Exclusion List. This brings into force 80% of Vietnam’s tariff reductions under 
AFTA. Vietnam has also committed to lowering the duty on 6,130 categories to 0-5% by 2006 and on nearly 
all commodities to 0% by 2015. The Ministry of Finance estimates that average rate of CEPT will fall to 




foreign trade closer to the requirements of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
international arrangement that Vietnam was negotiating to join at that moment.102  
The accession negotiations to the WTO, which lasted for 12 years,103 have been the most 
significant achievement of the economic and trade reforms in Vietnam. Being part of the 
multilateral trading system was a supreme goal of the country, settled by the VIII Party 
Congress in the course of implementation of Doi Moi Policy.104 The Deputy Prime Minister 
Vu Khoan explained “Vietnam decided to apply for WTO membership with a view to expand 
its economic, trade and investment ties with other WTO member countries. This reflects a firm 
determination of the Party and the State to continue the process of integration of the 
[Vietnam’s] economy into the world trading system… A successful accession into the WTO 
means that Vietnam will be incorporated into the world economy as an essential part of the 
international market. [Thus] Vietnam will accept and follow the legal philosophy and rules 
provided by the world trade system”.105  
Improvement of the national legal system to meet the requirements of a post-WTO era is not 
only in line with Vietnam's own economic and social development needs, but also helps 
                                                 
 
102  Under the framework of the BTA, Vietnam undertook the following reforms: (i) substantial reductions in 
MFN tariffs; (ii) increase transparency in government procurement; (iii) uniform implementation of 
standards, taxes, and dispute resolution; (iv) removal of quotas; (v) improve market access rights; (vi) 
elimination of trade-related investment restrictions; (vii) and acceptance of WTO rules on customs 
valuation, intellectual property rights, and trade in services. All these reforms hence only effective in regards 
to the trade between Vietnam and United States, although it was later also extended to some other trading 
partners of Vietnam in 2004. 
103  Vietnam applied for the accession to WTO on 04/01/1995 and finished the multilateral and bilateral 
accession negotiations with WTO members on 07/11/2006. On 11/01/2007, Vietnam officially has become a 
full member of the WTO. 
104  VCP, Nghị quyết Đại hội Đảng lần thứ VIII (Resolution of the VIII Party Congress), (1/7/1996) 
[http://cpv.org.vn/tiengviet/tulieuvankien/vankiendang/?topic=191&subtopic=8&leader_topic=225] (last 
visited: 20/10/2007) 
105  Vu Khoan, “Vietnam wants to join the World Trade Organization” – a conversation with Deputy Prime 




Vietnam compete in the international marketplace and bring her into the multilateral trading 
system more smoothly.106
Accession to various international economic arrangements, especially to the WTO, have 
contributed significantly to the trade liberalization reforms in Vietnam. The WTO accession 
negotiations introduced more outside pressures on Vietnam’s reforms of its legal system and 
policy as Vietnam had to “voluntarily” undertake more international obligations than the 
country had ever done so before. As the whole WTO system is based on multilateral trade 
regulations and rules, member countries, without exception, are required to bring their laws 
and regulations into conformity with WTO legal framework.107 In other words, the Vietnam’s 
government has to accept and obey the rules of game provided by the multilateral system of 
the WTO. Joining the system means that it could no longer able to administer the national 
foreign trade regime as it did in the past. Realizing this, the government has decided to take an 
initiative in this process by upholding the principles of the WTO as the basis for its trade 
policies, and revising its legislation to gradually adapt to the rules and principles of the WTO. 
                                                 
 
106  VCP, “Phương hướng, nhiệm vụ kế hoạch phát triển kinh tế - xã hội 5 năm 2001 – 2005” (Orientation, 
Tasks and Plans for Socio-Economic Development for Five Years from 2001-2005), Nghị quyết Đại hội 
Đảng IX (Resolution of the IX Party Congress), 22 April, 2001.   
[http://cpv.org.vn/tiengviet/tulieuvankien/vankiendang/details.asp?topic=191&subtopic=8&leader_topic=22
6&id=BT2280560851] (last visited: 20/10/2007); see also VCP, “Nghị quyết Trung ương Đảng 07/NQ-
TW/2001 về vấn đề hội nhập kinh tế” (Politburo’s Resolution 07/NQ-TW on the international economic 
integration), 27 November, 2001.  
[http://cpv.org.vn/tiengviet/tulieuvankien/vankiendang/details.asp?topic=191&subtopic=279&leader_topic=
688&id=BT3150660211]. (last visited: 20/10/2007)  
107  WTO Agreement, Article XVI (4): "Each Member shall ensure the conformity of laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the Annexed Agreements." In legal sense, this 
means that the laws and regulations of a sovereign state are now subject to WTO rules and possibly for the 
first time in history, an international organization is thus endowed with such a vast power to impose sanction 




Looking back to the period of the mid 1980s-1990s, Vietnam's legal reforms were largely 
internally driven. As far as legal reforms were concerned, they were often in response to the 
changing internal socio-economic situation. For many years, the Vietnamese government was 
cautious about international regulations and obligations undertaken as a result of entering 
international treaties or conventions with capitalist countries. For instance, the application of 
the fundamental GATT principle of non-discrimination, particularly national treatment, to 
foreign individuals and businesses and in the past was considered as a threat to national 
sovereignty and thus was not formally recognized in the Vietnamese legal system until the 
promulgation of the new Constitution 1992 (although in reality this principle was, to a certain 
extent, had been adopted in the investment regulations in order to attract FDI since late 
1980s).108 However, the commitments made during the WTO accession negotiation together 
with bilateral and regional trade agreements have brought such a situation to an end. Many 
western principles of trade rarely treated seriously in the past should now be applied 
constantly and widely in practice as a part of the country international commitments. The 
principles of national treatment (NT) and most-favored-nation (MFN) were subsequently 
recognized in 2002.109 With the introduction of international trade law principles into the legal 
system, those once seemingly legitimate restrictions imposed on foreigners had been 
gradually eliminated and foreign business entities can enjoy no less favorable treatment (in 
terms of trading-rights) than their Vietnamese counterparts.  
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The transparency, one of the main principles of the WTO, has been also introduced gradually 
into the national legal system following the accession negotiations with WTO members and 
particularly after conclusion of the bilateral trade agreement with the United States in 2000. 
As a matter of fact, due to its political tradition and history, the Vietnamese government had 
been used to governing the country in a “non-transparent” manner. Foreign companies 
therefore faced much difficulty in finding and obtaining copies of regulations and other 
measures undertaken by various government agencies and local authorities. Transparency in 
publication of governmental regulations and administrative rulings, particularly at the 
ministerial and other sub-national levels, was essential since these bodies were authorized to 
provide the details on how the more general laws, regulations and other measures of state 
would be implemented. Significantly, nowadays, trade-related laws, regulations, 
administrative rulings are more easily accessible to the public in Vietnam (except when 
publication of information would be against public interests). Most government agencies have 
gradually developed their websites to update the public with information of their activities and 
to provide updated legal documents. It is interesting to note that these websites usually 
contain not only Vietnamese but also English version, which makes it easier for foreign 
counterparts to access to information and policy in relevant sectors (although the English 
version is not always updated and well developed).  
WTO accession injects an impetus into Vietnam legal reforms and presents a fresh 
opportunity full of promises. Combined with the internal push driven by Doi Moi policy, this 
impetus ensures a more persistent and more powerful liberalization reform in the country. The 
reforms used to be almost independent of outside pressure, but now they carry a new 




and the whole international community closely observe Vietnam's performance of its 
commitments under the international arrangements as they wanted to wait to see what changes 
would happen in Vietnam before as well as after its accession to the WTO system. The 
Vietnamese government knows that it should take more international obligations into account 
when it consider reform measures and the development of national legislations and thus 
should be more world-oriented. In the course of integration, not only would the economic 
structure of Vietnam adjust to the international standards, but the national legal system and 
practices in foreign trade would also undergo transformations in response to changes and 
requirements of the international community. 
 
2.3. INSIGHTS OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
2.3.1. Adoption of Rule of Law Concept In The Legal System 
One of the outstanding features of the legal reforms in Vietnam during the Doi Moi period is 
the recognition and introduction of the concept “rule of law” in legal system. Since 1991, the 
official documents of the CPV started to mention that the “State of Vietnam governs society 
by laws”. The policy report of the VII Party Congress (1991) declared that one of the major 
tasks in Doi Moi period is to “establish the socialism-oriented state governed by the rule of 
law under the leadership of the Communist Party”. Although, it was not clear at that time 
whether the “socialist rule of law” should have the same meaning as the rule of law in the 
western world, the political recognition of the importance of establishment of a rule-of-law 




With the promulgation of the 1992 Constitution, it seems to be that the concept of the “rule of 
law” has become a part of the Vietnamese legal system. Article 12 of the Constitution 1992 
has elaborated the scope of the term “governance by means of the law” as follows:  
• The State exercises the administration of society by means of the law; it shall 
unceasingly strengthen socialist legality.  
• All State organs, economic and social bodies, units of the people's armed forces, and 
all citizens must seriously observe the Constitution and the law, strive to prevent and 
oppose all criminal behavior and all violations of the Constitution and the law.  
• All infringements of State interests, of the rights and legitimate interests of collectives 
and individual citizens shall be dealt with in accordance with the law. 
Based on this regulation, one can arguably claim that the requirement of “socialist rule of 
law” being built in Vietnam has the following characteristics: (i) democratic centralization of 
state powers, (ii) supremacy of the Constitution and law, (iii) equality of all peoples before the 
law, and (iv) full protection of rights (including human and property) and legitimate interests 
of individuals and collectives. It also means that the government in all its action is bound by 
rules fixed and announced in advance. Apart from the emphasis on the supremacy of socialist 
legality, the concept of “rule-of-law” in the Vietnamese legal system is quite similar to the 
Western concept of “rule-of-law”. 
The term of “socialist state governed by the rule of law” was further mentioned in the policy 
reports of the VIII and IX Party Congress in 1996 and 2001. The repetition of the task of 




supports the rule-of-law reform. Evidence of such developmental change is clear, as 
demonstrated by the change of role the CPV has undergone in the state administration. The 
CPV, which for long time was able to intervene directly the social and economic management 
activities at both central and local levels through its “resolutions”, now only acts on policy-
making. The function of state administration is designated by the Constitution to concrete 
state organizations and agencies.  
The application of rule-of-law is seen as the main base for the development of a strong and 
efficient legal system, which eventually will contribute to economic performance and the 
increase of prosperity. Nonetheless, moving from a theoretical recognition of the concept to 
actual implementation is not an easy task. Vietnam still faces tremendous problems and 
challenges in its transition to the rule-of-law system. Some of these problems will be 
illustrated in the following sections. 
2.3.2. Rule-Making and Rule-Implementing 
In the transitional process of Vietnam, laws and regulations have been seen as crucial tools of 
the state in “governing the society by the rule of law” and promoting economic development. 
In addition, the legal system is aimed at satisfying contemporary requirements of international 
integration of Vietnam. Thus, legal reform took place very early and contributed significantly 
to the economic development in Vietnam recently. As a result, a large number of laws and 
regulations have been issued since the “Doi Moi”. However there are many shortcomings and 
deficiencies of legal institutions in Vietnam. There have been complaints that the laws and 
regulations in Vietnam are issued progressively, but the regulations often cannot be 




legal system is due to rapid changes in economy and society. 110  Some other authors 
emphasize the legacy of former Soviet socialist-law and the incompatibility between social 
norms and rules currently imported from Western legal systems.111 It is of the author’s 
opinion that arbitrary discretion in the rule-making process causes the backwardness of the 
Vietnamese legal system.   
Under the current system, the National Assembly of Vietnam (NAV), as a representative 
organ of the whole nation, holds the supreme legislative power and decides the most 
important issues of the nation. Theoretically, all state power belongs to the people.112 Vietnam 
does not adopt the Western doctrine of separation of powers and the constitution does not 
recognize the need for a system for checks and balances between legislative, executive and 
judicial branches of government. The constitution provides that the NAV and local people’s 
councils should be the dominant center of power. Nationally, the NAV is the ultimate state 
organization of power and the Standing Committee is its permanent manifestation. The 
paradox here is that although the NAV has a great deal of powers and competences, almost all 
NAV representative positions are not permanent professional careers. This is because the 
NAV meets only twice a year and the term of each session is about one month. For this 
reason, there are two weaknesses in the legislation of Vietnam.  
First, most of the laws drafted in Vietnam are not prepared by parliament members, but by 
other government organizations such as various ministries in government. The law-making 
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process in Vietnam can be briefly described as follows: The government delegates a group of 
officials who work at a certain governmental agencies to draft the law. For instance, the anti-
dumping, anti-subsidy, safeguard and competition legislations were drafted by the Legal 
Department of the Ministry of Trade, while the customs and taxation legislations were drafted 
by the Ministry of Finance. The final draft of the laws should be submitted to the NAV for 
review and adoption. Therefore, in many cases the drafts of law would be passed at the NAV 
session without changes or only with minor changes. In recent years, many draft laws have 
been publicized to gather public opinions before being submitted to the NAV. However, the 
rule-making process remains within the exclusive authority of governmental agencies. It 
explains why sometimes the laws do not address the issues as appropriately as they should, or 
do not reflect the majority interests of the members in society.  
Second, because the NAV representatives are lacking in professional skills and time, the NAV 
frequently delegates powers of supplementing, guiding and interpreting laws to administrative 
bodies. Although these powers of governmental organs are also stipulated in the 1992 
constitution and many laws (e.g.: the 1996 Law on promulgation of Legal documents), they 
are usually so vague and broad that it is difficult to define their limitations. The effectiveness 
of a law entirely depends on the behavior of governmental agencies. For instance, in order to 
implement a law, it is in need of under-law guidelines. In some cases, although the law had 
been enacted for two or three years, guidelines still had not been promulgated, which led to de 
facto inefficacy of the law. In short, Vietnam has failed to create an effective legislature 
which many economists regard as a direct driving force of growth and development113  
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Because many government organs can promulgate laws and regulations, the legal framework 
of Vietnam is very complex (see the chart 1). According to the Law on Promulgation of Legal 
documents 114 , the Vietnamese legislation system is composed of the law normative 
documents and under-law normative documents. The law-normative documents are 
promulgated only by the NAV and have the highest legal effects in the system. This category 
of documents includes the “Constitution” (Hiến pháp), “Laws” (Luật), “Ordinances” (Pháp 
lệnh) and “Resolution” (Nghị quyết) of the NAV. Meanwhile, the under-law normative 
documents are issued by other state organs to interpret and implement the law-normative 
documents. This kind of document is further categorized into several types depending on the 
legal sources:  
(i) National administrative regulations - issued by the executive organs of the state to 
implement the national laws. The national administrative regulations are existed at two levels: 
the governmental administrative regulations by the government – the Decrees [Nghị định], 
Resolutions [Nghị quyết] and the ministerial rules enacted by the ministries and departments 
of the government to provide further detail guidelines for implementation of the governmental 
regulations, such as Circulars [Thông tư], Directive [Chỉ thị] and Cross-Ministerial Circulars 
[Thông tư liên tịch].  
(ii) Local governmental regulations/rules – issued by the empowered local People's Councils 
or People’s Committees, and  
(iii) Judicial or prosecution interpretations - issued by the Supreme People's Court or the 
Supreme People's Procuratorate. Among these under-law normative documents, the 
prosecution decisions interpret the regulations of criminal law; meanwhile the local 
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government regulations/rules only have local effect and cannot conflict with national laws and 
administrative regulations. 
 
Source: Vietnam’s Ministry of Justice (2005) 
All legal documents mentioned above are regarded as official sources of Vietnamese law and 
are implemented directly by administrative authorities or judges to regulate specific 
relationships or to solve disputes in society. In addition, there are a large number of 
administrative documents issued by officials in government’s organs at central and local 
levels, for example, announcements or guidelines and directive letters. The status of these 




law consistently and with limited discretion. However, these documents are made internally 
and have no binding force vis-à-vis public. Practically speaking these normative documents 
are the “law” for agency staff but not for the whole society. This practice is probably the 
remnant of the former socialist legal system can also be found in some other countries in 
transition, such as China. Evaluating this practice, some Chinese scholars point out that 
although these non-legislative documents are not binding in theory but in practice they are 
often serve as the agency’s “secret weapon” in regulating society.115  
In Vietnam, there are still many normative documents which are contrary to the laws. 
However, they are still functional because Vietnam has not yet established an appropriate 
judicial review system. That is one of the main issues in development of modern legal system, 
which will be discussed in a later section. At the moment, the superior governmental organs 
are entrusted with the power of removing or suspending illegal normative documents which 
are issued by inferior organs. For example, Article 82 of Law on Promulgation of Legal 
Documents gives the NAV Standing Committee with the power of supervising and reviewing 
normative documents of other states organs and to direct them to modify or abolish in whole 
or a part of the regulations which are contrary to ordinances and resolutions of the Committee. 
While the power of reviewing normative documents is entrusted to various organs at both 
central and local levels, there is still lack of transparent procedures for appealing and 
examining the normative documents which are supposed to be illegal. Consequently, most of 
governmental organs are unable to use this power. For example, the NAV Standing 
Committee has never exercised this power in reality.  
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Not withstanding the above mentioned facts, the existing legislative arrangements in Vietnam 
have undoubtedly improved substantially since the commencement of the reforms. Law-
making is now considerably more professional, the number and quality of draftsmen available 
and the educational attainment of Vietnamese legislators has improved remarkably compared 
to two decades ago. The importance of a more transparent, logical and professional approach 
to the construction of a comprehensive legal system has been appreciated by the government 
as a necessary precondition for an effective market-based economy. The construction of a 
comprehensive and rational legal corpus is proceeding but will take sometimes to complete.  
2.3.3. Achievements and Issues in Developing a Modern Foreign Trade Regime 
As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, Vietnam's economic reforms and 
integration process have not only brought changes to the national economic structure, but also 
facilitated changes to the national legal system. In the course of economic integration and 
international economic cooperation the development of a modern foreign trade regime, which 
is compatible with internationally accepted standards, has become increasingly important. 
Obviously, where there is hardly a legal system to speak of with respect to trade and 
investment, nothing could convince the international community of Vietnam's willingness to 
integrate, more than its effort to join the world trading system.  
2.3.3.1. Revision of Economic Laws and Regulations 
Up to now, notwithstanding the huge amount of work facing The Vietnamese government in 
the process of integration, substantial progress has been made in developing the national 
legislation in this regard. Hundreds of pieces of laws and regulations and administrative 




local governments, have been formulated and amended. According to a report by the Ministry 
of Justice, only from 2001 to 2003 the government had reviewed 265 items of legislation in 
order to identify the legislative reforms required for WTO accession. As a consequence this 
review work 94 pieces of legislation (including 24 Laws and 15 Ordinances) were identified 
as necessary to be amended and developed to meet the requirement of the WTO accession.116 
Most of them were adopted during the last two years.117
As to the legal reforms in international trade, laws and administrative regulations in relation to 
import-export control have been released and modified to encourage international 
cooperation. The result is that Vietnam's legal system in this field has become more 
comprehensive, transparent and easier for application. Generally speaking, such laws and 
regulations result in greater deregulation and more trade liberalization which are in line with 
WTO rules. Hence, Vietnam’s government still maintains the right to take emergency actions 
during the trade liberalization. In case of crisis or per se relevant government authorities 
might enjoy certain discretionary power to take measures to re-establish order, but these types 
of proceedings are inconsistent with international rules and regulations. This is the main 
reason why the government has made special efforts in developing the trade remedy 
legislation in the last few years.  
The improvement of the legal framework for a competitive environment is also an important 
part of the current legislative agenda. Special attention has been paid to some particular 
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problems arising under this category, such as the issue of restrictive business practice, in order 
to defend the fair competition in the market place. In this respect, Competition Law,118 
Commercial law,119 Law on Intellectual Property,120 are already in place to create a level 
playing-field for all competitors without regard to their nationality. The important 
characteristic of the recently developed legislations is that they were drafted systematically 
with implementation regulations. Given the earlier mentioned particularity of the Vietnamese 
legal system, whereby the laws and regulations adopted by the NAV can be fully enforced in 
practice only when they are accompanied with under-law detail guidelines for application, the 
efforts to introduce implementation regulations by the executive organs has shown the 
political will of The Vietnamese government to make changes happen in the legal system, 
especially in the area of economic and trade. 
It can be observed clearly that the objective of the legislative works in the field of foreign 
trade is not just to introduce new legal documents but to eliminate those regulations found to 
be in contravention of WTO rules and to amend some provisions which contradict normal 
international customs, such as technology import restrictions and arbitrary pricing policies. 
Another focus is to accord full national treatment to all foreign nationals and business entities 
alike. One of the most important developments in this regard is the promulgation of a new 
Investment law 121  and Company law 122 , which replace the former investment laws 
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discriminating against domestic and foreign investors and give a unified legal regime for all 
individual and entities. The amended laws and regulations will not only provide an open legal 
framework to trade but also promote the inflow of urgently needed foreign capital into 
Vietnam and boost Vietnam's participation in international competition.  
Hence, there are certain important points that Vietnam should further improve to meet the 
requirement. Firstly, the legislative language of the trade related legislations should be further 
developed to make the interpretation of the regulations more direct. At the moment, many 
regulations and legal terminology, particularly those in highly technical legal areas of trade 
law, such as anti-dumping and anti-subsidy, are very general or vague leaving large loopholes 
in their enforcement. The problem of vague terminology in the anti-dumping legislation will 
be discussed and elaborated in the later sections of the chapters. 
The second issue of the current legal system of Vietnam is the improvement of transparency 
and predictability in the procedural laws. Up to now the development of legislation in 
Vietnam pays more attention towards substantive issues than on procedural issues. The WTO 
agreements, by contrast, highlight the strict and transparent procedural rules as the basis to 
uphold justice and ensure a fair result in legal proceedings.123 In the foreign trade area, this 
problem deserves special attention because the subjects of regulation are highly complex with 
many technical standards. Therefore, if the law and regulations are not clear and precise, and 
thus leave for the government agencies broad discretionary power in implementing rules it 
can lead to numerous contradictory and arbitrary decisions in regards to the subject issue. It is 
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evident that arbitrary discretion of the government agencies appears to be a crucial obstacle to 
the state of “rule of law” in the legal system and hinders the transitional process to market 
economy in Vietnam. This issue is relevant to the efficiency and fairness of legal procedures, 
including the national anti-dumping. That is also the reason why, this author advocates 
strongly the development of an effective judicial review system for foreign-trade-related 
matters in Vietnam as it would help to extend judicial examination into the issue whether 
investigation authorities follow procedures in deciding cases and to intervene in the interests 
of justice.124  
Strengthening transparency also means that the system creates opportunities for more people 
to take part in the legislative process with a view to allowing the interests of various socio-
economic groups to be heard and considered. This is also a reflection of the spirit of "rule of 
law", which has been advocated by the Vietnamese government in its legal reform policy..  
2.3.3.2. Judicial Review System 
One of the main obstacles for development of a rule-of-law legal system in Vietnam is the 
lack of an effective judicial review system. It is evident that if the administrative organs’ 
actions are not subject to judicial review, there is virtually no means to prevent the arbitrary 
discretion in interpretation and implementation of law, and therefore, the rule of law in the 
modern sense will not be ensured.  
In Vietnam, the idea of independent judicial review is much more than a matter of 
mechanism; it really touches the innermost part of the national legal system. Basically, the 
                                                 
 




judicial review is designed to ensure that no agency has the absolute authority or power to 
adjudicate any case and to give interested parties in any case an opportunity to have a channel 
through which to challenge decisions of the trade authorities, if they consider them unfair or 
illegitimate. The existence of such a system is deeply rooted in western ideology and has 
found expression in the WTO. Therefore, the establishment and maintenance of such an 
independent system assume great importance for both the judicial and the administrative 
systems because these WTO requirements are applied to Vietnam right at the moment it 
became a WTO member. The once powerful administrative power shall be subject to new 
supervision exercised by the judiciary. 
The judicial review system of Vietnam at the moment arguably exists in theory but not really 
functional. Generally, one may refer to the Law on Complaints and Denunciations (LC&D)125 
and the Administrative Dispute Settlement Ordinance (ADSO),126 which deals with the issues 
relating to the right to appeal against administrative decisions or actions, as legal foundation 
for judicial review system. Under this complaints and denunciations system, individuals and 
organizations can challenge the administrative decisions and actions before the Vietnam’s 
administrative court if they consider such decisions or actions unlawful. However, in practice, 
this system has not been used frequently. Probably it is because the court has not been active 
in developing principles and mechanisms for such judicial practice.  
The judicial review system of Vietnam is just in the initial step of development. In general, it 
is still an idea that is gaining slow acceptance. It can be explained by the historical reason. In 
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the past as an aftermath of the time when "rule of law" was ignored and administrative power 
supervised most affairs, courts were remained on the sidelines concerning international trade 
issues which were traditionally within the hand of administrative agencies. Nowadays, as the 
administrative authorities are still assigned to conduct foreign trade policy. Thus, it is quite 
difficult to expect them to be active in giving power to and sharing experience with others. 
Without a judicial review system interested parties in international trade dispute cases would 
feel definitely insecure because there is no guarantee that the trade authorities would act fairly 
and non-arbitrary. This issue is especially emergence within the scope of trade remedy 
system, i.e. anti-dumping measure. However, with recent WTO accession, judicial review, 
which is to fill the gap and offer another safety valve to allow the interested parties to have 
their interests fully protected, is expected to be developed in Vietnam as in other member 
countries of the system. 
2.3.3.3. Transparency Issue 
As it was discussed earlier in this chapter, improvement of transparency in the legal system is 
highly significant for Vietnam in its legal reforms. Improvement of transparency in foreign 
trade regime is also one the main requirements of the WTO system, along side with non-
discrimination and promotion of fair-competition. As matter of fact, all countries upon joining 
the multilateral trading system of the WTO should publish promptly laws, regulations, 
judicial decisions and administrative rulings having a bearing on various components of 
international trade, such as rates of duty, taxes or other charges, import-export restrictions 
etc.127 Besides, they are also required to administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable 
                                                 
 




manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the said matters. 128  Thus, 
development of institutions to guarantee the improvement of transparency is also an 
international obligation of Vietnam in it integration process. 
This challenge is tremendous because for a long period of time the state organs in Vietnam 
enjoyed a wide discretion in interpretation and implementation of rules. The internal 
normative documents, i.e. the VPC directions or government orders, sometimes carried more 
importance than the legal rules and regulations, especially in relation to foreign trade matters. 
Such practice is of course done internally and in secrecy. Such a situation often renders rules 
useless and makes predictability of laws and regulations impossible. Even worse, it often 
makes the impartial administration of laws and regulations less possible, as some may be 
favored and others not. Lack of transparency is a major concern for many foreign investors 
and exporters who demand equal access to government orders and information.129 Although 
since 1991, efforts have been made to publish laws and regulations related to international 
trade and the situation has improved somewhat, the old bad tradition dies hard and problems 
arising from this question persist. Now, the transparency concept of WTO will gradually force 
the administrative agencies to increase the transparency of their work and thus a level 
playing-field in this regard can be within sight shortly.  
Vietnam’s Law on Promulgation of Legal Instruments, as amended in the last months of 2000 
and again in 2002, and Decision 909/2003/QD-TTg to Reform the Formulation and 
Promulgation of Legal Instruments and to Raise the Quality of Legal Instruments (Decision 
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909/TTg), together introduced a number of important reforms to make the publication of laws 
and regulations become more easily accessible to public. According to it, all legal documents 
(national and local) and agreements to international conventions are now to be published in an 
official Government gazette. Since March 2003, government agencies are required to forward 
a copy of all legal instruments to the Office of Government within two days of promulgation 
and consequently mandating the publication of such information in the Official Gazette (Công 
Báo) within fifteen days of promulgation.130 As of the 1st July 2003, the Official Gazette has 
been published on a daily basis.  
In addition to it, Vietnam government has also begun a campaign to build an internet-based 
government (e-government) with a view to provide easy and fast access to the relevant 
policies and information. The Law on Promulgation of Legal Instruments requires the Office 
of the Government not only to publish all new legal documents and regulations of the 
government and the Prime Minister but also to publish the draft of those documents on the 
Internet or in mass media for comments by agencies, organizations and individuals.131 At the 
moment the government has not developed a specialized website for the publication of draft 
legal documents, but the draft legal documents are published on the website of the responsible 
ministry and drafting agency, i.e. on the Ministry of Trade website for documents concerning 
trade rules and regulations (www.mot.gov.vn), and on the Ministry of Finance's website for 
documents on tax and finance (www.mof.gov.vn), some draft documents are also published 
on the website of the Ministry of Justice (www.moj.gov.vn). However, the law does not 
stipulate any timeframe for the solicitation and provision of comments. Such issues were still 
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left to the discretion of the drafting entity. Thus, by far the public participation in drafting law 
is only a mere of formality. Still, such development is significant for the strengthening the 
legal system in Vietnam. 
However, WTO requirement of transparency does not end here. Practically, transparency also 
requires that judicial decisions and judgments having a bearing on trade issues be published 
so as to allow foreign government and businessmen prompt knowledge. For example, the 
TRIPS Agreement provides that laws, regulations, final judicial judgment relating to 
intellectual property rights in terms of its scope, acquisition, enforcement and protection be 
published by the members. Of course such a requirement of Vietnam’s judicial bodies is quite 
stringent, as in the past, few courts would make public their judgments. However, the 
People’s Supreme Court of Vietnam has already made it clear to all levels of courts in 
Vietnam that all judgments shall be made public gradually except to the hardship or the 
publication of such information would create undue hardships or be judicial decisions is that it 
can make sure hat the judiciary system itself be put under scrutiny by the general public. Such 
a system is expected to ensure justice to the greater extent is possible. However, it takes time 
to see the full implementation of such requirements, given the fact that Vietnamese judicial 
system has been used to keeping itself from the sight of the public for years. 
 
2.4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to outline the historical, economic and legal background against 
which a comprehensive anti-dumping law would operate. It is the assertion of the author that 




context within which the law will operate in a particular jurisdiction. This is especially 
important in relation to a country that operates on very specific legal background. Vietnam’s 
economic and legal reforms have many specific characteristics that even some other 
transitional economies may not have. Thus, any attempt to analyze the anti-dumping system 
of Vietnam, without taking into consideration those characteristics; will be imprecise and 
























The background economic and legal conditions of Vietnam explored in the previous chapter 
have set a scene for a discussion of the current position of anti-dumping dumping policy and 
law in Vietnam. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the historical antecedents that led to 
the promulgation of the Vietnam’s Anti-dumping Ordinance and subsequently the regulations 
implementing the Ordinance. It also analyzes the contemporary development of the anti-
dumping system in Vietnam and the organizational framework of the anti-dumping 
authorities. Finally it will touch on the issue whether or not the Vietnam’s anti-dumping 
policy corresponds with the economic and trade policy consideration discussed in the Chapter 
I and conclude with some strategic considerations for development of the anti-dumping 
system. 
 
3.2. VIETNAM’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS NATIONAL 
ANTI-DUMPING SYSTEM 
The process of trade liberalization and economic integration since 1990s has brought huge 




creates new difficulties and challenges for the country. The issues of mercantilistic trade 
strategy of dumping by foreign firms and anti-dumping measures against Vietnamese exports 
by some trading partners have become increasingly worrisome problems for Vietnam in 
recent years. 
3.2.1. The Problems of Foreign Anti-Dumping Practice 
After a decade of successful integration, Vietnam’s exports are starting to face serious trade 
obstacles in the international arena in the form of anti-dumping actions by its trading partners. 
The progressive expansion of market share of certain Vietnamese products has become a big 
concern to producers and trade authorities of some countries. To that end the domestic 
producers of those trading partners actively approach all available trade instruments, 
including anti-dumping and other measures, to restrain and prevent the massive penetration of 
Vietnamese products into the local market.132 As a consequence, Vietnamese exporters start to 
experience an increasing number of anti-dumping investigation and measures abroad. 
According to a report of the MOT in 2005, during the period of 1994-2004, 19 investigations 
                                                 
 
132  For instance in the case of US Catfish case I, the Catfish Farmers of America (CFA), an association 
representing interest of US catfish farm-raised industry, started the dispute by asserting that the Vietnamese 
producers had taken 20 % of the U.S. frozen fillet market through the use of misleading trademarks and thus 
required the Congress to pass a law restricting the use of the term “catfish” to American varieties. CFA 
argued that Vietnamese “catfish” were not catfish and that only the North American species, known as 
“Ictaluridae”, should be branded in this way. Congress took CFA’s side and issued Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act in 2002, which stating that for the purposes of the Federal Food, Drug or Cosmetic Act, the 
term “catfish” may only be considered to be a common or usual name for fish classified within the family 
Ictaluridae. This regulation barred the Vietnamese exporters from using the word “catfish”. Vietnamese 
exporters had to register their products under different the names of “Basa Bocourti” and “Basa” to be 
allowed to sell in the U.S. market. However, despite CFA’s effort to restrict Vietnamese catfish imports 
such imports have continued to grow. In the second attempt, CFA approached anti-dumping measures as a 
mean to restrict the Vietnamese exports. See World Bank, “Saving Fish and Fishers - Toward Sustainable 
and Equitable Governance of the Global Fishing Sector”,  Report 29090-GLB, May 2004; Diep Thai, 
“Does free trade mean freely trade to developing countries? A case study of catfish dispute between US and 
Vietnam,” final thesis, Graduate Program, Geography Department, University at Buffalo, (2002); Tran Van 
Nam, “Un-free Trade with Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Current Catfish Dispute between US 




were held into cases of alleged Vietnamese dumping133, of which 15 cases were initiated 
during the period of 2000-2004.134 The users of anti-dumping measures against Vietnamese 
exports are from all over the world, including US, EC, Colombia, India, Peru, Poland, 
Canada, Philippines and Korea.  
According to the same report, all anti-dumping investigation resulted in affirmative anti-
dumping determination and high anti-dumping duties. The products subject to anti-dumping 
actions by foreign countries were mostly the traditional export products of Vietnam, including 
rice, footwear, bicycle, clothes, seafood etc. With the consequent contraction of the export 
markets, many Vietnamese producers concerned were badly affected. Some of them went 
bankrupt in a short period of time. In the recent anti-dumping case of “US catfish case II”135 
alone Vietnamese producers and exporters lost more than USD 80 millions. 136  Around 
                                                 
 
133  MOT, “Báo cáo thống kê về những vụ tranh chấp thương mại đối với hàng hoá xuất khẩu của Việt Nam” 
(Report on “International trade disputes against to export products of Vietnam), BC-BTM2005, Hanoi, 
(20/09/2005). 
134  Ibid. 
135  Ibid. US Catfish Case  II: On 28 June 2002 , the CFA filed a petition with the US Department of Commerce 
(DOC) and the International Trade Commission (ITC) accusing Vietnamese producers of frozen (basa) 
catfish fillets of illegally charging prices below fair market value in the US market, resulting in material 
injury to the domestic industry. In December 2002, DOC determined that Vietnam is a non-market economy 
(NME) country and thus decided to apply NME methodology of calculation dumping margin in regards to 
Vietnamese frozen (basa) catfish fillets [1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act - 19§1667], 
according to which the products normal value has been constructed based on the comparison with the 
respective prices obtained of similar products from a third surrogate country with market economy 
(Bangladesh). DOC subsequently concluded that “Vietnamese producers/exporters have made sales to U.S. 
customers at less than fair value” and recommended the slapping of anti-dumping tariff on the subjected 
products imported from Vietnam with a margin ranging from 36,84% to 63,88%. Afterwards, ITC approved 
this final determination on 23/07/2003. See also DOC, Notice on Final Antidumping Duty Determination of 
Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Affirmative Critical Circumstances: Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, A-552-801, 23 June, 2003; USVTC, Fact Sheet on Final Determination in 
the Antidumping Duty Investigation of Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from Vietnam 
[http://www.usvtc.org/trade/other/antidumping/catfish/factsheet.htm] (last visited: 20/09/2007) 
136  Action Aid, “Báo cáo kết quả nghiên cứu nhanh các ảnh hưởng của Vụ CFA kiện các doanh nghiệp thành 
viên VASEP đối với nghề nuôi cá tra và basa tại một số tỉnh Đồng bằng sông Cửu Long” (Quick study 
report: Effects of the CFA‘s dumping allegation towards VASEP members on tra and basa farming in the 




200,000 guiltless farmers in the Mekong Delta all of sudden were put in a very critical 
situation because of a discretionary decision of the US Department of Commerce (DOC).137
The highly damaging outcome of the US verdict in the Catfish Case II forced the government 
and the business community to pay serious attention towards this trade remedy instrument.138 
In 2002, the government instructed the MOT to form a special expert team to do research and 
analyses of the anti-dumping situation and measures to deal with problem. This was the first 
time that the trade authority of Vietnam closely analyzed and considered the issue of dumping 
and anti-dumping measures in the light of the requirement of the international trade 
regulations and practices. 
The report pointed out two important points: First, the anti-dumping duties are among the 
most important legal instruments of the foreign trade policy of the US as well as other 
countries, which are also strategic trading partners of Vietnam. They are imposed against 
foreign imports which are found dumped by the special investigation proceedings. The report 
also stated that the high anti-dumping duties imposed on Vietnamese catfish products were 
mainly because Vietnamese exporters were unprepared for the anti-dumping proceeding. It 
was found that “because of lack of knowledge and experience on US anti-dumping law, most 
                                                 
 
137  Ibid. “Throughout the anti-dumping proceeding, there were many protests by Vietnamese Association of 
Seafood Exporters and Producers (VASEP) members against the approach of the US trade authorities. The 
first of these was that Vietnam should not be considered a non-market economy if compare to the same 
criteria which DOC used to identify some other countries, i.e. Kazakhstan, as market economy. More 
importantly, Bangladesh prices do not properly reflect the price situation in Vietnam since the production 
environment of the two countries is different. Even more unfair, pointed out VASEP, was the fact that DOC 
used retail prices as a surrogate for wholesale prices in Vietnam. Add to that the fact that neither company in 
Vietnam nor the Vietnamese government was in the financial position to be able to subsidize their exports, 
either for a significant amount of time or a major quantity of products”. 
138  Before the US Catfish Case, there had been already several anti-dumping cases initiated against Vietnamese 
exports (by Colombia, India, and Philippines). However, due to the small size of those export markets, the 




Vietnamese producers did not react adequately against the request of the US authorities”.139 
The “inadequate cooperation” was the reason that the US DOC directly imposed a high anti-
dumping duty of 63.88 % on the products of majority Vietnamese exporters (15 companies). 
While the duty rate for producers, who voluntarily responded to US DOC questionnaires, was 
only 44.6 % (6 companies).140
Second, “the main and decisive factor leading to the failure of Vietnamese basa (catfish) 
exporters in the dispute was the utilization of “surrogate country” approach [by the US 
DOC] in the dumping determination …Because US authorities considered Vietnam as “non-
market economy”, the sale price of Vietnamese basa (catfish) fillet products were not taken 
into account when they [US DOC] calculated the dumping margin. Instead, the sale price of 
catfish fillet in Bangladesh (as the surrogate country in this case) was used as a base for 
determination of normal value for catfish fillets, which eventually lead to high difference 
while compared with export price of Vietnamese catfish.”141  
In all other anti-dumping cases against Vietnamese products, foreign anti-dumping authorities 
also took a similar approach like the US DOC in their investigation. The “non-market 
economy” status and “surrogate country” approach in dumping determination have direct and 
detrimental effect on the levels of dumping found in investigations of Vietnamese exports. 
Given the fact that the anti-dumping authorities can always ignore the data and information on 
the domestic sales of Vietnamese producers and choose the sale prices of any third surrogate 
country that they wish to (regardless whether that country in fact has a similar condition like 
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dispute case with the US), BC-BTM2003, Hanoi, 20 Sept., 2003. (Translated and summarized by the author) 
140  Ibid. 




Vietnam)142, and it makes relatively easy for them to prove that Vietnamese products are 
dumped with high dumping margins.  
The Vietnamese government has identified that the main challenge for the Vietnam in anti-
dumping disputes is the non-market economy status of the country. Thus, the Vietnamese 
government has tried to raise a campaign persuading its trading partners to reconsider their 
definition of the economic status for Vietnam. This campaign so far reached very minimal 
result. By July 2007, there are only 11 countries143 have recognized Viet Nam as a full market 
economy, while other countries denied or only promised to reconsider the request of Vietnam 
at later time. Hence, upon accession to the WTO, Vietnam and WTO members have agreed 
that the “non-market economy” status of Vietnam for the purpose of anti-dumping proceeding 
would be effective until 31/12/2018.144 This agreement would lead to a continued treatment of 
Vietnam as a non-market economy in anti-dumping proceeding at least for 12 years. 
Nonetheless, according to many, that certainty is better for Vietnam since the expiry date of 
this treatment it is now clear.145 Moreover, it is believed that the continued development of the 
market economy reforms and improvement of economic ties with other countries will help 
                                                 
 
142  For instance, in the EC - Footwear Case the European Committee decided to choose Brazil as surrogate 
country to pick up the sale prices for normal value calculation instead of Thailand of Indonesia as suggested 
by Vietnamese companies, despite that fact that conditions in Brazil are very much different from Vietnam. 
See: EC - Regulation Imposing definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain footwear with uppers of 
leather originating in the PRC and Vietnam”, Council Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006, O.J. L 275/1, 05 Oct. 
2006. 
143  According to the VCAD by 20/05/2007, eleven countries have officially recognized the market economy 
status of Vietnam, including South Africa (as from 24/05/2007), China (as from 9/10/2004) and 9 ASEAN 
countries of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, and the 
Philippines (as from 3/5/2007). [http://www.vcad.gov.vn/Web/Content.aspx?distid=491&lang=en-US] (last 
visited: 28/10/2007)  
144  Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam, Report on the Accession of Viet Nam, WT/ACC/VNM/48, 
(27/10/2006), para. 225 (d) 
145  Ngo Gia Tu, Conversation with Ngo Gia Tu – Deputy Minister of Trade, Chief WTO negotiator, interview 




Vietnam to persuade WTO member countries to change their policy against Vietnam before 
the 12 year deadline.146
3.2.2. Problems of Foreign Dumping 
While some Vietnamese industries were facing a serious export situation in international 
arena, there had been also increasing number of Vietnamese companies losing domestic 
markets. With the deepening transformation of the whole economic system in Vietnam, the 
foreign trade regime has been changed to be more liberal. The right to trade has been 
expanded to cover virtually every sector of the economy regardless of type of ownership.  
Private and state-owned, domestic and foreign business entities now are granted with equal 
opportunity to import and export goods irrespective of the lines of business for which they 
have business registration (except for the goods on the list of prohibited and restricted 
imports/exports).147 The elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers at the border due to the 
implementation of trade liberalization commitments has also provided a favorable condition 
for exchange of goods. Since late 1990s foreign-originated products with cheap price has 
started storming into the market of Vietnam and thus inflicting lots of pressure on Vietnamese 
producers. However, the tough price competition created by foreign exporters and domestic 
importers is not always fair. One of the clearest illustrations of those alleged unfair business 
practices was the case of “Chinese motorcycle imports”, which resulted in a serious crisis to 
the whole motorcycle industry of Vietnam during 1998-2002. 
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3.2.2.1. Chinese Motorcycle Imports Case 
China is the largest producer as well as the largest market of motorcycles in the world. In 
2000 China produced over 17 million motorcycles, 3.9 million of which were exported 
overseas148. Since the end of 1990s harsh competition at home has driven many Chinese 
motorcycle producers to search for export market. Period 1997 - 2002, the principal markets 
for Chinese motorcycle exports were Vietnam and Indonesia. 149  The main strategy for 
Chinese motorcycle exporters is to gain market share in both markets was price policy.    
During the 1990s, Vietnam government still applied a strict control over the importation of 
finished motorcycles in order to promote development of domestic motorcycle industry. To 
evade the law, Chinese exporters and their Vietnamese partners applied a strategy to import 
complete-knock-down (CKD) and semi-knock-down (SKD) parts from China and have them 
assembled in Vietnam by local affiliations. The problem became critical when Chinese 
exporters started to apply an aggressive price policy which made the retail price of their 100 
cc-stroke and 125 cc-stroke motorcycles on the market equal, approximately only one-third to 
one-fourth (USD 400-600) of the similar motorcycle models produced by Vietnamese 
producers (USD 2,000) in the late 1990s.150 Chinese motorcycle quickly penetrated into the 
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Intarakumnerd, P. and Fujita, M., “China’s Threat and Opportunity: Challenges for Thai and Vietnamese 
Motorcycle Industries”, Conference Paper presented at VII Annual Global Development Conference 
“Institutions and Development: At the Nexus of Global Change”, St Petersburg, 18-19 Jan., 2006, p. 2 
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Chongqing’s Motorcycle Makers in Vietnam”, Discussion Paper No.04-E-08, Taiwan, (2003) p. 8 




Vietnamese market expanding the annual sales from 379,000 in 1998 to 1.96 million in 2001 
and quickly got almost 66% of the Vietnam’s motorcycle market.151
Domestic producers, which composed mainly of joint-ventures with Japanese and Taiwanese 
companies, were faced with tremendous difficulties competing with Chinese products. Most 
of them were forced to cut down production; some even had to stop the production for certain 
period due to the harsh competition from “Chinese” motorcycles. The paradox of this case is 
that Vietnamese government could not react promptly. There was speculation that the 
government was unprepared for the business method applied by Chinese producers. The 
industrial policy of Vietnam at that time was to encourage development of domestic industry 
so the government was in dilemma whether to react against the domestic producers 
assembling Chinese motorcycles. In the end it decided not to consider those producers as 
target for protection because they did not contribute to the development of domestic industry. 
The crisis for Vietnamese motorcycle industry ended late 2001 upon the decision of 
government to impose a series of import restrictive measures, including: (1) application 
quantitative restriction in the form of import license for motorcycles in complete unit and 
SKD, CKD components for complete assembly; (2) imposition of new tariff policy based on 
local content requirements (the minimum localization ratio of motorcycle engines is 20%)152; 
and (3) raise to 100% in import tariff rate for finished motorcycles and increase the minimum 
                                                 
 
151  Intarakumnerd, P. and Fujita, M., “China’s Threat and Opportunity”, supra note 149. 
152  If the producers fail to attain the minimum localization rate of 20% from 2002 for motorcycles or their 
engines they will be subject to retrospective collection of import tariff at the import tariff rates for 
motorcycles in complete units (even though they were completed in Vietnam) and fined; See: Joint Circular 
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prices of synchronous components sets of motorcycles imported from China  for import 
taxation purpose. 
During the motorcycle case, the local media, business community and government officials 
mentioned the problem of price discrimination of Chinese imports and considered that as 
ground for counter measures. Although the measure applied against Chinese imports was not 
relevant to anti-dumping measures, after this case the idea of developing an instrument for 
remedy against foreign dumped-imports has gained more support from government and 
business society.   
The abandonment of traditional trade barriers undertaken by Vietnam due to as its 
international obligation has helped to increase trade and investment significantly but on the 
other hand has also created better environment for disruptive trade flows since there were no 
appropriate trade instruments to address them. According to the MOT, during the period 
1998-2001 the domestic industries worst hit by foreign cheap imports were cement, 
motorcycles, construction glasses, garment, textiles and sugar.153 The impact of foreign trade 
distortion on economic development of the country was serious. But domestic producers did 
not know how to protect themselves, and, more seriously they had no idea what rights they 
had. The government also had a hard time because what it was facing was completely new. At 
the crisis of motorcycle industry during the 1998-2002, domestic producers were seriously 
affected because of unfair cheap imports from China. They lost more than 66% of their 
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market share to the Chinese products within only two years (1999-2001)154  and were put in a 
very critical business situation. From the pure strategic economic policy point of view, the 
administrative measure applied by Vietnamese government was necessary to prevent losing 
the infant motorcycle industry and stabilized the competition situation in the national market. 
However, those measures are not compatible with the current rules and principles of the 
multilateral trading system of the WTO. Vietnamese leaders understood that it should have in 
hand emergency trade protection instruments to guard the national market against various 
contingencies arising out of liberalization, which would be legitimate under the WTO 
framework.  
After a study on trade remedy system and the experience gained through some trade remedy 
dispute cases with other countries, Vietnam’s government has realized that, with the 
development of trade and the establishment of its market-economy system, there is an urgent 
need to establish the national trade remedy system to deal with contingencies arising from the 
trade liberalization. It was understood that with the accession of Vietnam to the WTO, anti-
dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguards measures would be the only three legally permitted 
trade measures under the framework of the WTO that Vietnam could utilize to protect its 
domestic industry and maintain a positive competition environment in the foreign trade area. 
This motivation has become the main engine promoting the introduction of the current anti-
dumping legislation in Vietnam. 
 
 
                                                 
 




3.3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL ANTI-DUMPING LAW  
3.3.1. Brief Legislative History  
The efforts to establish an anti-dumping regime in Vietnam can be traced back to 1997 when 
the Vietnam National Assembly promulgated its first Commercial Law.155 Article 8 of the 
Commercial Law 1997 classified dumping activity as one of the unfair competitive behaviors 
which might be subjected to administrative restrictive measures and criminal penalties (if it 
includes all elements of a crime). This regulation was intended to address the practices of all 
business entities, including both foreign and domestic traders. However, no further detailed 
regulations were adopted to clarify the composition of dumping as well as procedure of 
investigation and determination of this unfair competitive practice. Although, Article 264 of 
the Commercial Law 1997 specified that the government would provide detailed instruction 
on the implementation of the law but this process has never been adequately completed. 156 
Besides, the government also did not assign any government agency to administer and 
implement the Article 8 of the Commercial Law 1997. Therefore, the regulation was not 
applicable in practice. In addition, from theoretical perspective, the application of criminal 
penalty in regards to foreign dumping behavior is not consistent with modern international 
trade practice. These drawbacks made the regulation of Commercial Law inefficient and 
                                                 
 
155  The Commercial Law 1997 was replaced in by a new Commercial Law passed by the National Assembly in 
June 14, 2005.  
156  Of 14 decrees that were supposed to be developed to ensure the law’s proper implementation, only two had 
been produced in 2001, none of them were relevant to the interpretation of Article 8 of the Commercial Law 
1997. See also United Nations Development Program (UNDP) & Central Institute of Economic 





inappropriate legal instrument to counteract foreign dumping of imported goods into Vietnam 
market.   
On the other attempt to discipline the foreign dumping practice, the government of Vietnam 
introduced a regulation allowing imposition of special import duty to counteract foreign 
imports alleged of being dumped products under the Law on Export and Import Tariffs 
1998.157  According to Article 1.2 of Export-Import Tariff Law 1998, National Customs 
Office, the government agency in charge of collecting import duties, was assigned to apply 
“additional tariff on goods imported into Vietnam with sale prices which are extremely lower 
than standard prices as a result of dumping, thereby causing difficulties in the development of 
production of the same goods in Vietnam”.  However, like the case of Article 8 of 
Commercial Law 1998, the enforcement of this regulation was at a standstill again because 
the Vietnamese government did not provide detail guidelines for implementation mechanism: 
there was neither regulation on the method of calculation of dumping nor anti-dumping 
investigation proceeding. Therefore, the Customs Office did not have a proper legal basis to 
conduct the function assigned under the law.  As a consequence, after 6 years of being in 
force, there was no anti-dumping duty imposed on any foreign imported products.158
Explanations for the failure of establishment of an anti-dumping system at that period are 
several. First of all the Vietnamese government at that moment did not have adequate 
knowledge as well as expertise in the field of international trade. Vietnam had just started its 
                                                 
 
157  Law on amendment of and addition to a number of articles of the law on export and import tariffs No 04 - 
1998-QH10, adopted by the National Assembly on 20 May, 1998. (Export and Import Tariffs Law 1998) 
158  The Export and Import Tariffs Law 1998 was replaced by the new Export and Import Tariffs Law (45-2005-




integration into the world economy and international trade system for couple of years159 so the 
legislators did not understand in depth the theory behind dumping and anti-dumping 
mechanisms. This could be observed from the fact that the regulations on anti-dumping 
measures were vague and unsystematically included into the legal system. Both the 
Commercial Law and the Import and Export Tariffs Law contained a provision regulating the 
issue of dumping but the methods to counter that practice varied significantly in each piece of 
legislation. The lack of knowledge and expertise also prevented them from developing 
substantial guidelines for implementation of relevant regulations. In addition to it, the 
incentive to develop the anti-dumping system among the legislators was weak since at that 
time the trade regime of the country was still not much liberalized. The high tariff and non-
tariff barriers applied at the borders by Vietnamese government that keep out all imports, by 
definition, also prevented dumped imports. The issue of competition between domestic 
products and foreign dumped imports was not very obvious and critical. 
The development of a new framework for national anti-dumping system can be attributed to 
the conclusion of the US-Vietnam BTA in 2000. The BTA, the most comprehensive bilateral 
trade agreement ever negotiated by the US,160  involves almost all legal disciplines and 
technical procedures provided under the WTO framework, including trade remedy 
measures.161 Vietnam, therefore, has been required to perform a comprehensive review and 
overhaul the national foreign trade regime and legal system to make them consistent with 
                                                 
 
159  By 1998 Vietnam was only in the first year of membership of the APEC (1997), third year in ASEAN 
(1995), while the government had started the second stage of WTO – having meetings with WTO Working 
Party. On 30/07/1998 the first Meeting with the WTO Working Party was held in Geneva. 
160  Schmidt, U. “Roadmap for Vietnam’s Accession to the WTO - A contribution to a rational approach in 
trade liberalization”, Duisburg Working Papers on East Asian Economic Studies, Germany, (2002), p.45-46 
[www.uni-duisburg.de/FB5/ VWL/OAWI/ARBEITSPAPIERE/AP66.pdf] (last visited: 10/05/2007)  




discipline provided by the BTA. To that end, in 2001 all government agencies were instructed 
“to formulate concrete and comprehensive action plans to amend and supplement legal 
documents according to the BTA schedule, strengthen the legal system, to finalize 
policies…”162 In December 2001, the Prime Minister approved the initial review by the 
Ministry of Justice in regards to the legal instruments that needed to be amended in order to 
comply with Vietnam's international undertakings (including the BTA) and the WTO 
accession.163 Accordingly, 94 items of legislation were identified as requiring amendment or 
formulation (which included 24 Laws and 15 Ordinances), of which legislations on trade 
remedy measures were considered as among “the most urgent elements of the national legal 
system to be developed in light of the WTO accession”.164  The MOT was assigned to 
“formulate promptly relevant anti-dumping regulations and laws, as a means to protect 
domestic industries and promote fair competition in accordance with trade protection methods 
allowed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO)”.165  
The development of anti-dumping legislation was conducted by the MOT in coordination 
with various state agencies, including the Government Office, Legislative Office of the 
National Assembly, Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). 
                                                 
 
162  Resolution 48/2001/NQ-QH10 adopted by the National Assembly on the Ratification of Vietnam-U.S. 
Bilateral Trade Agreement dated 28/11/2001, Clause 4. 
163  Official Letter 6172/VPCP-TCQT of the Office of Government dated 18/12/2001 instructs ministries, 
branches and people's committees to continue to check the legal instruments within the sectors for which 
they are responsible and the instruments issued by them. 
164  MOT, “Tình hình nghiên cứu soạn thảo Pháp lệnh chống bán phá giá” (Progress of researching and 
preparing for the draft of the Anti-dumping Ordinance), Report to the Prime Minister, Hanoi, 10 Dec. 2001. 
pp.17-18 
165  Circular of the Government Office No 226/VPCP/PC regarding the instruction of the Prime Minister to the 
Ministry of Trade to preside the drafting of the text of Anti-dumping Ordinance and assign the Minister of 




During the drafting process, the legislators carried out a comprehensive volume of works, 
including checking and analyzing domestic legislations, studying international rules on anti-
dumping and national anti-dumping legislation of some countries166. On 29 April 2004 the 
final text of the Ordinance 20-2004-PL -UBTVQH11 against Dumping of Imported Goods in 
Vietnam (Anti-dumping Ordinance), was adopted by the National Assembly’s Standing 
Committee. The newly promulgated legislation, which has taken legal effect as from 1 
October 2004, provides a legal base to offset the foreign unfair trade practices of dumping 
which have taken place in Vietnam’s market. However, unlike the previous unsuccessful 
regulations, the current anti-dumping regulations were drafted with a clear intent to comply 
with international principles and regulations. The legal framework for anti-dumping 
proceeding of the Anti-dumping Ordinance has been basically designed to correspond with 
the requirement of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement (ADA). Accordingly, the Ordinance 
establishes three main principles: (i) foreign products imported into Vietnam shall be 
considered as dumped and subject to remedy measure only when they are sold at a price lower 
than the domestic normal value, (ii) such sale caused injury or threaten to cause injury to a 
domestic like-product industry and (iii) between the dumping and the injury there is a causal 
link. Besides, the anti-dumping measures is also defined as a temporary trade measure to 
offset foreign imports dumped into Vietnam causing significant injury to domestic 
manufacturing industry.  
 
                                                 
 
166  MOT, supra note 165. The national legislations which were used as reference during the draft of Anti-
dumping Ordinance include: the European Community Anti-dumping Regulations 1996, US Anti-dumping 





3.3.2. Significance of the New Anti-Dumping Legislation 
The importance of the newly promulgated Anti-dumping Ordinance cannot be over-
emphasized, because it has filled a vacuum in the Vietnam’s foreign trade law system. As the 
first special legislation in Vietnam’s history to address the issue of foreign dumping imports 
in domestic market, there is no doubt that the Anti-dumping Ordinance has a tremendous 
positive impact on the development of the Vietnamese economy.  
The Anti-dumping Ordinance provides substantive legal framework to be followed by both 
government and domestic industries. The government has established specialized anti-
dumping agencies, which are authorized to initiate an anti-dumping investigation, to conduct 
the investigation, to make preliminary or final investigation and decision, and to levy and 
collect provisional or final anti-dumping duties on dumping imports. The investigation and 
the decision on the imposition of anti-dumping measures against the foreign imported 
products should be conducted in accordance with strict rules and principles. The trade 
authorities now can only utilize trade remedy measure when they can prove that the subject 
imported products have been dumped into Vietnamese market and distorting the operation of 
domestic competing industry. In order words, the remedy actions by the government agencies 
must operate within the framework established by the Anti-dumping Ordinance and the 
supporting legal documents.  
The Anti-dumping Ordinance constitutes the legal framework, within which the domestic 
manufacturers and producers can seek necessary relief and protection against dumping goods 
and articles by the exporting companies and business entities of any country in the world. The 




times in view of the scenarios arising out of trade remedy decisions by some of the trading 
partners, especially after the significant reduction of import’s tariff and non-tariff barriers. As 
a matter of fact, until recently, most Vietnamese producers were not familiar with the anti-
dumping rules and proceedings due to the novelty of this trade measure in their practices but 
as the process of integration goes on they started to realize the importance of this legal 
instrument as some of them have been badly affected by the anti-dumping measures abroad. 
Now, with the existence of an anti-dumping legislation in the national legal system, 
Vietnamese producers will soon learn about problem-solving remedies in case their legitimate 
rights provided in the law are being violated or threatened. In order words the newly issued 
anti-dumping legislations can serve as a ‘safety valve’ trade instrument to guard against 
contingencies arising out of the liberalization and tariff reduction. To that end, the domestic 
industries will support more of the trade liberalization policy that the government is currently 
pursuing. 
The Anti-dumping Ordinance also contributes to the perfection of Vietnam’s domestic market 
economy. Since 1986, Vietnam has undergone a continuous transformation of its economic 
system. With the acceptance of multi-component economic structure167 and an increasing 
number of laws and regulations passed to stipulate fair competition in domestic businesses, 
the Vietnamese economy has become more and more market-oriented. But it cannot be a real, 
mature market unless it integrates itself into the international market and can solve the 
problems brought about in the process of such integration. The anti-dumping regulations if 
                                                 
 
167  Constitution 1992, Article 15. “The State [of Vietnam] promotes a multi-component commodity economy 
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production and trading is based on a system of ownership by the entire people, by collectives, and by private 




efficiently applied will serve to preserve a fair competitive environment for domestic and 
foreign competitors and to maintain fair competition by fighting against foreign unfair 
business practices of dumping. 
Furthermore, anti-dumping measures can serve as a strategic trade instrument for bargaining 
power in international trade relations. Since the anti-dumping measures applied on foreign 
imports can seriously affect the economic interests of the relevant exporting country it is 
argued that the anti-dumping proceeding can be used as a mean to persuade a trading partner 
to remove/change an irrational trade policy (i.e. the barrier that facilitates a discrimination 
against Vietnamese products in that country) or adjust their trading practices. The imposition 
of anti-dumping duties on dumped products of exporters from a country, which is pursuing 
discriminatory trade treatments against Vietnamese products, can be made to “realize the 
costs of the measures” and thus pressure their own governments to change the measures 
against Vietnamese products.168 Nonetheless, this approach towards the use of anti-dumping 
regime is not much desirable because it would turn the trade remedy instrument into a trade 
retaliation instrument, which is far removed from the original intent of anti-dumping 
measures. 
Finally, the new national anti-dumping legal framework also plays a significant part in the 
economic integration process of Vietnam. It is important to note that at the time the Anti-
dumping Ordinance was drafted and adopted, Vietnam was not yet a member of the WTO 
trading system. Hence, it had designed the national anti-dumping legislation to correspond 
                                                 
 
168  MOT, “Báo cáo tổng kết của Ban pháp chế Bộ Thương mại về vụ việc Ủy ban Châu Âu và Ùy ban thương 
mại Hàn Quốc điều tra các doanh  nghiệp Việt Nam bán phá giá bật lửa gas” (Report of the Department of 
Justice regarding the decisions of European Commission and Korean Trade Commission in their 




with the requirements of the anti-dumping framework settled by Article VI of the GATT and 
the ADA. That was a strong indicator of the desire and will of the Vietnamese government to 
harmonize its legal system and foreign trade regime with the WTO multilateral legal 
framework. This helped to pave the way for the country subsequent successful entrance into 
the WTO and the following anti-dumping system. 
 
3.4. INSIGHTS OF THE ANTI-DUMPING SYSTEM 
3.4.1. Legal and Institutional Framework of the Anti-Dumping System 
3.4.1.1. Legal Framework 
The legal framework of Vietnamese anti-dumping system has been developed on the 
foundation of the Anti-dumping Ordinance. This statutory document resembles, to a great 
extent, the WTO ADA in terms of logical structure. The Ordinance consists of 29 articles 
which are divided into five chapters, namely “General Provisions” (Chapter 1); “Investigation 
for Application of Anti-Dumping Measures” (Chapter II); “Application of Anti-dumping 
Measures” (Chapter III); “Review of Application of Anti-dumping Measures” (Chapter IV); 
“Complaints and Handling of Violations” (Chapter V); and “Implementation Provisions” 
(Chapter VI). Within the framework of the Ordinance, dumping is defined as the sale of 
foreign imported goods into Vietnamese market in normal commercial conditions less than its 
normal price.169 The “normal price” here is similar to the concept of "normal value" used in 
common international anti-dumping practices and regulated under Article VI of the GATT, 
which means the comparable price in of similar goods being sold on the local market of the 
                                                 
 




exporting country or territory. Thus in order to determine whether imports are being dumped 
or not, Vietnamese anti-dumping authorities are required to conduct an investigation to 
determine the normal price and export price of the relevant product. The anti-dumping 
legislation has adopted various methods for assessment and comparison of those economic 
values in accordance with the guidelines of the ADA. 
Anti-dumping measures in the form of temporary additional import duties shall be applied 
against foreign imports only when a relevant investigation concludes that the imports have 
been dumped at a significant dumping margin, that the volume, quantity or value of dumped 
products is significant, and that the dumping of such products directly causes, or threatens to 
cause, significant injury to a domestic manufacturing industry.170 The relevant investigation 
must be conducted by specialized agencies of the MOT and should be conducted within 12 
months in normal case and no more than 18 months in special cases.171  
The Anti-dumping Ordinance has also settled four fundamental principles regarding the 
application of anti-dumping measures in Vietnam: 
(1)  Anti-dumping measures shall be applied at a necessary and reasonable level only in 
order to prevent or limit material injury to the domestic industries; 
(2)  The application of anti-dumping measures shall be effected only after investigation 
has been conducted and must be based on the investigation determination; 
(3)  Anti-dumping measures shall only be applied directly to the imports dumped into 
Vietnam under the provisions of the Ordinance; and 
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(4)  The application of anti-dumping measures must not cause harm to the national 
socio-economic interests. 
Vietnam will not apply anti-dumping measures against foreign products which have 
insignificant dumping margin or negligible volume of sales in Vietnamese market. 
Accordingly, the dumping margin is considered as insignificant when the difference between 
the normal value of the imported products and their exporting price is less than 2%. While the 
negligible volume, quantity of sales of dumped products is defined at the rate lower than 3% 
of the total volume, quantity imports of like products into Vietnamese market, unless the total 
volume, quantity of the products dumped from a number of countries exceeds 7% of the total 
volume, quantity total imports of like products into Vietnam.172
As a temporary foreign trade measure, anti-dumping duty should not be applied more than 5 
years (although this period may be extended if a check by the Minister concludes that the 
continuation of the measure is still necessary to protect the relevant domestic industry). After 
one year of application of the anti-dumping measure if any concerned parties requests and the 
evidence provided by such party so merits, the Minister may conduct a review of the necessity 
of continuation of the anti-dumping measures. Such anti-dumping measure’s review may also 
be conducted on the initiative of the Minister, but only one year prior to expiry of the decision 
applying the anti-dumping measures.  
The Anti-dumping Ordinance itself only creates a broad framework of statutory norms. The 
regulations of the Ordinance were not detailed enough to give Vietnamese producers or 
industries sufficient guidance with regard practice of dumping nor do they provide relevant 
                                                 
 




Vietnamese authorities with clear guidelines to handle private complaints. As it was 
mentioned earlier in Chapter II, under the legal system of Vietnam statutory acts (including 
laws and ordinances) adopted by the National Assembly (especially in the field of public-
administration) usually need under-law implementing regulations (i.e. decrees, ministerial 
circulars explaining the detail implications) to be ready for implementation. To that end, 
several pieces of under-law legislation providing detail guidelines for application of the Anti-
dumping Ordinance were developed. In 2005, the Government issued the first important 
Decree 90/2005/ND-CP (Decree 90/CP)173 to provide guidelines for implementation of the 
Ordinance provisions in regards to the (i) basis for determination of a “major proportion of the 
total volume, quantity or value of similar goods manufactured domestically” and “direct 
relationship between domestic manufacturers manufacturing similar goods and any 
organization or individual exporting or importing goods which are the subject of the request 
for application of anti-dumping measures”; (ii) composition of Anti-dumping authorities 
under the under the MOT and their duties and powers in anti-dumping proceedings; (iii) rights 
and obligations of parties in anti-dumping proceedings; and (iv) application files requesting 
anti-dumping investigation; procedures for commencement of investigation, matters to be 
investigated and verified; conclusions of investigations, procedures for application of anti-
dumping measures. 
In January 2006 two other pieces of legislation related to application of Anti-dumping 
Ordinance were introduced, namely the Decree 06/2006/ND-CP (Decree 06/CP) 174  and 
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provisions of the Ordinance against dumping of imported goods in Vietnam, dated 11th July 2005. 
174  Decree 06/2006/ND-CP of the Government defining the functions, tasks, powers and organizational 




Decree 04/2006/ND-CP (Decree 04/CP)175, to regulate the establishment and functioning of 
two anti-dumping authorities, the Vietnam Competition Administration Department (VCAD) 
and the Council for handling of anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard cases (Trade 
Remedy Council - TRC). The Ministry of Finance also issued an official circulation 
106/2005/TT-TBC176 providing guidelines for Customs Office to collect and refund the trade 
remedy duties, including anti-dumping duties, to support the implementation of the anti-
dumping legislation. For the first time in Vietnam there are now systematic implementing 
legislations regulating anti-dumping measures. This initially shows the serious intention of 
Vietnam’s government to develop a sufficient legal framework for anti-dumping measures to 
prepare for the future participation in the multilateral trade system of WTO. 
3.4.1.2. Institutional Framework  
Establishment of institutional framework for implementation of the rules is also an important 
move to make the law become effective. The Anti-dumping Ordinance has authorizes the 
MOT as the principal government agency in charge of enforcement of anti-dumping 
regulations. According to Article 7 of the Ordinance the Minister shall be responsible before 
the Government for performing the state management over anti-dumping system. He should 
decide on the application of anti-dumping measures and bear responsibility for such decisions. 
However, actual anti-dumping proceeding is to be conducted by the two specialized agencies 
of the MOT, namely the Vietnam Competition Administration Department and the Council 
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176  Circular No. 106/2005/TT-BTCof the Ministry of Finance providing guidelines for collecting, paying and 
returning anti-dumping duty, anti-subsidy duty and collecting, paying and returning anti-dumping duty,  




for Handling of Anti-dumping, Anti-subsidy and Safeguard cases (Trade Remedy Council). 
These two agencies shall consult the Ministers of Trade in regards to the application of 
measures of against dumping. 
a. Vietnam Competition Administration Department 
The Vietnam Competition Administration Department (VCAD) was established in fall 2005 
under the MOT and officially started operation in January 2006 pursuant to the Decree 06/CP 
of the Government regulating the functions, competences and organizational structure of the 
VCAD. 
Pursuant to Decree 06/CP, the main function of VCAD is to administer the national 
competition policy, which includes both domestic and foreign sphere. Accordingly, VCAD 
shall supervise and conduct the enforcement of the regulations of the competition law177 as 
well as operate the trade remedy system, which includes safeguards, anti-dumping and anti-
subsidy measures, in an efficient and timely manner to provide protection to the domestic 
industry against foreign unfair trade practices.178  
In the field of anti-dumping control, VCAD shall carry out investigations on dumping 
practices and recommend in regards to the matter of application of antidumping duties, where 
it is demonstrated that the dumped imports cause or threaten to cause material injury to the 
domestic industry 179 . VCAD shall perform all the administrative procedures of an 
investigation, including, inter alia, issuing the public notices of initiation, preliminary and 
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final determinations; gathering information from the parties involved; carrying out 
conciliation meetings; conducting in suit verifications; considering price-undertakings; and 
establishing verification mechanisms to ensure compliance in coordination with the customs 
authorities.  
Specifically, VCAD is responsible for the entirety of anti-dumping proceedings, including 
both determination of dumping and injury. It shall make dumping investigation: i.e. looking 
into the existence of dumping, material injury or threat of material injury, and the causal link 
between them as well as recommend the concrete measure to counteract dumping. This differs 
from the practice of some countries, where two separate agencies are responsible for the 
findings of dumping on the one hand, and injury, on the other.180 This system is suitable for a 
developing country like Vietnam since it helps to save the operational budget as well as 
maximize the performance of limited resources of experts given that some of the 
competencies and skills involved in the determination of unfair trade practices and injury are 
similar.181  
Other functions of VCAD include: acting as an advisory unit to other government agencies in 
all matters relating to trade remedy practices, including the formulation of legislative reforms; 
participating in international negotiations in this area; and defending the resolutions of the 
MOT before dispute settlement panels under the various international agreements subscribed 
                                                 
 
180  Reference can be made to the anti-dumping system of the US, EC (since 1995), Korea.  These countries 
have two separate agencies in charge of the determination of dumping and the determination of injury.   
181  Vermulst, E., “Adopting and Implementing Anti-dumping Laws – Some Suggestions for Developing 
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seems preferable for developing counties because there are unlikely to be many cases in the beginning, and 
because staff will be trained most efficiently by conducting an administrative proceeding from the beginning 




by Vietnam. Additionally, VCAD provides assistance to Vietnamese exporters involved in 
anti-dumping disputes in foreign markets. 
b. Trade Remedy Council  
Alongside VCAD, the Trade Remedy Council (TRC) is another principal agency handling 
anti-dumping matters in Vietnam. Organized in accordance with the Decree 04/CP, the main 
responsibility of TRC is to assist the Minister to evaluate the report of VCAD on the case 
against the dumping imports and recommend the Minister to impose or not impose anti-
dumping duties against those alleged dumping imports.182 Members of the TRC shall discuss 
and decide by majority on whether the goods are dumped into Vietnam or not, causing or 
threatening to cause material injury to the domestic industries. The TRC final conclusion on 
the subject matter will reflect directly the decision of the Minister in regards to relevant anti-
dumping measures.  
The TRC does not operate on a permanent basis but rather is organized whenever there is 
dispute case on the trade remedy matters. The composition of the Council should include a 
number of standing members and some other ad hoc members who are appointed on the case-
by-case basis by the Minister.183  
3.4.2. Legislative Intention of the Anti-Dumping Policy   
As it was mentioned earlier, the newly developed anti-dumping legal framework of Vietnam 
was designed with reference to the WTO anti-dumping rules and principles. Nevertheless, it is 
always debatable whether national anti-dumping laws were created with the same legislative 
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intention as the ADA. Often, the national anti-dumping legislations are developed by 
countries to serve national economic interests, which include inter alia protecting interests of 
domestic industries, maintaining market orders or restraining the unfair trade practice of 
foreign products to gain dominance on the market, whereas, Article VI of the GATT was 
adopted to confine national anti-dumping actions (preventing the abuse/misuse of this trade 
remedy instrument for the purpose of protectionism) on which the ADA provides for more 
restrictive requirements. 
Nowadays, almost every country is at the same time both an exporting country and an 
importing one. It is understandable that each country has its own anti-dumping laws. 
However, they may have different or sometimes completely contrary attitudes towards the 
anti-dumping rules depending on the priority objective of protection. The national 
governments often have to face an uneasy task of balancing interests of various economic 
groups in the national economy, namely the domestic competing producers, downstream 
producers, workers, importers and consumers of the subject products. Theoretically, the 
development of national economy through optimal resource allocations lies on the free trade 
and open competition, however, in reality realization of the national industrial policy’s goals 
is also very highly significant. The national government cannot let a domestic industry 
collapse for the short-term benefits of certain economic groups. The market order and stability 
of national economy are also very important factor that any government should always take in 
consideration. This paradox was dramatically demonstrated by those difficulties that nation 
states have to face during their multilateral negotiations to develop international framework 




negotiations where participated countries were has their priority set on anti-dumping issues 
and development of the ADA. 
Compared with the Anti-Dumping Code 1979,184 the WTO ADA brought about numerous 
changes, which more strictly is confined to the national anti-dumping practices. Although, 
according to some observers, “the adopted changes cannot resolve the fundamental problems 
of an inflated dumping margin and the quasi-presumption of injury” and that “anti-dumping 
measures remain as restrictions on trade and protection against foreign production”185 certain 
balance was still achieved in the ADA. The anti-dumping procedural rules have been 
significantly strengthened to discipline the national anti-dumping proceedings. The ADA 
shows a clear intention to protect foreign trade against the abuse of powers of importing 
countries and forces them to improve transparency in their anti-dumping actions. More 
importantly, under the multilateral trading system of the WTO, the national anti-dumping 
laws are considered to be legitimate only when they are consistent with the standard 
requirements established by the ADA. 
According to the statement of purpose of the Anti-dumping Ordinance made by the MOT, 
Vietnam’s “anti-dumping system should preserve liberal foreign trade order and fair 
competitive market”.186 The wording seems to show that its intentions of the anti-dumping 
legislation are no exception to those of other national anti-dumping legislations. But given 
their background, principles and contents, the legislative intentions of the Vietnamese Anti-
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Dumping Ordinance are still rather distinctive to some extent. Unlike anti-dumping laws of 
some WTO member countries, which were enacted a long time ago and therefore may contain 
many provisions inconsistent with the WTO anti-dumping regulations, 187 the Vietnamese 
anti-dumping legislation has been developed in the light of the most recent development of 
the international rules and principles of anti-dumping measures. Many new liberal anti-
dumping concepts of the ADA, which promote the economic efficiency consideration in anti-
dumping proceeding, have been included into Vietnamese legislations. It is also worth noting 
that the Anti-dumping Ordinance recognizes some legal concepts, which are not required 
compulsorily under the WTO anti-dumping framework (i.e. the lesser duty or public interest 
considerations). The consistency of the Vietnam’s national anti-dumping legislation with the 
ADA will help to reduce the chance that certain regulation is challenged by other trading 
partners at the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. More importantly, it shows that anti-
dumping legislation of Vietnam is designed not to refuse foreign products and to protect 
domestic industries arbitrarily, but to preserve and promote fair competitive environment in 
the domestic market. This legislative intention is very important in the sense that it will serve 
as a theoretical foundation for possible improvement of their anti-dumping system.  
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In addition, it is also worth noting that at the moment of issuance of Anti-dumping Ordinance, 
Vietnam was still negotiating to join the WTO. So, the WTO rules and regulations were not 
effective for Vietnam. The WTO non-member status, however, did not prevent Vietnam from 
restraining its own actions in anti-dumping and other aspects. The self-restrained anti-
dumping legislation has showed Vietnam's intention to cooperate with the WTO and its 
members and it was generally contributive for the improvement of global trade. 
3.4.3. Linkage Between Anti-dumping and Competition Policies in Vietnam  
In Vietnam, due to the specific economic and historical background, all national economic 
policies, including industrial policy, privatization policy, competition policy and trade policy, 
have been developed under the single umbrella of the Doi Moi economic reforms. Under 
traditional central planning economic system, competition had no role to play either in theory 
or in practice, and therefore there was no room for competition policy. Thus, Vietnam did not 
have any competition policy until the late 1980s when the government started the implication 
of  Doi Moi economic reform policy. With the recognition of market oriented economy, the 
government started permitting the development of private sector and thus introduced 
competition into the economy. Since then, some kinds of competition regulations together 
with various policy measures have been introduced to promote competition environment in 
Vietnam.  
The development of competition policy in Vietnam can be divided into three stages. At the 
first stage of development market oriented economy (late 1980s – mid 1990s), competition 
policy has played a leading role in promoting development of other economic policies. It 




market by introducing competition among existing business entities, relaxing price controls 
and promoting private trading rights. These measures contributed significantly to 
development of foreign trade.  
In the following stage (from mid 1990s to 2000) the competition policy both promoted and 
limited competition: in some areas the market access barriers erected against domestic and 
foreign private investors have been wiped out, however in some others the policy was directed 
to development of economic concentration and monopoly. With the goal to improve the 
competitiveness of domestic firms, Vietnamese Government decided to establish a series of 
state-sponsored business groups or general corporations (“Tổng công ty”) as they are known - 
which should play the roles of “national champions” in the international competition. These 
general corporations were merged by administrative decisions without taking into account 
their economies of scale. In order to enhance their competitiveness, these “national 
champions” were granted tariff protection, special rights to engage in international trade, 
access to easy loan from the state-owned banks, and other preferential treatments.  
However, the widespread existence of most general corporations has actually restricted 
competition between corporations and other non-member enterprises and even among 
member enterprises of a corporation. In addition, these corporations could not improve their 
competitiveness when being strongly protected from the competition of other domestic 
competitors, especially foreign invested ones and of the imported products. Due to special 
trade protection, those general corporations tend to earn high profits, but their capacity to 
meet the challenges of deepening integration and increasing competition is highly 
questionable. Sugar and cement processing industries were the clearest examples of failure 




were the dominant suppliers in the national market. They are facing serious problems in 
competing with foreign imported products immediately after years of “successful” operation 
based on high concentration and artificial trade barriers. Hence, the government had to pay 
dearly for its failure to reconcile industrial policy with competition. Meanwhile, most 
competitive and successful industries in Vietnam, such as textiles – garments, rice and 
seafood are those which have experienced the most turmoil and excessive competition during 
the last two decades. 
The new stage of development of competition policy in Vietnam, which started from 2000 up 
to now, is characterized with progressive liberalization and openness under the influence of 
the WTO accession negotiation. It is during this period the first Vietnamese competition law 
was adopted.188 Since 2002 the Vietnamese government has re-evaluated the effectiveness of 
general corporations and promoted the corporation restructuring and privatization. The policy 
makers have been making tremendous efforts to establish pro-competitive market structure. 
During the IX Party Congress, the leaders have expressly recognized that for economic 
transition and reform, the benefits of an open market economy cannot be fully realized unless 
restrictions on competition, both internal and external, are removed.189 This approach towards 
the competition gives significant impetus for the formation of objective for foreign trade 
remedy instruments, including anti-dumping, which have more emphasis on preserving fair 
and competitive environment than providing pure protection for domestic firms. 
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Trade liberalization in Vietnam during the last two decades has induced a market structure 
that encourages competition and to a certain extent eliminates the monopolistic behaviors of 
inefficient state-owned companies. But when the domestic market is not competitive, the 
intended benefit of foreign trade reform may not be realized. With increasingly open 
economies due to trade liberalization, some large state-owned enterprises may attempt to 
protect the domestic market through forming price cartels, arrangements with local retailers to 
effectively curtail imports from foreign market. The abuse of anti-dumping measures can also 
protect the potential positive effects of trade liberalization on domestic consumers. Thus, 
instead of nurturing competition, anti-dumping measures can sometimes result in an increase 
in anti-competitive practices (when they are misused to protect domestic cartels).  
Thus, while an open trade policy is supportive of competition policy objectives in principle, it 
is not necessarily a guarantee of fair competition in practice. Recognizing this problem the 
Vietnamese government has, during the last few years, pledged to develop the foreign trade 
polices and foreign trade instruments in such a way to comply with competition principles. 
This economic underpinning fair competition has been introduced into the anti-dumping 
ordinance (e.g. inclusion lesser duty rule, public interest provision) and should be served as 
the base for development of a competition friendly anti-dumping regime. 
3.4.4. Competition Policy Considerations Within the Anti-Dumping Policy 
a. Unified Competition – Anti-Dumping Agency 
One of clearest attempts by the Vietnamese government to connect the anti-dumping 
proceeding with competition policy is the act of authorizing the competition authority - the 
VCAD - to conduct the anti-dumping investigation. The VCAD is established to conduct both 




that although foreign trade-remedy and domestic competition policies are independent and 
based on different concepts, the two legal instruments are quite closely related in the sense 
that their genuine goal is to maintain a fair competitive order in the national market. 
Therefore, their enforcement might be more efficient and systematic if they are under 
administration of a single government authority.  
Furthermore, the government also considered the fact that the abuse of anti-dumping 
measures in international practice are mainly because the anti-dumping authorities are not 
aware of or ignore the positive competitive effects of low - price imports on competition. 
They only concentrate on protecting the interests of domestic producers while ignoring the 
interests of other concerned parties in the market place, such as consumers and industrial 
users. In other words, this organizational structure is expected to make the investigating 
authorities take the competitiveness of the market into serious consideration when they make 
the determination. 
This approach towards improvement of the anti-dumping system is noteworthy since most 
countries in the world would have anti-dumping authorities that operate separately from the 
national competition authorities. Therefore, they usually do not closely cooperate or consult 
with domestic competition policy authorities in the course of their decision making procedure. 
As a consequence, the calculation of economy-wide welfare effect of anti-dumping measures 
to the importing country is usually ignored by the anti-dumping authorities during the 




national anti-dumping authorities are frequently subject to strong criticism from different 
quarters, especially from economists.190  
To that end, it is the view of author that the initiative taken by Vietnam can give certain 
impetus to lessen the anti-competitive nature of the anti-dumping measures. It is expected that 
VCAD staffs, who are involved should enforce both competition and anti-dumping policies, 
will have a more rational approach in anti-dumping investigations, i.e. taking more 
considerations in regard to competition environment and consumer interests rather than just 
the interests of domestic industries in the trade dispute cases.  
b. Socio-Economic Considerations 
Furthermore, as the anti-dumping system is considered not only as an instrument to safeguard 
the interests of domestic industries, but also to defend the fair-competition and economic 
development, the trade authority of Vietnam has made some initiatives beyond the 
requirement of the WTO in regard to the system. First of all, it is related to the provision on 
the principles of applicability of anti-dumping measures, which emphasize that ‘any 
application of anti-dumping measures must not cause harm to domestic socio-economic 
interests’.191 This can be interpreted to mean that interests of various interest-groups in the 
national economy should be taken into account upon consideration of application of anti-
dumping measure. As discussed in the previous chapter ,if all important economic interests 
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other than just the interests of competing domestic industries were taken into consideration 
(like the interests of downstream industries and consumers) the anti-dumping measure would 
become more balanced and economically-sound. The socio-economic consideration in 
Vietnamese anti-dumping system corresponds with the commonly known Public Interest 
concepts in international trade practice. This concept has been recognized by anti-dumping 
reformists as the nucleus for improvement of the efficiency in the national anti-dumping 
regime.192 Although so far there is no detailed guideline for the implementation of this radical 
provision of the Anti-dumping Ordinance, the recognition of such concept in the Anti-
dumping system is very important as it calls the investigating authorities to consider anti-
dumping complaints in a wider context, taking into account not only the interests of the 
affected domestic industry, but also the costs of the anti-dumping intervention to the national 
economy. In this connection, this author will provide some suggestions for further 
improvement of the socio-economic interest mechanism in chapter IV. 
A soft option to ensure fulfillment of socio-economic interest consideration in Vietnamese 
anti-dumping system can be referred to the “lesser duty rules”, which would require 
antidumping duties to never exceed the dumping margin.193 It is argued that the lesser duty 
rules appears to be a worthwhile change that helps to alleviate some of the harm caused by 
anti-dumping duty to consumers and other users of the dumped products. It is because the 
applied duty rate is adequate only to remove the injury to the domestic industry. It is worth 
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noting that although the ADA does regulate the lesser duty rule concept, it does not make the 
application of this concept mandatory for member countries. 194  Therefore the unilateral 
recognition of the lesser duty rules shows the strong will of the Vietnamese government to 
promote the socio-economic interest concept into the anti-dumping system.  
 
3.5. SOME STRATEGIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Despite a very short history of legal reform and the novelty of trade regulations to the 
Vietnamese authorities and the legal community, any objective observer must be impressed 
with the efforts put in and the accomplishments achieved in administration of anti-dumping 
system. Provisions of the Anti-dumping Ordinance and its implementations regulations are 
consistent with the ADA, i.e. the basic principles and spirits of Uruguay Round have been 
followed precisely. During the legislative process, Vietnam had all along looked into relevant 
agreements of WTO for essential guidance. It can be said that the drafters of current 
regulations frequently select and paraphrase requirements in the ADA. However, as it was 
discussed in the previous chapter, the WTO anti-dumping framework is still not perfect and 
still subject to strong criticism for the containing some features that allow the misuse of anti-
dumping measures for the purpose of protectionism. That is why many well-known 
protectionist biases of the anti-dumping provisions in WTO and other countries are also 
included in Vietnam current anti-dumping legislation, such as the provision of cumulative 
assessment on imports would make easier the demonstration of injury and widening the 
                                                 
 




geographical scope of protective measures 195 ; or the sunset review rules which allow 
extension of anti-dumping measures after the 5 year standard period 196 ; and a broad  
definition of the confidentiality of the information limiting the rights of the respondents.197 
Besides, some anti-dumping terms (i.e. “export price”, “comparable price”) and liberal 
concepts (i.e. “socio-economic interests” or “public interests”) are not clearly defined. They 
should be clearly regulated to avoid discretionary implementation by the government 
authorities. As discussed above, these provisions are not inconsistent with the requirement of 
the ADA; however, with the existence of some of them, it may produce a negative influence 
on the liberalization pace of economy as well as the fair competition environment. 
3.5.1. Improve the Substantive Content of the Legislation 
Although the regulations of Anti-dumping Ordinance are on the whole consistent with ADA, 
they still leave much to be desire. The wording of most of the provisions is still too general to 
be implemented. Thus, the trade authorities (MOT and its agencies) should consider issuing 
more detail implementing regulatory document to supplement the regulation of the Ordinance.  
Besides, the Vietnamese legislation use some terminologies which are different from the 
commonly accepted terms and already stipulated by the ADA, for instance “normal price” 
instead of “normal value”, “significant injury” instead of “material injury”, “similar product” 
instead of “like product” etc. Although the this terms include the same meanings as the terms 
provided under the ADA the divergent in wording may sometimes create certain difficulties in 
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interpretation and comparison. To that end, it is suggested that all the terms used in the 
Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation should follow that terminology provided by the ADA.    
Although the principal anti-dumping framework of Vietnam has been developed in light of 
the ADA many rules and principles on dumping and injury determination were left untouched 
under current anti-dumping legislation. Some provisions are either too simple compared to the 
requirements of the ADA or are not well elaborated in the implementing regulations. In order 
to ensure the effective application of the law in practice, those rules and regulations should be 
modified or amended. As mentioned in the earlier part, some competition policy 
considerations might be also introduced into the current anti-dumping legislation in order to 
improve the efficiency of the anti-dumping system and also to make it become more 
competition friendly. Socio-economic (public) interests’ clause, like product determination, 
constructed normal value, injury cumulation, provision, to name but a few examples of those 
legal provisions in Vietnamese anti-dumping system, which should be closely analyzed for 
improvement. 
3.5.2. Focusing More on Due Process and Operation of Anti-Dumping Authorities 
When keeping the substantive part of anti-dumping legislation consistent with the ADA, 
Vietnam also recognizes the importance of maintaining due process in an anti-dumping 
investigation so as to guarantee the interested parties concerned to enjoy full rights of 
information and argument in the whole administrative process. One of the main goals of the 
Decree 90/CP is to elaborate the anti-dumping procedure related rules, such as rules on 
initiation, investigation, accession to non-confidential information, and price taking, etc. 
Decree 90/CP has established a framework for due process of anti-dumping proceeding, 




framework that need to be looked into. For instance, in regards to provisions on determination 
of dumping, the Vietnam’s anti-dumping legislation does not stipulate the rules for 
comparison of normal value and export price in the situation where the number of exporters, 
producers, importers or types of products involved is so large as to make a simple comparison 
on the price of individual items of goods, therefore, creating difficulties for anti-dumping 
authorities in the execution. Meanwhile, this rule is regulated quite clearly in the ADA198. 
Furthermore, there are also some problems in regards to the organizational framework of anti-
dumping authorities. As it was described above, Vietnam has established a specific anti-
dumping regulatory apparatus. It has two agencies in charge of the anti-dumping matters but 
they do not function like the “US model”, which divide the functions of determination of 
injury to International Trade Commission (ITC) and determination of dumping to Department 
of Commerce (DOC). Within the Vietnamese anti-dumping system, the VCAD actually 
performs most functions of an anti-dumping agency. It receive petition, conducts investigation 
and make conclusion in regards to the dumping issue. However, VCAD jurisdiction is limited 
by the TRC, which is the governmental agency to the make final recommendation whether or 
not there is a necessity to apply anti-dumping duties against the foreign imported under 
investigation. 199  Therefore, at least in terms of government structures, for anti-dumping 
administration, Vietnamese system is neither ‘monist’ nor ‘dualist’ as these terms are 
generally understood. In so far as the system divides scarce human and financial resources 
and creates departmental frictions and additional burden of coordination among all two 
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agencies involved, it appears to have inherited some the drawbacks of a ‘dualist’ system and 
goes beyond it to have a something even more complicated than that. As a matter of fact the 
division of labor between TRC and VCAD to the present time is still so unclear. Both of them 
operate under the umbrella of the MOT and most of their operations so far are only recorded 
in the legal regulations. Even Vietnamese practitioners, who are presumably more adept in 
navigating the legal system, have criticized the confusion created.200  
The shortcoming of structural organization in legislation might cause unpredictable issues to 
the national anti-dumping system and may reduce the efficiency of the system. The issue is 
even more important as the role of governmental agencies in developing and strengthening the 
anti-dumping system in Vietnam right now and in the near future is overwhelming since the 
majority of the society does not have adequate knowledge about this issue.   
3.5.3. Improvement of Transparency  
Lack of transparency is a shortcoming of many national anti-dumping systems in the world. 
For Vietnam, this issue is even more critical because of its ancient rooted legal tradition. 
During the 1990s, when Vietnam was just integrating into the world economy the lack of 
transparency in administrative control was heavily criticized by its foreign trading partners. 
However, with the gradual realization of economic integration, Vietnam has started to 
enhance the transparency in its legislation and administrative practices. Nowadays, all the law 
and regulations are largely available for public right after their adoption by government 
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authorities. In the anti-dumping area, even the drafts of the legislation were published by the 
MOT for public access.  
However, the transparency requirement is not only limited to prompt publication of laws and 
regulations but also extended to the anti-dumping authorities during the process of 
investigation and decision making. The anti-dumping legislation of Vietnam has established a 
clear time framework for each stage of the anti-dumping proceeding to which the anti-
dumping authorities should strictly comply with. This helps interested parties to predict the 
length of the proceeding.  
Still, anti-dumping proceedings in Vietnam are not open. By large, the process of 
investigation and decision-making tends to be secret and “closed-door” affairs of the anti-
dumping authorities. Thus, it will be difficult for concerned parties  to access information to 
know about the methodologies used by the VCAD during the investigation; they simply must  
accept the final outcome. The closed-door proceeding would make the work of anti-dumping 
authorities a subject of interference of various lobbying pressures. This makes it hard for the 
officials to maintain their neutrality and objectivity, which can derail the proceedings and 
eventual outcome of the case. The concerned parties can lobby and give pressure to either 
VCAD or TRC through various channels in order to influence the outcome of the case. 
In short, lack of transparency definitely weakens the ability of concerned parties to defend 
their interests in the anti-dumping proceeding. It is virtually impossible for parties to 
challenge the decision of the anti-dumping authorities due to lack of sufficient information in 




authorities, thus, may give them an incentive to make a discretionary decision. This situation 
should be improved to make the system more efficient and impartial. 
3.5.4. Necessity of Judicial Review Regulations 
As mentioned above, WTO places special emphasis on the judicial review system, and that it 
must be independent of any other outside intervention, particularly of the powerful 
administrative agencies which usually supervise trade issues.  
The Anti-dumping Ordinance contains only a very general regulation that if concerned parties 
disagree with the decision of the Minister regarding their complaints on the anti-dumping 
determination they have right to approach the court proceeding in accordance with the law of 
Vietnam.201  Based on the analysis made in the Chapter II, it can be assumed that this 
provision refers to laws on administrative settlement proceeding,202 which means that the 
review of anti-dumping matters can be made at the Administrative Court. Hence, this should 
not be the excuse for the absent provisions concerning judicial review procedures in the 
Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation, particularly after Vietnam has become a member of the 
WTO.  
3.5.5. Rising the Public Understanding of the National Anti-Dumping System 
As it was mentioned earlier, the anti-dumping system is a new element of the Vietnamese 
national legal system. The whole society only started learning about the functions as well as 
the impacts of the anti-dumping measures after some recent dispute abroad. At this moment 
only Vietnamese producers, who were involved directly in foreign trade remedy cases, do 
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have some knowledge of the foreign anti-dumping system. Most Vietnamese domestic 
producers still have very little knowledge of, and experience in, anti-dumping procedures. 
Although they know that the anti-dumping system has been developed by the government to 
provide protection for their economic interest, they take very cautious position in approaching 
the system. Many domestic producers have a wrong perception that the government should 
take the initiative to apply the anti-dumping measures whenever they are harmed by  
unreasonably cheap foreign imports. So they remain very passive in learning about the anti-
dumping rules and regulations. Probably because of this reason, more than three years since 
the Anti-dumping Ordinance has come into effect, no anti-dumping complaints have been 
lodged to the MOT.  
It is also observed that many domestic producers are reluctant to approach the system because 
they are not certain of their victory meanwhile they think that the litigation costs are too high. 
Thus, some producers prefer to observe others take legal actions against foreign producers 
and importers and wait to the result of the complaint. They do not understand very well that 
they should be cooperative and united as one to fight against dumping in order to win the 
case.  
To that end, it is highly important that the government agencies, media and other socio-
economic organizations (universities, research institutes, business associations) should initiate 
publicity campaigns to raise awareness on the matter. They should organize periodical 
training programs or workshops on anti-dumping issues for concerned parties in the anti-
dumping proceedings, including inter alia domestic industries and government authorities so 
as to raise their proficiency in dealing with anti-dumping matters. Domestic consumers should 




that they can take an active part in requiring anti-dumping determination be made with public 
interest considerations.  
 
3.6. CONCLUSION 
The adoption and coming into force of the Vietnamese Anti-dumping Ordinance and its 
implementing regulations are highly significant both internally and externally. The 
development of the national anti-dumping legislation is a clear example of Vietnamese 
legislature being more and more aware of the compatibility of such legislation with 
international law such as the WTO ADA in this case although in reality there may be still 
certain gaps between them. The consistency of the national anti-dumping legislation is 
particularly imperative for Vietnam in  striving to strengthen the market-oriented economic 
reform and complete the integration into the multilateral trade system of the WTO. 
It seems that it will take some time for Vietnam to perfect anti-dumping legislation, to bring it 
into full play in economic and trade relations and to make it completely consistent with 
Article VI of the GATT and the ADA. At the moment and in the near future the related 
government should speed up the formation of some implementation rules and methodologies 
of the present anti-dumping regulations, such as a detailed schedule of investigation 
procedures, a standard form of questionnaire, rules of using sampling investigation, rules of 
hearing, rules of confidentiality, provisions of judicial review, etc. as well as further 










The legal framework for the Anti-dumping system in Vietnam has been established with the 
issuance of Anti-dumping Ordinance in 2004. Its emergence is considered as an important 
move to complement the current legal and trade reforms of the country. According to its 
supporters, the anti-dumping legislation will serve to maintain Vietnam foreign trade order, to 
meet the requirements of the WTO legal framework as well as to ensure fair competition and 
protect relevant domestic industries after the successful accession into the WTO system. Yet, 
the legislation has not been fully developed and therefore it might create certain questions in 
application in the future. 
Anti-dumping legislation can be assessed from two distinct parts: the substantive law and 
procedural law. The former regulates the issues related to determination of dumping and 
actionable dumping, meanwhile, the latter answers the questions related to procedural aspects 
of the anti-dumping mechanism, such as standing of petition, investigation procedure, 
investigation techniques, and review procedure. 
The substantive law has two main components: (1) regulations on dumping determination: to 
identify whether an imported product is dumped; and (2) regulations on injury determination: 




domestic industry which produces the like product. The current anti-dumping system only 
permits application of remedy measures against foreign imports when the determinations of 
both conditions are positive. 
This chapter of the thesis looks at possible implications and development of substantive law 
of anti-dumping system in Vietnamese and comparative contexts. Hence, it does not attempt 
to deal with all provisions provided in the Vietnamese legislation; rather it concentrates on 
those parts which have proved to be the most contentious. To that end, the language of the 
Anti-dumping Ordinance and its implementing regulations will be subject to detailed analysis 
and comparison with WTO anti-dumping regulations and practices, and is to be read in 
conjunction with economic considerations discussed in the previous chapters. In short, the 
purpose of this chapter is to answer the question whether there is any scope of improvement 
which could be made to enhance consistency in application and reduce any adverse 
consequences resulting from the current anti-dumping legislations of Vietnam.  
 
4.2. DUMPING DETERMINATION 
As it was mentioned in Chapter I, countries in the world determine dumping largely based on 
the regulation of Article VI of the GATT and Article 2.1 of the ADA, which provide that a 
product is considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country 
at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported from one country to 
another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product 
when destined for consumption in the exporting country. Under this definition, the key 




According to the current Anti-dumping Ordinance, dumping in Vietnam is defined as entry of 
product into the Vietnamese market in the ordinary course of trade at an export price lower 
than its ‘normal price’.203 As such, in determining whether products are being dumped into 
Vietnam, the anti-dumping authorities are required to determine the “normal price” (giá thông 
thường) and “export price” of the imported products. At this point, one might question the 
meaning of “normal price” within the Vietnam’s anti-dumping system. The ‘normal price’, 
however, is not at all a new legal concept. In fact, it is derived directly from and is equivalent 
to the well known concept of “normal value” in international trade law. Why the Vietnamese 
legislation did not use term “normal value” in the national legislation is unexplained; 
however, based on the content requirement of the provision of “normal price” determination, 
it can be affirmed that the accepted concept is not excluded from the Vietnam’s Anti-dumping 
Ordinance but has been rather paraphrased.204 In this thesis, this author will use the term 
“normal price” and “normal value” interchangeably.  
4.2.1.  Normal Value Determination 
Establishing the normal value is a very important aspect of the dumping investigation, 
because this is the element that sets the standard used to assess whether goods are dumped. A 
higher normal value means a higher likelihood of a finding of dumping and a lower normal 
value simply means a lower likelihood of a finding of dumping. Therefore, the methods to 
calculate normal should be clearly defined value in national legislation to prevent 
manipulation of information and misinterpretation of the rules by the authorities so as to come 
up with biased figures.  
                                                 
 
203  Ordinance, Article 3 




Normally, the ‘normal value’ of an imported product is defined as the comparable price of 
that product in the ordinary course of trade, when the product is destined for consumption in 
the exporting country’s market.205 If the sales are not under standard conditions, alternative 
methods of calculation of normal value should be applied. Article 3.3 of the Anti-dumping 
Ordinance distinctively points to two non-standard situations: (1) when a like product is not 
sold in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of exporting country or territory; 
and (2) where the sale of like product in the exporting country is insignificant in volume, 
quantity or value, to allow a proper comparison. Under any of these situations, the reference 
price becomes the price of the product exported to an appropriate third country or a 
constructed price of the product consisting of reasonable prime production cost, plus other 
reasonable expenses and profits, considered pursuant to each phase from production to 
circulation on the market of the exporting country or territory or of a third country.  
The Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation has established a legal framework whereby the anti-
dumping authorities are required to first examine the possibility of determination of normal 
value based on exporter’s domestic price and only in the absence of that price, and then 
establish normal value according to either of the other two methods. This regulation is 
basically consistent with the spirit of and design of the Article 2.2 of the ADA, which also 
contains the above mentioned three categories of normal value and establishes the same 
hierarchy for their determination. 
 
 
                                                 
 




4.2.1.1. Exporter’s Domestic Price  
In a normal commercial condition, the determination of normal value is based on the exporter 
domestic price method, which relies upon prices established by the home market of exporter. 
The Anti-dumping Ordinance establishes four conditions for application of this method: (i) 
there must be sales in the exporting country; (ii) these domestic sales must be significant; (iii) 
third, they must have been made in the ordinary course of trade; and (iv) they must permit a 
proper comparison.206
The first condition means that the like product must be destined for consumption in the 
exporter’s domestic market. 207  Obviously, normal value cannot be based on exporters’ 
domestic sales where there are no such sales. There are certain instances when products are 
manufactured solely for exportation, in that case their normal value should be determined on 
other bases. These alternative bases are the subject of the next section. However, there is also 
a possibility that although foreign producers sell the like products in home market but at very 
insignificant quantity/volume compared to that of their exports. In that case, the Anti-
dumping Ordinance also excludes the domestic sales price from the calculation of normal 
value because such sales are considered as not “representative” enough for an accurate 
assessment. No doubt these regulations correspond to the requirements of Article 2.2 of the 
ADA. However, Vietnam’s anti-dumping legislation does not specify further the criteria to 
define the state of significant domestic sales. It remains uncertain what quantity/volume of 
sales should be considered as significant and vice versa.  
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Regarding this issue, Footnote 2 of Article 2.2 of the ADA defines that “sales of the like 
product destined for consumption in the domestic market of the exporting country shall 
normally be considered a sufficient quantity for the determination of the normal value if such 
sales constitute 5% or more of the sales of the product under consideration to the importing 
country”.208 In other words, the volume of exporter’s domestic sales should be no less than 
5% of the total exports to the importing country in order to be considered as representative 
sales. Although some commentators might argue that the 5% threshold is arbitrary from 
economic rationale (since such a small domestic sale is not likely to be able to support 
dumping in foreign markets)209 the threshold definitely contributes certainty element to the 
national anti-dumping system. It is quite important that there is an established standard that 
concerned parties in anti-dumping proceedings can refer to when they defend their interests. 
Furthermore, this standard can also reduce the discretion of national authorities in deciding 
the domestic sales of the exporters. Vietnam definitely needs this provision in the anti-
dumping legislation to ensure the clarity in the national anti-dumping system. 
There is another issue needs to be considered in this context – the method of determination of 
the 5% viability threshold. Footnote 2 of the ADA only provides a general rule that domestic 
sales of the imported products under consideration are sufficient to be considered as a base for 
normal value determination when such sales constitute at least 5% of the total export sales of 
like products to the importing country. The ADA does not specify further as to how the 5% 
viability test must be conducted. This discipline is left for open interpretation by member 
countries individually. This check, therefore, may be performed in two different levels: (i) to 
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compare total exporter’s domestic sales of like product and total exports of the like product to 
the importing market (“total like product comparison”) or (ii) to compare exporter’s domestic 
sales of a particular model/type of product with total sales of that particular model/type of 
product to importing country (“model/type comparison”).210 As there is neither requirement 
under the ADA nor under the domestic legislation in regards to the issue, the VCAD has a 
broad discretion in choosing the method to assess sufficient domestic sales of the subject 
imported products. 
Hence, it is important to understand that each approach in comparison has its own particular 
characteristics, which might consequently affect the assessment’s outcomes. 211  The 
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512 megabyte SDRAM 30,000 6,000 
 1 gigabyte  SDRAM 6,000 150,000 
Total 36,000 156,000 
 
Total like product comparison:  36,000 / 156,000 x 100 % ≈ 23 %  
If the viability test is based on this approach the average domestic sales of total SDRAM product (in country 
A) is roughly 23 percent, which is more than 5 percent threshold. 
 
Model/type comparison:  512 Megabyte SDRAM:  30,000 / 6,000 x 100 % = 500 % 
     1 Gigabyte SDRAM:   6,000 / 150,000 x 100 % = 4 % 
If the viability test is based on this approach then domestic sales of 512 Megabyte SDRAM is far higher 
than the 5 percent threshold requirement (600 percent), however the domestic sales of 1 Gigabyte SDRAM 
are below the 5 percent of exports (only 4 percent). Thus, the anti-dumping authorities of country B can 
assert that domestic sales of 1 Gigabyte SDRAM of exporters of country A are not significant and therefore 




model/type comparison approach is more efficient than the total like product comparison in 
those cases where the subject product does not have a large variety in type/model or where the 
sale of a particular model/type of product is predominant among the products under 
investigation. However, the inherent problem of model/type comparison is that each 
model/type of product chosen for comparison must be sold by foreign producers in their 
domestic market, whereas in business practice, producers may introduce different model/type 
of the same products in different markets (due to particular market demand or consumption 
culture). This approach of comparison can make the calculation of the sales in exporter’s 
domestic market of particular type/model of products turn lower than 5% of the total volume 
of export, which does not necessarily correspond with the actual sales of the subject products 
by foreign exporters.212 Didier observed from the EU anti-dumping practice that in most cases 
the 5% domestic sales requirement fails to meet at the model/type comparison and this 
consequently provides the anti-dumping authorities a greater chance to use constructed 
normal value.213 As the constructed normal values are often higher than actual domestic prices 
(because the criteria to construct the values, i.e. “normal” profit, production costs, research 
and development costs etc., can be arbitrarily made by anti-dumping authorities), the average 
dumping margins obtained may be higher and the possibility of dumping determination is also 
higher.214 This definitely adversely affects the fairness of the anti-dumping system. To that 
end, it is necessary that Vietnamese anti-dumping system disciplines such undesirable 
administrative discretion in the 5% viability test rules. 
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One may argue in favor of the disallowance of the use of type/model comparison in anti-
dumping proceeding. However, such an approach may not be a good solution for the problem. 
A certain level of precision in sub-categorization of the subject products is necessary to in 
order to ensure that the comparison of the normal value and export price at the latter stage is 
accurate. Therefore it is proposed  that in order to reduce the arbitrary discretion in 
assessment by the exporter’s domestic sales, the Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation should 
direct  the VCAD to base the 5% viability test primarily on the total like product comparison. 
If the VCAD officials choose to apply the model/type comparison they must provide an 
official explanation as to why they prefer it to the total like product comparison, and whether 
such approach would better reflect the commercial reality.  
Such supplement to the national anti-dumping system will not only solve the uncertainty in 
the proceeding and meet the requirement of footnote 2 of the ADA but also help to discipline 
the abuse of the constructed normal value practice in dumping determinations.  
4.2.1.2. Like Product 
Determination of the “like product” is one of key issues in various stage of the anti-dumping 
proceeding. The scope of defined “like products” will directly affect the object of the anti-
dumping investigation and the anti-dumping measures. At the injury determination stage, it 
will serve as a ground for determination of the scope of the domestic industry being injured 
by foreign dumped imports. It is with respect to the like product that the anti-dumping 
authorities have to find injury as a result of the dumped imports. The determination of what 
are like products will also be relevant in determining which product in the domestic market of 




“like product” is directly relevant to the context of the determination of dumping. It is also 
important to note that although at each stage of anti-dumping proceeding the subject for like 
product determination might be different, the way that like products is defined should be 
consistent throughout the proceeding. 
According to Article 2.6 of the ADA, a like product is “a product which is identical, i.e. alike 
in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another 
product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those 
of the product under consideration”.215 Vietnamese legislation also has a similar definition 
although with different wordings.216 Article 2.6 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance specifies that 
like products are those which have all the same features, in the case of absence of the identical 
resembling products the, like of products are considered as the products having “many basic 
characteristics resembling the products”, which are subject to anti-dumping investigation. It 
seems that the law makers tried to use this language to emphasize a more narrow standard for 
determination of likeness compare to the one provided by the ADA. However, the terms used 
in the definition, according to the author’s opinion, are quite vague. It is unclear what kind of 
product’s characteristics can be considered as “basic” and how many like characteristics are 
qualified as “many”.  
Hence, the most critical issue in the “like product” definition is how to interpret the term 
“characteristics” [resembling the subject products]. Do characteristics refer to the 
manufacturing of products (physical likeness, technical composition) or their functionality or 
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their use in the market (substitutability in the marketplace)? Neither the Anti-dumping 
Ordinance nor the Decree 90/CP provides any clue for this issue not withstanding that this is 
the central element in the “like product” determination. 
This problem is actually also the main challenge of the “like product” concept in the WTO 
anti-dumping regime. The ADA model definition of “like product” is ambivalent in the sense 
that it does not provide any guidance with respect to which specific characteristics should be 
considered when assessing likeness. As a consequence, it gives room for inevitable discretion 
by national anti-dumping authorities. Several instances may be cited to illustrate this point 
based on a comparison of anti-dumping practices of the United States and European Union. 
The first example is related to anti-dumping cases against imported polyester staple fiber 
(PSF) products. During the 1990s the EU and the US initiated several anti-dumping 
investigations against PSF imports. The European Commission and Council consistently 
asserted that all PSF types are one "like product" because of their common physical 
characteristics.217  However, the US Department of Commerce (DOC) decided to differentiate 
the PSF products based on the “end-use” criteria. Accordingly, the PSF products were 
grouped into two different end-use categories, namely (1) conventional PSF - used in the 
manufacture of carpeting and (2) low-melt PSF - used for spinning into textile products (i.e. 
stuffing in sleeping bag, ski jacket, cushions, and pillows).218  
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In the polyethylene terephthalate film (PET film) case, both European Commission and 
Council agree that the metallized PET film are alike to base PET film since the metallization 
process does not alter the basic physical technical and chemical characteristics of the two 
products and their utility is similar.219 The parties involved argued that metallized PET film 
should be excluded from the product scope of the proceedings because it has different 
physical and technical characteristics, required different production equipments and 
processes, being consequently more expensive to produce and thus sold at a higher price. 
European Commission and Council, however, considered that an additional production step 
required for the production of metallized PET film resulting in higher cost of production and 
sales price, was not an element which could justify per se the exclusion of a certain type of 
PET film from the scope of the product. On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, meanwhile, 
basing the analysis on physical characteristics and user’s perceptions on the subject products, 
the US DOC came to a conclusion to exclude all metallized film and other finished films that 
have one of their surfaces modified by the application of a performance enhancing resinous or 
inorganic layer of more than 0.00001 inches thick from the scope of the products under 
investigation, which were all gauges of raw, pretreated or primed PET Film.220  
The above mentioned instances suggest that within the existing the ADA “like product” 
definition the national trade authorities enjoy wide discretion to define the scope of product 
under investigation. Hence, the way that the national anti-dumping authorities approach the 
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definition of like product can have considerable impact on the determinations of dumping and 
injury and consequently the imposition of the anti-dumping measures. If the scope of “like 
product” is defined very narrowly, it may be easier for anti-dumping authorities to conduct the 
investigation. At dumping determination stage, for instance, it can help to “minimize” the 
problems relating to comparability of the normal value and export prices. A narrow approach 
towards the like product’s determination in some occasions (e.g. when the products sold in 
exporters’ domestic market and the subject imported products are not qualified as alike) will 
increase possibility that the normal value are being constructed (anti-dumping authorities do 
not need to assess the actual domestic sale prices of the subject products before comparing 
them with their export prices). The constructed normal value, as it was discussed in the earlier 
sections of this thesis, can contribute to inflate the dumping margin and thus help the anti-
dumping authorities to establish dumping.  
Since the scope of a domestic industry is determined largely by “like product”, concerned 
domestic firms may also find easy to demonstrate injury if the anti-dumping authorities take a 
narrow approach on like product determination.  
However, the price of a narrow approach of determination of like product is the possible ease 
of evasions - foreign exporters and importers can circumvent the anti-dumping measures that 
rely on narrow product definition by importing the products components for local assembly or 
by replacing subject products with other substitute products, which fall outside the scope of 
defined like products. In this circumstance, the anti-dumping order will not provide full 




On the other extreme, if the like product is defined too broadly then the anti-dumping 
measures will not be applied where it is necessary.221 Obviously, the wider the scope of “like 
products” is defined the larger will be the scope of domestic industry. Since injury to one or to 
a few firms in a multiple firm industry will not satisfy the standard in the anti-dumping law, a 
broad market definition (because of broad like product determination) will make it harder to 
prove injury to the industry as a whole.  
In both instances the economic effects of the trade remedy measures would be definitely 
diluted. A proper definition of the like product in accordance with economic considerations 
should be the starting point of antidumping investigations.222 As for Vietnam, there should be 
more certain rules in anti-dumping legislation that can provide a rational and disciplined 
framework to define the scope of product under investigation. The question now is how those 
rules should be drafted. 
Up to now, the best known test on categorization of products in Vietnam can be found in the 
import/export classification rules of the Customs Office, which have been formed under the 
Decree 06/2003/ND-CP of the Government and the Circular 85/2003/TT-BTC of the Ministry 
of Finance. 223  It is assumed that without any specific guidelines for like product 
determination the VCAD would refer to the customs import/export products classification 
system as the main basis to identify characteristics of the subject products. According to these 
customs rules, imported products are categorized on the four criteria:  
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(i) Vietnam’s Classification List of Export and Import Products; Import Tariff 
Nomenclature, Export Tariff Nomenclature;  
(ii) Physical characteristics of products; 
(iii) Technical documents, detailed products descriptions, products catalogue; and 
(iv) The results of products analysis and expertise.224 
The customs classification of import and export products basically focuses on two criteria: the 
import tariff nomenclature and physical characteristic of the products. The classification in 
tariff nomenclatures based on the Harmonized System (the "HS"), however, is  a “not-fully-
reliable” guide in identification of "like products" within the WTO practice because product 
descriptions under the  specific tariff bindings or concessions of each WTO member country 
under the Article II of the GATT may not be precise. Many countries have bindings in their 
schedules which include broad ranges of products under one HS tariff heading. Hence, this does 
not indicate likeness of the products covered by the relevant tariff bindings. The Appellate Body 
in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages case has asserted that the [tariff binding] represents 
[in the first place] the results of trade concessions negotiated among members of the WTO… 
[Therefore], if tariff bindings include a wide range of products they are not a reliable criterion 
for determining products "likeness". 225  The second criterion of comparison, the “physical 
characteristics”, may be useful as it does contribute to satisfy the requirement of Article 2.6 of 
the ADA that like products must be “identical in all respects”. The problem with full reliance on 
the “physical similarity” approach is that the test might significantly narrow down the scope of 
products under consideration. As it was earlier analyzed, a too narrow definition of like 
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products might have adverse effect on the anti-dumping measures. Thus, the use of “physical 
characteristics” test of the customs products’ classification rules in determination of like 
products might not be sufficient for the anti-dumping investigation purpose.  
From the above mentioned analysis, it can be concluded that the custom’s classification rules 
may be served as a useful but not fully sufficient basis of reference for like product 
determination. The VCAD still needs to take into account other supporting evidence to ensure 
that the finding is accurate and correspond with the commercial reality of specific case.    
WTO members have developed different non-physical characteristics criteria for the “like 
product” test in their practice. The US anti-dumping authorities, for instance, have established 
a non-exhaustive list of factors to be examined in like-product determination, including (i) 
general physical characteristics; (ii) the expectations of the ultimate purchasers; (iii) the 
channels of trade in which the product is sold; (iv) the manner in which the product is sold 
and displayed; and (v) the ultimate use of the merchandise.226 No single factor in this list is 
determinative and in case of necessity the US anti-dumping authorities might also examine 
other relevant factors, i.e. common manufacturing facilities, production processes, and 
production employees. The US anti-dumping authorities pay great attention to the 
“commercial use” aspect of the subject products. Australian and Canadian authorities have 
also taken a similar approach, by adopting a “functional similarity” test that looks not just at 
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physical similarities of the subject products but also at their substitutability in the consumers 
and industrial user perceptions.227  
Among the traditional anti-dumping users, the EC anti-dumping authorities have, for long, 
stuck to their practice of applying the narrow definition of the like product: requiring that a 
close physical characteristic of the subject products should be the main factor in like product 
determination.228 It was explained that such a straight and steadfast interpretation would help 
to ensure predictability and administrative convenience. Even so, in a number of cases, the 
Commission and Council have had to recognize physical characteristics of products were not 
enough sufficient to determine their likeness. They have more often displayed a willingness to 
look at “substitutability” in the marketplace as supporting evidence.229 In the recent anti-
dumping cases, the EU anti-dumping authorities have also started to take into account “end-
use” factor as the basis for like product determination.230
It is observed that countries would develop a set of criteria in their legislation to help the anti-
dumping authorities determine the like products. Beside products’ “physical likeness” other 
criteria, such as “market substitutability”, “end-users’ expectation” and “functional 
similarity”, are widely accepted for determination of like product. However, due to the highly 
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complex and diverse nature of products in trade, no criteria would be considered as 
standardized to test the likeness. The national anti-dumping authorities are usually allowed to 
decide which criteria have greater weight in likeness determination for particular products and 
circumstances.  
Recently, an additional criterion in determining the ‘like product’, namely the requirement of 
“direct competition between products” or “market based approach”, has been proposed to 
strengthen the like product test in injury determination. Adamantopoulos observed that such 
legal interpretation would enhance fair competition by requiring that only dumped imported 
products which are in direct competition with the domestic industry's products can be 
considered in the injury assessment.231 It is assumed that this market based approach towards 
the determination of like products can be an effective way to increase legal certainty and limit 
the discretion of administering authorities. The WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies have on 
some occasions also expressed support to this particular test. In Japan –Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages II232 and Korea –Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages233, the Panels opined that what 
counts in defining like products is competition in the market place which is determined from 
the consumer’s perspective. Although the two above mentioned cases were not anti-dumping 
(they were related to the application of non-discrimination principle under the Article III:2 of 
the GATT) and therefore have no direct legal implication on the like product determination in 
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anti-dumping area, 234  the logic of the Panel’s recommendation on interpretation of like 
product can be taken into consideration in the anti-dumping proceeding without distorting the 
current framework of the ADA. 
In this author’s opinion, this approach will definitely broader the scope of like products 
compare to the purely physical characteristic base approach because it would include both 
physically alike products (as physically identical products definitely will compete in the 
market) and their substitute products from the consumer’s perspective. Besides, the scope of 
like products determined by market based approach will not be too broad to dilute impact of 
anti-dumping measures, because the requirement of direct competition between the subject 
products will limit the determination within the right objective.  
Based on the above mentioned analysis, it is suggested that Vietnamese anti-dumping 
legislation should direct the VCAD to use a variety of different criteria to determine the 
likeness of the product under investigation on a case-by-case basis. The comparison of the 
physical characteristics of products should always be the primary requirement in the 
determination of likeness because it would show the most direct relation between the subject 
products. In addition, a legal recognition of “market based approach” or “direct competition” 
test should be the central factor to direct the “like product” determination. This rule is useful 
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for Vietnam as it would strike the right balance between various factors, e.g. physical 
characteristics, market substitutability, and consumer perceptions, when the anti-dumping 
authorities determine the scope of products subject to anti-dumping investigation.  
4.2.1.3. Where the Exporter’s Domestic Price Cannot be Ascertained 
Article 2.2 of the ADA provides for alternative method of ascertaining normal value, where: 
“When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic 
market of the exporting country or when, because of the particular market situation or the low 
volume of the sales in the domestic market of the exporting country, such sales do not permit 
a proper comparison,…” This is also taken into account in the Article 3.3 Anti-dumping 
Ordinance to allow the VCAD to adopt a prescribed alternative method rather than the 
exporter’s domestic price for normal value determination. The pre-conditions for a move 
away from domestic market sales for normal value determination is (i) where there are no 
sales of like product on exporter’s domestic market’ or (ii) the sales are other than ‘in the 
ordinary course of trade’. 
There is no precise definition of the concept “ordinary course of trade” either in the GATT or 
ADA. From the history of Uruguay Round, during the negotiations, certain contracting parties 
tried to approach this issue by requesting that the concept be defined, and that a non-
exhaustive list of irregular transactions be annexed to the ADA235. This proposition failed.236 
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Consequently, Paragraph 2.2.1 of the ADA only has an indirect explanation regarding the 
issue by stating that “sales of the like product in the domestic market of the exporting country 
or sales to a third country at prices below per unit (fixed and variable) costs of production 
plus administrative, selling and general costs may be treated as not being in the ordinary 
course of trade…”. This guideline shows that the sales below-cost is a business action that 
can be categorized as being outside ordinary course of trade. In international practice this is 
also the most frequently cited circumstances in anti-dumping determinations. In addition, in 
practice, there are some other examples that can be also categorized as sales not being in the 
ordinary course of trade, such as sales between related parties, particular market situation or 
even sample sales.  
In Vietnam, prior to the promulgation of Anti-dumping Ordinance, the term ‘ordinary course 
of trade’ did not even exist in commercial law and other related commercial regulations. The 
concept has been mentioned in official documentations only after the signature of US-
Vietnam BTA in 2000. The Anti-dumping Ordinance for the first time incorporates this 
concept in determining normal value. However, similar to the ADA, the exact meaning of this 
phrase is not defined in any regulation of the Vietnam’s anti-dumping legislation. The VCAD 
officials contended that they would follow the internationally accepted practices in assessing 
this issue.237 Thus, it can be assumed that the VCAD will disregard in first place the sales 
below-cost as practice within ordinary course of trade. 
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In principle, domestic price derived from the sale below-cost can be treated in two ways. If it 
is determined that the volume of sale below-costs is not of significant quantity, the below-cost 
sales will be neglected and the general domestic price from sale above costs will be applied 
for determination of normal value. On the other hand, if there is a considerable volume of sale 
below cost, the VCAD would totally disregard these sales and establish the constructed value 
of the products.  
As mentioned above, lack of legal definition of the term “ordinary course of trade” is not the 
most critical problem for Vietnamese anti-dumping system, since the VCAD can refer to 
general practice of other countries in making their finding. However, the problem could be the 
‘over-simplistic’ understanding of the treatment of below cost sale. As it was discussed in the 
previous chapter of this thesis, from the economic point of view, the below cost sales are not 
necessarily restricted business practices.238 The VCAD, therefore, should be concerned about 
the relevant cost criteria upon making the decision in order to ensure that the measures that 
they apply would protect not only the interests of Vietnam’s competing industries but also the 
fair competition environment, which form the original goals of the current anti-dumping 
legislation.239 Given the sensitivity and novelty of the issue for Vietnamese anti-dumping 
system, there should be certain guidelines, which the anti-dumping authorities could refer to 
when they consider the sales below-cost issue during the investigation. 
These guidelines can be designed based on the background regulation of the WTO relating to 
ordinary course of trade, which states that “anti-dumping authorities may consider the below-
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the-cost sales outside of ordinary course of trade if it is established that such sales are made 
within an extended period of time in substantial quantities and are at a price which do not 
provide for the recovery of all costs”.240 Two points should be emphasized upon interpreting 
this provision: (i) the determination of the reasonable period of time and (ii) the determination 
of sufficient quantity of sales. 
The concept extended period of time is to check whether or not the exporters can recover the 
production costs. It is submitted that the recovery of average variable cost in the short term is 
sufficient to retain competitive viability, in contrast to the long term where it is not. But the 
problem for the Vietnamese authorities is to define as to what extent the time frame of the 
extended period should be so that the investigation can reasonably reflect the business reality.  
According to footnote 4 of the ADA, this period should normally be one year but shall in not 
be less than six months. Some countries, i.e. United States241, European Community242 and 
Canada 243 , have already established in their legislation that the extended period for 
investigation is from six months to one year. However, from a business point of view, usually 
six-month period may be not long enough for full cost recovery and therefore may not be 
qualified to fulfill the goal of the test. Therefore, a more practical approach would be to 
accept the extended period for recovery of up to one year or longer, depends on particular 
case. It is suggested that the anti-dumping legislation is amended to require the VCAD to 
determine the time frame based on the consideration of normal time expectation (from an 
accounting point of view) of full recovery of cost in each particular industry. 
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As regards to the  volume/quantity of sales below cost that gives significant impact on the 
ordinary course of trade, the ADA  expressly  stipulates that the sales are in substantial 
quantities when it is established that "the weighted average selling price of the transactions 
under consideration for the determination of the normal value is below the weighted average 
per unit cost, or that the volume of sales below per unit cost represents not less than 20% of 
the volume sold in transactions under consideration for the determination of the normal 
value".244 If this rule is adopted into Vietnamese legislation, the anti-dumping authorities can 
decide easily whether to include or exclude below cost sales in the calculation of domestic 
price as normal value based on a clear sales quantity threshold. More importantly, a relevant 
regulation in Vietnamese legislation when drafted should guide the anti-dumping authorities 
to compare the 20% of quantity of products used to determine normal value and not to the 
total volume of sales.  
Beside the sales below-cost, sales to domestic related (affiliated) parties are also considered as 
instances which national anti-dumping authorities are likely to categorize as being out from 
the ordinary course of trade. The Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation does not specifically 
regulate this issue in its content; neither does the ADA. However, in practice most national 
authorities would disregard the domestic sell price of a product if the producer sells it to an 
affiliated distributor because it is contended that the price may be unreliable or may not 
indicate the real market value.  
However, the systemic disregard of domestic sale price between affiliated parties for the 
purpose of normal value calculation based on the presumption that the transactions between 
                                                 
 




related parties are not in the ordinary course of trade is an irrefutable practice because it may 
not reflect the economic reality and competition between domestic businesses in the exporting 
country. Certainly, the prices charged to related parties are usually lower than the prices 
charged to unaffiliated customers. But this might be because those who sell directly to un-
related distributors or wholesalers have to incur costs in marketing functions while those who 
sell domestically via a captive network, do not perform such functions themselves. Therefore, 
the automatic qualification of the sale prices between affiliated parties in exporting country as 
non-subject of exporter domestic prices can create a disruptive effect on normal value as “the 
further downstream in the domestic distribution chain the reference price is taken the higher it 
is, and, hence, the higher the dumping margin”.245 This understanding may not reflect the 
intention of the Article VI of the GATT and ADA.246
Regarding this issue, the US proposed an interesting method of definition, named “99.5% 
test”, whereby the weighted average sales price of domestic sell price to an affiliated party is 
compared with that of to all non-affiliated customers. If the former is more than 0.5% lower 
than the latter then this sale is automatically excluded from the calculation of normal value. 
However, under this method the US authorities do not check whether affiliated party sales are 
higher price. Because of this, the legality of this method was challenged at the WTO.  
In the US-Hot Rolled Steel case, both the Panel and the Appellate Body considered the 
practice of the US as inconsistent with the ADA because of its one-sided nature. It was 
contended that the US approach does not examine the differences in prices of sales to 
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affiliated customers as compared with unaffiliated customers, which might indicate that sales 
are not made in the ordinary course of trade. Through the automatic exclusion of marginally 
low-priced sales, coupled with the automatic inclusion of all high-priced sales, except those 
proved, upon request, to be aberrationally high priced the US practice is not just exclude 
certain exporter’s domestic market sales but more importantly raise normal value.247 Thus, 
Appellate Body concluded that this one-sided and unfair approach of the US toward 
determination of “ordinary course of trade” was inconsistent with the requirement of the 
Article 2.1 of the ADA.248
An alternative approach towards the issue can be found in the EC anti-dumping system, which 
excludes the price between affiliated parties, but allow it, if it is determined that the sales 
price is not distorted due to the special relationship between the affiliated parties.249 This 
approach seems more flexible and balancing however it requires an accurate and precise 
assessment of the “affiliation” status (compensatory arrangement) of the parties and the 
effects on sales price derived from such affiliation relationship. Some experts in Vietnam 
have suggested the VCAD should consider adopting the above approach in assessing the sales 
of the foreign producers to affiliated customers.250 There are, however, some problems in 
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implementation of this approach in Vietnam. First, there is no recognized method to evaluate 
the disruptive effect on price due to the compensatory arrangement between the affiliated 
parties. Another difficulty for Vietnamese authorities in application of the EC affiliation 
approach in an even-handed manner is the lack of human and technical infrastructure. 
Hence, according to the author, Vietnam can consider adopting a simpler approach applied by 
China in the Polyester Staple case. 251 The Chinese anti-dumping agency in that case specified 
that the price between related parties will be accepted if it is not different from prices between 
unrelated parties but rejected if there is a significant difference between the two. Although 
this approach gives the anti-dumping authorities some discretion it has some practical 
implication by introducing the concept of “normal price” between related parties in defining 
the “ordinary course of trade”, which certainly is much more flexible a concept than the 
“transactional price” between non-related parties. 
4.2.1.4. Export Price to Third Country 
Where the sales in the exporting country cannot be used for determination of normal value 
Article 3.3 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance allows two alternative methods: (i) the use of 
products’ export price to a third country and (ii) the constructed normal value of the products 
cost of products. Similar to the ADA, the Anti-dumping Ordinance does not provide for a 
hierarchy of choice in application these two alternative methods.  
It can be assumed that utilization of the export price to third country for determination of 
normal value is more precise than constructing the normal value of products because the 
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result is based on actual market price. The Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation does 
elaborate a mechanism to support the export price to third country method. The only 
requirement in this regards is that the normal value shall be defined at the price level 
“comparable to the export to Vietnam”. 252  This can be explained by the fact that the 
Vietnamese policy-makers could not refer to any detailed guidance from the ADA regarding 
this issue.  On the other hand, the application of export price to third country method may be 
impractical and ineffective for Vietnam because it would require the anti-dumping authorities 
to possess comprehensive human and technical resources to assess and evaluate the available 
data in the third country.253 It is regrettable that this first method of establishing normal value 
is given  little attention by the law, as arguably, if normal value is based on the price of a 
product when sold to a third country, then the normal value established would constitute a 
more proper indication of the market price of the product in an international trade forum. 
However, leaving the question open now is probably the best solution for Vietnam at this 
stage of development, as it needs time to develop the resources to make such an investigation 
and determination possible. Thus, the emphasis of the discussion on the alternative methods 
of calculating normal value will be shifted to the method of constructed normal value. 
4.2.1.5. Constructed Normal Value 
a. Calculation of Cost of Production 
Article 3.3 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance stipulates that the calculation of constructed 
normal value shall be based on “the reasonable costs of the product plus other reasonable 
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expenses as well as reasonable profits, determined at each stage from production to 
circulation on the market of the exporting country or territory or of a third country”. This 
regulation is far less elaborated upon than provision of Article 2.2 of the ADA. There is no 
further detailed regulation to prescribe the methods for estimating the relevant factors of 
constructed value determination. Thus, it is totally uncertain how the constructed normal 
value will be defined within the Vietnam’s anti-dumping system. It can be assumed that the 
VCAD would refer to relevant provision of the ADA in such situation. However, even direct 
application of the guidelines of the ADA will be not simple. This author anticipates a number 
of issues in interpretation and implementation of Article 2.2 of the ADA in Vietnamese anti-
dumping system, which will be discussed below. 
According to the regulation of the ADA, there are two stages of determining normal value. In 
the first stage, the cost of production is determined and an amount for profit is allocated254, 
and in the second, a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs is added 
to this cost of production255. Article 2.2.1.1 states that cost should be calculated on the basis 
of records kept by the producer. These records have to be in accordance with the accounting 
principles of the exporting country, and must reasonably reflect the costs of production and 
sale of the product under consideration. This regulation does not dictate with precision what 
evidence should be taken into consideration, but rather states that "all available evidence on 
the proper allocation of cost"256 should be taken into consideration. This gives the national 
anti-dumping authorities latitude in determining what evidence is required. Article 2.2.1.1 
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does provide two conditions:  
• First, evidence on the allocation of costs made available by the producer or the 
exporter during the course of the investigation must be taken into consideration, but 
only if it is proven that the allocation of costs have been utilized in the past. This 
relates especially to establishing appropriate amortization and depreciation periods and 
allowance for capital expenditures and other development costs.  
• Second, the cost must be adjusted appropriately to take into consideration non-
recurring costs that benefit the production and start-up costs which might affect the 
costs during the period of investigation. 
These seemingly elaborate regulations still have some ambiguities, which allow anti-dumping 
authorities certain discretion in deciding the cost calculation. First of all, it is related to the 
requirement of ‘reasonably reflects’, the cost of production and sale of a product. This 
subjective criterion would lead to a fundamental question: What should be considered as 
reasonable? Some countries would disregard the exporter’s records when depreciation during 
the investigation period was too low due to irregular calculation methods used for tax 
purposes resulting in an artificially low depreciation during the investigation period; others 
would deviate from exporter’s records when the exporter sourced components from related 
companies at a price below the cost of production resulting in a lower cost based on the 
books.257 Where a research and development company, which is related to the producer, was 
involved in the development of the product, but the incurred costs from such collaboration 
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have not been accounted for by the exporters, then such costs might also be added.258  
With respect to the allocation of cost259, the ADA provides that evidence on the allocation of 
cost should be considered only when such allocation has been historically utilized by the 
exporters. Hence, unless reflected in the cost allocations, the costs shall be adjusted 
appropriately for those non-recurring items of cost which benefit future and/or current 
production, or for circumstances in which costs during the period of investigation are affected 
by start-up operations.260 This provision is subject to different interpretations with regard to 
the treatment of the nonrecurring costs, treatment in case of start-up operations and the length 
of a start up operation. The ADA directs national anti-dumping authorities to disregard 
abnormally high costs and/or losses in domestic prices where production is in a start-up phase 
when calculating the normal values. Furthermore, it is stipulated that in case of start-up 
operations, the cost at the end of the start-up period will be taken into account, which 
generally would be the time when the cost of production in the new line would have 
stabilized. 261 However, if the start-up period extends beyond the investigation period, the 
most recent cost shall be taken into account by the anti-dumping authorities during the 
investigation.262
Nonetheless, there is no regulation in the text of the ADA with respect to the terms “start-up 
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operations”. It is, therefore, not clear whether this applies to “start-up losses” due only to the 
new production facilities or the launching of new products within old facilities is also to be 
taken into account. It is also not clear what costs are included in this special regime? Does it 
include start-up overheads or research and development expenditure? What is the length of a 
start-up phase? These questions are critical during the process of determination as an incorrect 
approach would result into upward adjustment to the normal value of the products in 
investigation. At this point, the VCAD cannot base its assessment on any guidance from the 
ADA. This issue is left to each individual country’s own interpretation. So until a set of rules 
in this regards is developed the VCAD could look at experience of other more experience 
countries in interpreting and implementing the provision on “start-up production cost”.  
Reference can be made to EC and US anti-dumping systems, which incorporate a quite an 
extensive definition of ‘start-up operations’. Under the EC legislation, start-up operations are 
characterized by the use of new production facilities requiring substantial additional 
investment and by low capacity utilization rates263. The average costs for the start-up phase 
should be those applicable at the end of such a phase and shall be included at that level, for 
the period concerned, in the relevant weighted average costs.264 In regard to the length of the 
start-up period, the EC legislation stipulates that it should be determined in relation to the 
circumstances of the producer or exporter concerned, but shall not exceed an appropriate 
initial portion of the period for cost recovery265. From these regulations, it can be concluded 
that a start-up period covers part of but not the full period of recovery. Beyond that initial 
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start-up period, costs will be adjusted. Article 2.5, EC Regulation 384/96 provides that 
adjustments with respect to start-up operations extending beyond the investigation period will 
only be made if the relevant information was submitted within three months of the initiation 
of the proceedings and prior to the verification visit. According to some observers,266 this EC 
interpretation of the ADA is intended to reflect economic reality as the end of the start-up 
phase is reached at the latest when a normal rate of capacity utilization is achieved. At this 
time, the exporter should also have reached the break-even point. Therefore, any 
interpretation, which extends the start-up phase beyond the break-even point of production, 
would mean that the exporter should not only be able to cover its actual unit cost but also to 
compensate for past losses. Such an approach is too broad and does not reflect the notion of 
start-up period stipulate by the ADA.  
The provision for start-up costs adjustment could potentially result into downward adjustment 
to the normal value, and decrease likelihood of finding of dumping. Hence, in actual 
application of this provision by the European Commission (Commission), the effect of the 
adjustment on the normal value has been limited because Commission only allows the 
respondents to claim adjustments for new production facilities, while totally excludes the cost 
related to research and development and start-up expenses from calculation.267 In addition to 
it, the fixed three month period of cost recovery for start-up operations might be too rigid 
since the nature and timing of startup operations would vary from industry to industry and 
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from product to product. The limitations within the EC cost adjustment mechanism, therefore, 
dilute the above mentioned effect of the start-up cost adjustment provisions.268
The US anti-dumping legislation also adopts regulations to define start-up operations and 
explain startup adjustments, but it has a more radical approach compared to EC, by allowing 
adjustments for start-up operations where a producer is using new production facilities or 
producing a new product where substantial investments are required and where production 
levels are limited by technical factors associated with the initial phase of production.269 The 
US anti-dumping legislation defines production of "new product" as the one that requires 
substantial additional investment, including production which involves the complete 
revamping or redesign of the product, except only production of a routine model year 
changes.270
With regard to the length of start-up phase, US legislation provides that it should end at the 
time the level of commercial production characteristic of the merchandise or industry 
concerned is achieved. The US Department of Commerce (DOC) considers that 
accomplishment of peak production levels will not be the standard for identifying the end of 
the startup period, because the startup period may end before a company achieves optimum 
capacity utilization. 271  Similar to the EC Regulation 384/96, the US Statement of 
Administrative Act (SAA)272 specifically stipulates that the adjustment start-up period should 
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not be extended so as to cover improvements and cost reductions that may occur over the 
entire life cycle of a product. But the US SAA goes further by providing more detailed criteria 
to establish whether the producers reach commercial production levels. According to this 
regulation, the US DOC should consider first the actual production experience of the product 
in question, while the production levels will be measured based on units processed.273 In case 
of necessity, DOC can examine other factors, such as historical data reflecting the same 
producer's or other producers' experiences in producing the same or similar products.  
The US anti-dumping legislation recognizes the flexibility of the time length of start-up 
operations. Thus, it allows the US DOC an absolute power to determine the duration of start-
up period, which could be as short as one or two months or longer, depends on particularity of 
industries in question. This legislative approach would create some concerns for respondents 
in the anti-dumping case because the anti-dumping authorities might use their power in 
deciding the duration of start-up operation period to establish the start-up period 
discretionarily in order to create upward influence on the normal value of the product in 
investigation.  
From the above mentioned analysis it can be found that the approaches used by the US and 
the EC contain both advantages and disadvantages. Hence, Vietnamese legislation might 
incorporate useful parts of each approach into its content to clarify the application. It is 
proposed that the Vietnamese legislation to be adopted with provisions on start-up operation, 
which would specify the following points: first, start-up operation shall be referred to the use 
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of new production facilities or production of new product which still requires substantial 
additional financial and technical investment. Furthermore, the anti-dumping authorities 
should determine the length of a start-up phase in relation to the circumstances of the 
concerned producer/exporter on the case-by-case basis, but this period should neither be 
unreasonably shorter (i.e. less than 3 months) nor longer than an appropriate portion of the 
period for cost recovery (commonly accepted international practice). Finally, the adjustment 
for start-up operations should also reflect the costs at the end of the start-up period or the most 
recent costs which can reasonably be taken into account by the anti-dumping authorities 
during the investigation. 
b. Calculation of Sales, General Administrative Expenses and Reasonable Profits 
In addition to provisions concerning determination of production costs mentioned in above, 
the ADA prescribes three rules for establishing and selling, general and administrative 
(SG&A) expenses and profits, if the actual data pertaining to production and sales in the 
ordinary course of trade cannot be used for such a determination.274 First, the actual amount 
incurred and realized by the exporters or producers under investigation may be based on the 
actual amount incurred in the production and sales of the same general category of products in 
the domestic market.275 Second, the amount may be established according to the weighted 
average of the actual amounts incurred by other exporters or producers investigated exporters 
or producers subject to investigation in respect of production and sales of the like product in the 
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domestic market of the country of origin.276 Third, the amount may be determined by any other 
reasonable method, provided that the amount for profit does not exceed the profit normally 
realized by other exporters or producers on sales of products of the same general category in 
the domestic market of the country of origin.277 Similar provisions are neither included in the 
Anti-dumping Ordinance nor Decree 90/CP. Therefore, it is unclear how the VCAD will 
calculate the SG&A expenses and profits of producers. This is another legal issue that needs 
to be carefully analyzed to ensure an even-handed determination of the normal value. 
As it has been mentioned elsewhere in the Chapter I of this thesis, the most obvious problem 
with calculation of constructed normal value is the inclusion of appropriate profit to the 
product price. It is quite difficult to identify the reasonable profit margin which on the one 
hand reflects the general economic condition of the exporter’s domestic market and on the 
other hand in consistent with the relevant segment of exporter’s businesses. Under current 
practice, profit margin is usually calculated by the national anti-dumping authorities on the 
basis of the average profitability of profitable sales of the products under investigation in the 
market when there is a sufficient number of such sales278 or even to take into consideration 
sales of related consumables.279 In order words the “reasonable” profit margin is calculated by 
expressing the above profit amount as a percentage of the turnover of sales of like product 
that passed the ordinary course of trade test only. Clearly, if an estimated amount for profit is 
to be included in the constructed value of the product in question, then limiting consideration 
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to only the profitable sales would distort the business reality and artificially inflate profits — 
and thereby normal value and  dumping margins. This practice can result to, in most cases, a 
high amount for profit margin, which usually exceeds the conceivable norm of the company-
wide profit margin on turnover.280  
This approach to calculate average profit margin manifestly disregards the reality of 
commercial operations in the sector concerned. Although the ultimate goal of the business 
entities is to maximize profit, they would not always be able to sell in their domestic markets 
all product types with the high profit margin of the transactions in the ordinary course of 
trade. Commercial reality is that companies offset profitable with non-profitable sales in order 
to reach a company-wide profit margin that would be satisfactory for the company's 
shareholders. For those companies that manufacture and sell a large number of product types, 
commercial reality is that certain types may be sold at a loss, which is to be compensated by 
other product types that are sold at a high profit. The profit margin of the high-profit product 
types and transactions only is not necessarily an appropriate and "reasonable" surrogate for 
other product types.  
A good illustration for the problem of unfair calculation of SG&A expense and profit is 
provided by the EC-Bed Linen case. In this case the EC established normal value based on 
constructed value for all investigated Indian producers. However, it had calculated only the 
                                                 
 
280  Lindsey, B., supra note 279, pp. 10-22 Lindsey, after comparing the constructed profit rates applied by the 
US DOC and average profit rates of the equivalent US industries during the year the respective initiation 
were made, fond that the different between them ranged between 6.57 % and 20.54 %. In addition to it, there 
are cases where like products imported from different countries would have different constructed profit 
rates. For instance, in 1997 US DOC decided a profit rate of 25.77 % for Dinnerware from Taiwan, but in 
the parallel the investigation of dinnerware from Indonesia was constructed a profit rat of 22.61 %, while the 




sales of Bombay Dyeing, which was found to have representative domestic sales of the 
subject product, and used it as sample for the information of SG&A expense and profit in 
constructing the normal value of all other Indian producers. India challenged the EC 
methodology at the WTO considering that it is inappropriate for national anti-dumping 
authorities to exclude data relating to sales that are not made in the ordinary course of trade. 
In order words the EC should have used the profit achieved by each exporter, considering 
sales on the domestic market of a different product from the same general category. 
In addressing the issue, the Appellate Body referred to Article 2.2.2 (ii), which stipulates that 
the SG&A expense and profit can be calculated on the basis of “weighted average of the 
actual amounts incurred and realized by other exporters or producers subject to investigation 
in respect of production and sales of the like product in the domestic market of the country of 
origin”. It found that in referring to "the actual amounts incurred and realized", this provision 
does not make any exceptions or qualifications. Therefore, the ordinary meaning of the phrase 
"actual amounts incurred and realized" includes the SG&A expense actually incurred, and the 
profits or losses actually realized by other exporters or producers in respect of production and 
sales of the like product in the domestic market. There is no basis in Article 2.2.2(ii) for 
excluding some amounts that were actually incurred or realized from the “actual amounts 
incurred or realized”. Therefore, in the calculation of the "weighted average", all of "the 
actual amounts incurred and realized" by all producers or  exporters must be included, 
regardless of whether those amounts are incurred and realized on production and sales made 
in the ordinary course of trade. In other words the exclusion of those sales that were not made 
in the ordinary course of trade from the calculation of the "weighted average" under Article 




authorities could only calculate the SG&A expense and profit on the basis of “weighted 
average” method if data relating to more than one other exporter or producer is available.281
The decision of the Appellate Body in EC-Bed Linen case, in regards to interpretation of 
Article 2.2.2, gives national antidumping authorities a good technical guideline in 
constructing the normal value of products for the sales, which are not in the ordinary course of 
trade. It establishes a ground where antidumping authorities should approach the issue with 
certain economic-wide considerations. Since Vietnam anti-dumping legislation has no 
regulation prescribing the methods for establishing SG&A expense and profits for the 
circumstances where actual data pertaining to production and sales in ordinary course of trade 
is not available, legal guidelines for application of relevant methods, which are based on 
rational economic considerations and fully consistent with the intention of Article 2.2.2 of the 
ADA, are of practical significance.  
For the purpose of transparency and predictability, it might be also reasonable for Vietnamese 
anti-dumping system to set certain hierarchy between the methods of calculating SG&A 
expense and profits, although at the moment the ADA has no such requirement. In addition, 
an introduction of the rules which require that the anti-dumping authorities, upon parties’ 
request, to make a separate written disclosure concerning the method and reasons for the 
determination of costs and profits, would also make the normal value determinations more 
transparent for parties involved.  Furthermore, in order to reflect with the commercial reality, 
it is appropriate to emphasize in the relevant provisions that the constructed profit margins 
                                                 
 




should not exceed profits normally realized by sales of other producers in the same general 
category of products on the domestic market. 
c. Constructing Normal Value Based on Best Available Information 
In case where the interested parties refuses access or do not provide necessary information, 
and therefore, impede the investigation, preliminary and final findings, the ADA provides that 
relevant findings may be made on the basis of the fact best available.282 This also rule can be 
found in Article 13.2 of Anti-dumping Ordinance and Article 22.5 of Decree 90/CP.  
It is observed that the main problem related to the application of the “best available 
information” provision for calculating normal value is that it gives anti-dumping authorities a 
wide discretion in determining the scope of business information that interested parties must 
give for access. As a consequence, it leads to a misuse of the provision for determination of 
dumping. A review of the anti-dumping cases suggests that any failure by the foreign firms to 
respond to the authorities’ burdensome reporting requirements (i.e. totally irrelevant 
information for dumping determinations) would also allow the authorities to disregard all 
their data and instead use the best information available, which typically means data reported 
in the domestic firm's petition. The latter source of information can lead to higher normal 
value and, therefore, higher possibility of affirmative finding of dumping and higher dumping 
margins.283  
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283  Lindsey, B., Supra note 279. pp 10-16: A research study made by Lindsey on 141 company-specific 
dumping determinations in 49 different antidumping investigations during period 1995-1998 in the US, 
shows that of 36 cases were defined based on facts available rather than actual company data. All the 36 




The practice of misusing the “best available information” method, stipulated under Article 6.8 
of the ADA, has been brought to the WTO dispute settlement system on many occasions. 
Most of those cases were settled in favor of complainer (exporting country). In US Hot Rolled 
Steel Products case, the Appellate Boby stipulated that the application of Article 6.8 of the 
ADA has not confined to cases where there is no information available whatsoever and where 
the entire margin is established using only facts available.284  Authorities can have recourse to 
this provision for remedying the lack of any necessary information. The Panel also defined the 
factors that may be taken care of while deciding whether information is submitted within 
“reasonable period of time”.285 In this case, the Appellate Body also directed anti-dumping 
authorities not to automatically reject information submitted by the concerned parties if this is 
submitted "in a timely fashion" and interpreted this as a reference to a "reasonable period" of 
Article 6.8 of the ADA.286As a matter of fact it is highly difficult to quantify the rule for 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
cases were defined by a simple comparison between US prices and exporter’s domestic prices, of which 
only in 2 cases the dumping were affirmative and the average dumping margins were only 7.36 percent. 
284  US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US-Hot Rolled Steel), 
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS184/AB/R (24/07/2001) para 81 
285  US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, Panel Report, WT/DS184/R, 
(28/02/2001), paras. 7.57 and 7.59.  According to the Panel, a “reasonable period” must be interpreted 
consistently with the notions of flexibility and balance that are inherent in the concept of 'reasonableness', 
and in a manner that allows for account to be taken of the particular circumstances of each case. In 
considering whether information is submitted within a reasonable period of time, investigating authorities 
should consider, in the context of a particular case, factors such as:  
(i) the nature and quantity of the information submitted;  
(ii) the difficulties encountered by an investigated exporter in obtaining the information; 
(iii) the verifiability of the information and the ease with which it can be used by the investigating 
authorities in making their determination; 
(iv) whether other interested parties are likely to be prejudiced if the information is used;  
(v) whether acceptance of the information would compromise the ability of the investigating authorities to 
conduct the investigation expeditiously; and 
(vi) the numbers of days by which the investigated exporter missed the applicable time-limit. 
286  US – Hot-Rolled Steel, AB Report, supra note 285, para. 77. The Appellate Body considered "Article 6.8 




application of “best available information” method in dumping determination because the 
concept itself is vague. The VCAD should be directed to be cautious in deciding the 
application of this method. Based on the analysis of the Appellate Body’s recommendations 
in the US Hot Rolled Steel Products, the Vietnamese trade authorities should require that 
VCAD not to disregard automatically information submitted by the respondents and resort to 
“best fact available” solely on the ground that the respondents have failed to provide 
sufficient supporting documentation within required deadline. The VCAD may consider to 
accept the information if the respondent parties are able to provide necessary document to 
justify the delay. On the other hand, when the information is submitted in time to be verified 
or actually could be verified the information should be accepted. The VCAD must also 
specify clearly to the responding parties the supporting documents which are expected from 
them and the deadline of submission. 
4.2.3. Export Price Determination 
The second key element in the process of dumping determinations is the calculation of the 
export price. As stated earlier, it is by comparing export price and normal value that a 
determination of dumping is made, and that precisely, is the first step towards imposing an 
anti-dumping duty. Article 26 of Decree 90/CP provides three ways of determining the export 
price: (i) constructed on the basis of contractual price that the Vietnamese importer actually 
paid or must pay for the product; (ii) constructed on the basis of the price paid by first 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
responses of the interested parties, by using 'facts' which are otherwise 'available' to the investigating 
authorities. According to Article 6.8, where the interested parties do not 'significantly impede' the 
investigation, recourse may be had to facts available only if an interested party fails to submit necessary 
information 'within a reasonable period'. Thus, if information is, in fact, supplied 'within a reasonable 
period', the investigating authorities cannot use facts available, but must use the information submitted by 




unrelated buyer; or (iii) on any reasonable basis determined by the anti-dumping 
authorities.287 The provision lists all three methods of calculation suggested by Article 2.3 of 
the ADA, however, the framework provided by the Decree 90/CP is still quite general, and 
therefore would create certain application issues.  
4.2.3.1. The Price Actually Paid or Payable 
Determination of export price based on the price actually paid or payable for the product is 
the most straightforward method of calculation of export price as it includes the direct use of 
the contractual price for the imported products by an unaffiliated importer in Vietnam. Article 
26 of the Decree 90/CP directs the anti-dumping authorities to use this method in the first 
place, whenever it starts the calculation of export price of the subject products. Only where 
the VCAD finds that the subject products are sold to importers in Vietnam, who are related to 
the exporters, the price of those transactions will not be used in calculation of export price. 
Instead, the sale transactions to independent buyers will be used as the basis of establishing 
the export price.288 This regulation fully corresponds with regulation of Article 2.3 of the 
ADA.   
 Having established which export price should be taken into account the remaining question is 
whose export price should be considered. This is a matter of establishing who the importer is 
and who the exporter is, especially when the sale transaction went through one or several 
intermediaries, whether because the exporter has a sales subsidiary which co-ordinates the 
export sales to the community or because he sells via a non-related third party.  
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What should be specifically determined by the current Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation is 
at which level of trade the export price has to be established: should the export price be the 
price charged by the sales subsidiary to the Vietnamese importer, or the price charged by the 
exporter to the sales subsidiary? The issue is of particular importance since the price charged 
by the sales subsidiary to the Vietnamese importer would be higher than what the sales 
subsidiary paid for the goods to the exporter, and considering that latter price would 
necessarily result in a higher value of the export price and potentially a lower dumping 
margin. The Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation does not have provisions dealing with these 
variations. However, it can be expected that the VCAD will only select the export price based 
only on the presence or absence of affiliation relationship between exporter and importer.289 
This practice will be discussed in greater details below. 
4.2.3.2. Constructed Export Price  
If the export price cannot be established by using contractual price between exporters and 
importers method due to the fact that the VCAD has a ground to believe that price is 
unreliable, the export price should be constructed by using the resell price of the products in 
question to the first independent buyer or by any other reasonable methods of construction.290 
Because the Anti-dumping Ordinance and Decree 90/CP do not further elaborate on methods 
to construct export price, the full implications of this provision might only be interpreted 
through comparison with provisions in the ADA and general practice of other countries. 
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Under the framework of the ADA the contractual export price between parties could be 
disregarded where the price appears to be unreliable due to affiliations or compensatory 
arrangements.291  Nonetheless, the permissible general practice seems to allow an almost 
automatic disregard of sales price whenever affiliation or association between producers and 
exporters exists.292 The export price constructed on the basis of the re-sale price to any third 
independent buyer shall normally be further adjusted to make it equivalent to prior-to-
importation rate. It is explained on the basis that the costs of products in question can be 
borne by the importer but paid by any party, who appears to be associated or to have a 
compensatory-arrangement with the importer or exporter. The ADA recognizes this general 
principle by stressing that in establishing constructed export price allowances for costs, 
including duties and taxes, incurred between importation and resale, and for profits accruing, 
to be made in order to arrive to a ‘reliable’ export price.293 Only on the basis that adjustments 
to the export price warranted, could the comparison with the normal value be conducted.  
When the Anti-dumping Ordinance was introduced, there was no mention about the issue of 
price adjustment in dumping determinations; however, a provision on price adjustment for 
export price has been subsequently adopted into the Decree 90/CP in 2005. Article 27 of 
Decree 90/CP stipulates that in case of necessity, the VCAD when determining dumping 
margins, may decide to adjust the normal [price] value and export price based on the 
differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical 
characteristics, and any other factors that the authorities deem appropriate. This implies that 
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Imposition of Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties in the European Community, Kluwer Law 
International 3rd Ed.,  London, 1996 p.54 




other relevant factors should only be limited to those that are directly ‘demonstrated to affect 
price comparability’ as required by article 2.4 of the ADA. It is commonly accepted that the 
relevant factors include the profits accruing or commissions paid, administration costs, 
expenses resulting from further manufacturing or assembling activities incurred in importing 
country. At this point, it is important to note that since the finding of concrete adjustments 
depends on the discretionary consideration of the investigating authorities, it is significant to 
have the scope of adjustment factors and level of adjustments regulated as strictly as possible 
in order to avoid the risk of bias in estimation. It is submitted that the greater the number of 
adjustments, the greater is the risk of artificial dumping findings if the overhead costs and/or 
profits are overestimated.  
Nonetheless, the main issue in the concept of constructed export price is whether the role 
being assumed by the affiliated trading companies are merely those of something like sales 
divisions of exporters. If that is the case, even if some costs can be associated with the 
operations of the trading companies, they ought to be treated no differently as part of the costs 
for making products ready for sales or exports. If, however, the affiliated trading companies 
perform as middlemen, sales agents, and charge commissions for the services, then they are 
more than just marketing arms of exporters. Therefore, the price established by sales to the 
first independent purchaser ought to be used to construct the export price by allowing 
deduction of reasonable-profit and costs. To that end, automatic exclusion of the sale price 
between related parties without analyzing the role played by those parties in the transaction to 
might result in unfairly penalizing exports via related importers, which can distort the 
commercial reality. The solution for this issue probably lies in the rethinking of the concept of 




normal value, to accommodate the contention that the association between the exporters and 
importers does not affect the export price. 
4.2.4.  Determination of Dumping Margin 
Dumping margin is defined on the basis of calculable differences between normal value and 
export price of the products in question. This is the final and the most important stage of 
dumping determination as the result of dumping margin determination directly affects the 
final tariff rate applied on the foreign imports.  
4.2.4.1. Fair Comparison 
Establishing a comparable price out of the normal value and export price is a crucial step in 
dumping determination. This is also considered as one of the most sensitive issues when one 
assessing the national anti-dumping system. This is because, as mentioned earlier, there are 
numerous differences affecting the price comparability and to the levels of trade that need to 
be properly examined and adjusted in order to make the comparison directly reflects the 
actual sales.   
Article 2.4 of the ADA regulates that “a fair comparison shall be made between the export 
price and the normal value. This comparison shall be made at the same level of trade, 
normally at the ex-factory level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same 
time. Due allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect 
price comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels of 
trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences which are also 




are stipulated in Article 27 of the Decree 90/CP, which deals with situations, where they are 
not at the same level of trade, or relates to sales occurring at different times, or are modified 
in different ways by taxes or quantities or terms or circumstances of the sales to which they 
relate, or are not sold in the market with the same currency. 
Among these elements the requirement on currency conversion deserves most attention 
because the value of each currency and the exchange rate between them are quite volatile in 
international trade. The inappropriate use of currency conversion method would create a 
“technical dumping” situation. The creation of a difference between export price and normal 
value is dependant totally upon the date of currency conversion and the exchange rate taken 
for comparison.  
Decree 90/CP stipulates that “each of the normal value and export prices of the products in 
question, if expressed in foreign currency, must be converted into equivalent amount of 
Vietnam Dong at the average exchange rate on the inter-bank foreign exchange market, 
announced by the Vietnam State Bank on the day of official initiation of the investigation or 
on the next day if such exchange rate is not announced on the day of initiation of the 
investigation.”294 It can be assumed that this regulation intends to establish a single currency 
conversion date in order to avoid the issue of the exchange fluctuation of exchange rates. 
However, the “spot exchange rate” seems to misaddress the core problem of the issue of 
currency conversion in the context price comparison. This is because it does not take into 
account the value of relevant currencies throughout the whole period of relevant transaction.  
From the economic perspective, the goal of comparison of normal value and export price is to 
                                                 
 




construct an ‘arm’s length price’ between exporter and importer at the time of actual 
transaction or sale. Logically, therefore, if the figures are expressed in foreign currency, the 
appropriate date for conversion should be the date of the relevant transaction or sale.  
This approach is regulated clearly under the WTO anti-dumping framework. Article 2.4.1 of 
the ADA states that “when the comparison under paragraph 4 requires a conversion of 
currencies, such conversion should be made using the rate of exchange on the date of sale, 
provided that when a sale of foreign currency on forward markets is directly linked to the 
export sale involved, the rate of exchange in the forward sale shall be used…” The date of 
sale here is considered as the date of contract, purchase order, order confirmation, or invoice, 
whichever establishes the material terms of sale.295  
Article 2.4.1 of the ADA further emphasizes that short-term fluctuations in exchange rates 
should not attract an anti-dumping order. It expressly states that “fluctuations in exchange 
rates shall be ignored and in an investigation the authorities shall allow exporters at least 60 
days to have adjusted their export prices to reflect sustained movements in exchange rates 
during the period of investigation.” The exclusion of the effects of short-term fluctuations in 
the exchange rate will help overcome the problem of the inflexibility in inventory costing 
systems of manufacturers.  
From the above analysis, it can be concluded beyond doubt that regulation on currency 
conversion of Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation not only misaddresses the core issue of 
currency conversion in the context of price adjustment, but is also not consistent with the 
requirement of the ADA. Vietnamese rules on currency conversion therefore need to be 
                                                 
 




amended to meet the requirements of the ADA. 
4.2.4.2.   Comparison Methods   
Once all the relevant values are determined and adjusted, the normal value and export price 
should be compared to identify the dumping margin. There are typically three methods of 
comparison: (i) a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted average 
price of all comparable export transactions (weighted average-to-weighted average method) to 
the importing country, or (ii) by a comparison of normal value and export price on a 
transaction-to-transaction basis, or (iii) by a comparison of a weighted average normal value 
to individual export price method. These methods are recognized under Article 2.4.2 of the 
ADA. The last method may be used only where there is a pattern of export prices which 
differs significantly among different purchasers, region or time periods. Article 2.4.2 of the 
ADA regulates that the national anti-dumping authorities cannot apply the third method 
unless they can provide an explanation as to why those differences cannot be taken into 
account by using one of the two other comparison methods. The WTO does not favor 
weighted average normal value to individual export price method because such a comparison 
would result in a higher dumping margin, since it does not account for transactions that are 
not dumped when determining the dumping margin.  
Vietnam’s anti-dumping legislation mentions the issue of dumping determination in both 
Anti-dumping Ordinance and Decree 90/CP. However, the related provisions adopt very little 
from the Article 2.4.2 of the ADA. It only provides some overall principles in computing the 




separately the dumping margin for each requested party in an anti-dumping case.296 Only in 
cases where the determination of separate dumping margin is impossible due to the large 
number of requested exporters or the enormous scope of the imports in question, anti-
dumping authorities may limit the scope of investigation in order to determine separate 
dumping margins for a number of requested exporters or imports requested.297 Hence, when 
selecting samples for investigation, the anti-dumping authorities shall hold necessary 
consultation meetings with the requested exporters and importers related to the sampling and 
must get consent of such requested persons on the selection of samples. Finally, for the entire 
period of anti-dumping investigation, a total normal value and total export price of both 
dumped and non-dumped products will be calculated.  
The fact that the anti-dumping legislation does not regulate in detail the methods of dumping 
margin calculation will create a legal uncertainty in the anti-dumping system. Although the 
VCAD officials claim that they would implement the law in light of the requirement of 
Article 2.4.2 of the ADA,298 the absence of detailed regulations addressing this issue in 
national legislation means they are given a high degree of discretion when choosing the 
method of establishing the margin of dumping. It might lead to a situation where certain 
restrictive methods, such as weight average of normal value to individual transactions 
comparison, will be also used without strict precondition. Meanwhile, the ADA provides this 
exceptional price comparison method be used only where exists a pattern of export prices 
which differ significantly among different purchasers, regions, and time periods, and when 
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accompanied an explanation is provided as to why such differences cannot be taken into 
account appropriately by the use of a weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-
transaction comparison.299  
As a matter of fact, the apparent purpose of the method of comparison of weighted average 
normal value to individual prices is to address instances of so-called targeted dumping, in 
which unfairly low prices to specific customers or regions or at specific times are masked by 
higher prices otherwise.300 Hence, the use of this method is more likely to result in finding of 
dumping because the anti-dumping authorities might choose to compare the weighted average 
normal value with the lowest export price. According to some observers, the misuse of this 
exceptional comparison method can have similar adverse effects to trade and competition as 
the “zeroing” method, which is highly condemned by the WTO.301
The recent WTO disputes related to the issue of dumping margin determination on the basis 
of “zeroing” method, i.e. the EC Bed Linen case302 and US-Stainless Steel from Korea case303, 
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300  Lindsey, B., and Ikenson, D., “Reforming the Anti-dumping Agreement: A Roadmap for WTO 
Negotiations”, Center for Trade Policy Studies of CATO Institute, 11 Dec., 2002, pp 20-21 
[http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-021es.html] (last visited: 12/08/2007) 
301  Lindsey, B. and Ikenson, D., Ibid.; Didier, P., “The WTO Anti-dumping code and EC practice”, supra note 
193, pp. 44-45 
302  EC-Bed Linen, supra note 52. The practice of "zeroing", as applied in the dispute, can briefly be described as 
follows: first, the EC identified with respect to the product under investigation - cotton-type bed linen – a 
certain number of different “models" or "types" of that product. Next, the European Communities 
calculated, for each of these models, a weighted average normal value and a weighted average export price. 
Then, the EC compared the weighted average normal value with the weighted average export price for each 
model. For some models, normal value was higher than export price; by subtracting export price from 
normal value for these models, the EC established a "positive dumping margin" for each model. For other 
models, normal value was lower than export price; by subtracting export price from normal value for these 
other models, the EC established a “negative dumping margin" for each model. Thus, there is a "positive 
dumping margin" where there is dumping, and a "negative dumping margin" where there is not. The 
"positives" and "negatives" of the amounts in this calculation are an indication of precisely how much the 
export price is above or below the normal value. Having made this calculation, the EC then added up the 




can be a good illustration as to how easy dumping can be created artificially by employing 
methods to calculate dumping margins, which are far from reflecting economic realities, but 
distorting them instead and allowing for "cherry picking" of data in order to ensure that a 
finding of dumping is made. In order to avoid such a situation, Vietnam anti-dumping 
legislation has to be amended to adequately address the issue of methods of comparison 
normal value and export prices.  In particular, there must be regulations to impose strict 
requirements on the use of this method, and that investigative authorities shall be subjected to 
a high standard of accountability and burden of proof when employing any exceptional price 
comparison method.  
 
4.3.  INJURY DETERMINATION 
As it was discussed in Chapter I, the WTO system does not condemn the dumping practice; it 
only authorizes the member countries to counter injurious dumping. Article VI of the GATT 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
overall dumping margin for the product as a whole. However, in doing so, the EC treated any "negative 
dumping margin" as zero - hence the use of the word "zeroing". Then, finally, having added up the "positive 
dumping margins" and the zeroes, the EC divided this sum by the cumulative total value of all the export 
transactions involving all types and models of that product. In this way, the EC obtained an overall margin 
of dumping for the product under investigation. The Appellate Body found that the EC practice of 
“zeroing”, which excludes certain subcategories cotton-type bed linen products from the calculation, is 
inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement. 
303  United States — Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils And Stainless Steel Sheet And 
Strip from Korea (US-Stainless Steel from Korea), Panel Report, WT/DS179/R (22 December 2000) The 
US divided the investigation period for the purpose of calculating the overall margin of dumping into two 
averaging periods to take into account the Republic of Korea’s won devaluation in the period November-
December 1997, corresponding to the pre- and post-devaluation periods. The US calculated a margin of 
dumping for each sub-period. When combining the margins of dumping calculated for the sub-periods to 
determine an overall margin of dumping for the entire investigation period, the DOC treated the period 
November-December, where the average export price was higher than the average normal value, as a sub-
period of zero dumping—where in fact there was negative dumping in that sub-period. In the US-Stainless 
Steel from Korea Case, the Panel ruled that the US use of multiple averaging periods in this case  was 
inconsistent with the requirement of Article 2.4.2 to compare a weighted average normal value with a 





requires a finding that a domestic industry has been materially injured by reason of the foreign 
dumped imports before the anti-dumping duty can be imposed on the subject foreign imports. 
Material injury in this sense can be broken down into three components: (i) existing material 
injury (the material injury in narrow sense); (ii) future material injury (threat of material 
injury); (iii) present material injury to an establishing domestic industry (material retardation). 
This concept has been also adopted into the Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation, however, 
with certain divergence. This part of the chapter will focus on assessing those legislative 
issues. 
The overall investigation whether dumping causes injury to the domestic industry producing 
the like product, can be divided into sub-investigations, namely: (i) domestic industry 
definition; (ii) existence and extent of injury; and (iii) the causal link between the dumped 
imports and the injury. This division order will be discussed in this part of the thesis. The last 
section of this part will be reserved for discussion on development of public interest 
assessment mechanism in the current Vietnamese anti-dumping system provision. It is 
assumed that the development of anti-dumping legislation in that domain will contribute to 
improve the economic efficiency of the whole national anti-dumping system of Vietnam. 
4.3.1. Domestic Industry 
The Anti-dumping Ordinance defines domestic industry as “the assembly of domestic 
producers or their representatives with a volume, quantity or value of produced products 
which is a major ratio of the total volume, quantity or value of similar products (like product) 
which are produced domestically on condition that such producers do not import and do not 




products subject to the request for application of anti-dumping measures”.304 This definition 
identifies the scope of the term “domestic industry” for the anti-dumping proceeding, which 
shall only include the domestic registered producers manufacturing “like products” to the 
foreign imported products under consideration. The VCAD, therefore, would focus first on 
answering the question which domestic products are "like" the imported products alleged of 
being dumped, and only after delineating the product market it identifies the Vietnamese 
producers of those products. To that end, the accuracy of initial determination on the issue of 
like product will be very significant for the injury determination and in the first place for 
determination of the scope of domestic industry which is subject for trade protection. The 
discussion on this issue has been provided in section 2.1.2 of this chapter. It is recalled here 
that the like products test should correspond with commercial reality and thus the emphasis of 
definition criteria must be decided on the case-by-case basis.  
Once the VCAD has set the scope of like products, domestic firms producing those like 
products would be included in the domestic industry. Nonetheless, not all domestic producers 
can be considered as a part of the domestic industry. There is an exception, which allows the 
exclusion of some domestic producers from the scope of domestic industry when they are 
affiliated with exporters or importers or they are themselves the importers of the allegedly 
dumped products.  
The Vietnamese anti-dumping system determines the affiliation relation of producers based 
on the concept of ‘control’. Article 5, Decree 90/CP detailing the content of the regulations on 
direct relation of the domestic producers and exporters or importers of the Anti-dumping 
                                                 
 




Ordinance stipulates that the producers are considered as related for the purpose of anti-
dumping proceeding if (i) one of them controls the other, or (ii) both of them directly or 
indirectly control a third party, or (iii) both of them are directly or indirectly controlled by a 
third party.305 It is further stipulated that the ‘control’ is considered as existing when “one 
party has the right to control financial policies and operations of the other in order to gain 
economic benefits from the latter’s business activities”.306  
Compared to the ADA regulation, this legal clarification provides a clearer ground for 
examination of the relationship between producers in order to identify domestic industry. 
However, a strict application of this regulation might raise certain economic concerns. Given 
the current globalizing world, the fact that a company possesses shares or stocks of other 
companies or even that of its competitors is quite popular phenomenon, hence, it does not 
necessary lead to the inter-dependency of the related companies and changes of their business 
operation. Thus, the fact that domestic producers are ‘related’ to foreign companies, should 
not automatically exclude them from constituting part of the domestic industry. According to 
practices of some traditional anti-dumping users, such as the United States or the European 
Union, inclusion or exclusion of related or affiliated producers must be decided on a case-by-
case basis.307 The anti-dumping authorities of those countries would analyze the nature of the 
relationship between the domestic producers and their foreign counterparts and whether there 
are behaviors indicating that they profit from the relationship.308 Therefore, it is suggested that 
the regulations be applied in a more flexible manner by allowing the exclusion of domestic 
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producers who are related to the exporters or importers of the products alleged of dumping 
from the scope of domestic industry if the VCAD has grounds to believe or suspect that the 
effect of the relationship is such as to cause the concerned domestic producer to behave 
differently from the other non-related domestic producers. Although no administrative 
determination has yet concerned itself with this difficult issue up to now in Vietnam, it may 
become very much relevant in the near future considering the rapid increase of flow of foreign 
investment capital (both direct and indirect form investments) to the country after its 
accession to the WTO. 
4.3.2.  Material Injury 
One of the most critical issues in injury determination is the requirement that injury must be 
“material”. This condition qualifies the term injury and therefore is concerned with the degree 
of injury, necessary to warrant remedy action. 
Neither the GATT nor ADA provides a clear and precise definition of material injury. There 
is only a general perception that material injury to domestic industry in anti-dumping is the 
injury level which is less serious than that which warrant taking safeguard measures. This is 
apparent from the drafting history of Article VI of the GATT, when a proposal that the degree 
of injury should be “serious” was rejected.309 The problem is to decide where to draw the 
lowest limit of injury. The term “material” lends itself different interpretations. Some 
European countries consider that the term material injury should be understood as 
“important”. Another interpretation is that contained in the US legislation, which defines the 
                                                 
 




material injury as “harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant”.310 Both of 
these interpretations are very vague and do not provide a precise guidance for actual 
application of the term. Hence, the later one seems clearer with affirmation that injury 
required in anti-dumping action must be more than negligible.  
In Vietnamese legislation, a material injury to domestic industry is defined as a state of 
significant reduction or growth restriction in term of volume, price and sale of goods, profit, 
employment rate, investment and other indicators of a domestic manufacturing industry or the 
state of retardation of the formation of a domestic industry.311  While this definition of 
“material injury” is still general, it seems fair as the requirement of “significant” impacts of 
dumping on a domestic industry shows clearly that the injury finding shall not result from an 
insignificant to negligible impact on the domestic industry.  
The difficulty in quantifying the injury standard stems from the fact that the impact of 
dumping action to importing country might vary from one industry to others. Sometimes, for 
one industry, a small price undercutting or apparent volume of dumped imports may have 
significant impact on the market but yet have no or only minor consequences for other. 
Because of this, it is not possible to lay down pre-determined mathematical rules or thresholds 
in order to decide what does or does not cause material injury in all cases. This is to say the 
injury determination is more or less a subjective process, which include wide scope of 
discretion by anti-dumping authority. But inspire of discretion the national anti-dumping 
authority should take care to apply a reasonable standard of injury determination.  
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There is  number of relevant factors to be taken into account when assessing injury issue, such 
as trends of profits, market share, prices on domestic market, production growth, productivity 
etc. The ADA has defined the injury criteria by distinguishing the factors which could cause 
injury to domestic producers that is the (i) volume of dumped imports, (ii) the effects of 
dumped imports on prices in the domestic market of like product, and (iii) the consequent 
impact of the dumped imports on domestic producers of the like product. This is also the 
requirement of the Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation although with some divergences, 
which will be discussed in the following subsections.  
4.3.2.1. Volume Effects of Dumped Imports 
In evaluating the volume, the Anti-dumping Ordinance requires the anti-dumping authorities 
to examine whether the volume of the imports or any increase therein, either in absolute terms 
or relative to production or consumption in Vietnamese domestic market is significant.  
The VCAD must, therefore, review the relevant information and assess the percentage 
increase in the volume of dumped imports from one period to the next during the course of 
entire period of investigation. The import volume data then has to be compared to domestic 
production and apparent consumption data. Although the current law does not give any 
further guidelines in regards to imports volume evaluation, based on the state market control 
practices in Vietnam, it can be assumed that the VCAD will attach special attention to 
absolute increase in volume and increases in market share of the alleged dumped imports. 
Thus, if the volume of imports has increased immediately before and during a time-period 
when domestic production is continuously decreasing it can be a good ground for VCAD to 




imports has taken place while the production and apparent consumption of domestically 
manufactured products have remained steady or increase, this would indicate a general 
expansion of the imports could be because of overall increase of demand.  
The injury might also be proven if investigated data shows that market share of imported like 
products has been increasing during the same period in which domestic market is shrinking. 
Hence, the VCAD should preclude the injury finding for those cases where the market shares 
of alleged dumped imports are insignificant or the increase thereof is negligible to meet the 
requirement of the concept of material injury provided under Articles 2.7 and 12.2 of the 
Anti-dumping Ordinance.  
In the ADA context, consideration of significant increase of imports in injury finding by the 
national anti-dumping authorities is essential.312 In Thailand-H-Beam case, the Panel stated 
that “it must be apparent in the relevant documents in the record that the [national] anti-
dumping authority has given attention to and taken into account whether there has been a 
significant increase in dumped imports in absolute or relative term”.313
In order to ensure that the above mentioned requirement is met, the Vietnamese legislation 
should expressly guide the VCAD to review the relevant data to identify the trend in import 
volume and make appropriate assessment whether there is a significant increase in imports. 
The guidelines for the VCAD may also mention that data used for evaluation of the trend in 
imports volume can be taken on a quarterly, monthly or annual basis depending on nature of 
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the industry in investigation. This concept has already been asserted by the Thailand-H-Beam 
Panel.314 In addition, the VCAD should also be required to take into account other factors in 
the market place, such as cyclicality or seasonality of the industry, to consolidate its 
argument.  
Overall, the increased volume of dumped imports can directly and adversely affect the 
business operation of a domestic industry. However, it should not be assumed automatically 
that such increase is the cause of injury to domestic industry.  
4.3.2.2.  Price Effects of Dumped Imports 
The second factor of material injury assessment is the impacts of dumped imports in price in 
the domestic market. Pursuant to Article 12.2 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance, which 
corresponds to the second sentence of Article 3(2) of the ADA, an injury finding will be made 
if the level of prices of dumped imports leads to a general fall in the price of the domestically 
produced like products or a restriction of the possibility to reasonably increase of their prices. 
When assessing the effects of these prices, the Anti-dumping Ordinance points to the need to 
establish whether they have undercut the prices of domestic producers.315 This means that the 
respective prices have to be compared at the same level of trade or distribution channel, where 
the exporters and domestic producers first compete with each other. The VCAD must, 
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therefore, assess the overall trend of prices charged by the domestic industry, and decreasing 
prices would be an indication of injury.  
A situation of unchanged prices for the products on the matter can also be an indicator of 
material injury, if it can be found that prices should have increased to a higher degree without 
the presence of dumped imports. Price suppression is generally more difficult to identify than 
the normal price undercutting, because it rests on a counter-factual conclusion that because of 
the dumped imports, prices of the domestic product have not increased as they would have in 
the absent of dumped imports. In other words, the finding of price suppression is a 
hypothetical one since the price of the dumped products will not be compared to the actual 
price of like products in the domestic market, but rather to the hypothetical price of those like 
products if there was no dumping by either depressing the prices or preventing them from 
increasing. In order to be impartial and fair in this highly subjective examination, the anti-
dumping authorities should assess various factors influencing the domestic consumption.  
This author proposes that in parallel with consideration of price levels, the VCAD should also 
consider the relationship between quantity of sales and sale prices of the product. It is 
essential to explore the consumer perceptions relating to distinctions in the price and quality 
offered by domestic and foreign producers and to identify any specialty or niche markets in 
which certain firms may be competing. These market dynamics have a direct bearing on 
whether dumped imports are causing price suppression or depression. In this context, the 
market elasticity analysis, which is used in competition law investigation, could be 
particularly helpful in determining how sensitive Vietnamese domestic prices are to various 
quantities of foreign like imported products. The market elasticity test would show how 




product in the Vietnamese market.316 For some products in the market the demands may not 
be influenced by slight difference of price between domestic and foreign imported 
products.317 In that case, the VCAD may conclude that the market of the subject product is 
relatively inelastic and under this circumstance it is unlikely that some slightly lower priced 
imports would cause material injury to a domestic industry. On the contrary, if the market is 
highly elastic, then even a small margin of dumping might have a great impact on the 
Vietnamese domestic producers because customers would quickly move to the lower-priced 
imports. In other words, in an elastic and competitive market, one percent change of the sale 
price of a product would be more competitively significant than that of margin for a product 
sold in a low elastic market. These market dynamics have a direct bearing on whether dumped 
imports are causing price suppression or depression. 
The relevance of the price undercutting and price suppression analysis in assessing injury 
depends on achieving an accurate comparison between the domestic prices and the prices of 
the dumped imports. No provision in the Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation requires the 
anti-dumping authorities to ensure an accurate examination of import price’s effects. 
However, this is a requirement for national anti-dumping authorities under the Article 3.1 of 
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provoke a significant number of consumers to switch to another product. For an explanation of the economic 
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116/2005/ND-CP detailing the implementation of a number of articles of the Competition law (Decree 




ADA. In US - Hot-Rolled Steel, the Appellate Body held that the concept of "objective 
assessment" under the Article 3.1 of ADA shall be interpreted to “indicate essentially that the 
"examination" process must conform to the dictates of the basic principles of good faith and 
fundamental fairness”.318 To that end, the Vietnamese law-maker should consider amending 
the national anti-dumping legislation to reflect the obligation of the VCAD to conduct an 
objective and accurate comparison of domestic and import prices.  
The comparison of effects of dumped imports by the VCAD should be based on reliable and 
consistent series of data, which would be derived mostly from the respond to injury 
questionnaires by concerned parties. 
4.3.2.3. Impact of Dumped Imports on the Domestic Industry 
Another element to be examined in an injury analysis is the impact of the dumped imports on 
domestic industry producing like products. In fact, injury to domestic industry does not 
necessarily occur when significant quantities of dumped products are imported at cheap price. 
What really matters is the effect of these phenomena on the domestic industry. This only can 
be assessed by analyzing all economic factors which effect having a bearing on the domestic 
industry. The ADA has developed a list of economic factors that should be considered for the 
product under investigation.319  
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319  ADA, Article 3.4 : “The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry 
concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the 
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This list, according to Article 3.4 of the ADA, is not exhaustive nor can each or several of 
these factors give decisive guidance for the impact of alleged dumped imports on domestic 
industry. This implies that evaluation of all fifteen economic factors is mandatory in every 
anti-dumping investigation. The Panel reports in EC - Bed Linen held that “[t]he use of the 
phrase 'shall include' in Article 3.4 strongly suggests [to us] that the evaluation of the listed 
factors in that provision is properly interpreted as mandatory in all cases…, the ordinary 
meaning of the provision is that the examination of the impact of dumped imports must 
include an evaluation of all the listed factors in Article 3.4... [Hence], there may be other 
'relevant factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry' among 'all' such 
factors that must be evaluated”.320 This interpretation was also supported by the other WTO 
Panels, such as Thailand-H-Beam from Poland321 and Mexico – HFCS322. 
In Vietnam, Article 2.7 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance does name a number of economic 
factors to be assessed in determination of impacts of dumping imports in the definition of 
material injury, including inter alia the significant decline in volume, prices, sales, profits, 
production development rate, employment rate and investment into the domestic industry. 
Meanwhile, it worth noting that the ADA requires national anti-dumping authorities to 
evaluate all of the fifteen economic factors in evaluating. The inconsistence of Vietnamese 
legislation may pose legal problems for the VCAD practice. First of all, it can create 
difficulties when VCAD prepares the data information for the injury assessment. There will 
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be an issue whether questions in the questionnaires for the parties should be limited to the 
scope of factors expressly stipulated in the law or can be as wide as the VCAD considers as 
appropriate. If the assessment is only based on the data within the coverage of the factors 
listed in Article 2.7 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance it does not meet the requirement of the 
ADA, and the finding can be potentially challengeable at the WTO as a violation of Article 
3.4 of the ADA. 
In theory, the VCAD can make the determination based on factors other than those listed in 
the Anti-dumping Ordinance because Article 2.7 does regulate so. However, traditionally, 
when resolving a complex legal issue with foreign elements, administrative organs in Vietnam 
would usually apply the rules narrowly unless there is a guideline regulation or direction of 
the higher organ directing more detail application. The Decree 90/CP, meanwhile, does not 
provide such guidelines. Moreover, even if the VCAD refers to this provision in its practice, 
the problem of legal uncertainty still remains because it is still unclear as to what factors, 
apart from those listed in Article 2.7 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance, will be examined in 
injury determination and when they are chosen for examination. 
To solve the issue, it is highly important that the Vietnamese legislation be amended so that 
all fifteen relevant economic factors having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry to 
be considered in the injury determination. It should also be required that the evaluation of the 
economic factors has to emerge from positive evidence and not from more assumption or 






4.3.3. Cumulation of Injury 
When there is more than one country subject to anti-dumping investigation at the same time 
the ADA permits a cumulative assessment of the effect of dumping imports. This means that 
authorities can group together the imports from some or all countries under investigation and 
determine whether the combined effect of those imports is to cause or threaten injury. 
The basic theory behind the use of cumulation is that a domestic industry can be injured 
through the combine effects of imports from several sources even each of those sources 
individually might be viewed as incapable of being a “cause” of injury. An early analogy was 
that to the harm inflicted on a victim by multiple assailants – if several people are punching 
and kicking a crime victim, it may not be possible to tell which individual assailant delivered 
the punch that harmed the victim. Hence, it is assumed that all obviously participated and the 
cumulative outcome was harmful. 323  Thus, without cumulation assessment, artificial 
competitive advantages caused by group market distortions might go completely un-remedied.  
However, cumulation principle does ignore some important realities - the artificial 
competitive advantages targeted by antidumping policy supposedly accrue to particular 
foreign companies and arise out of government policies in their home markets. Accordingly, 
if particular companies or even whole countries are such minor players in an export market 
that they have no significant impact on competitive conditions in that market, then they 
cannot be said to enjoy any real competitive advantage vis-à-vis the domestic industry - and 
therefore cannot be an appropriate targets of antidumping measures.  
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During the Uruguay Round of negotiations many developing countries expressed opposition 
to cumulation practice as they consider that assessment of dumped imports on a cumulative 
basis would facilitate injury findings with regard to smaller suppliers, who are not the primary 
cause of injury.324 However, interestingly, most countries accept this practice in their national 
system. 
The ADA has tried to balance these competing considerations by providing numbers 
condition for cumulative assessment on dumping imports. Article 3 of the ADA stipulates that 
the national anti-dumping authorities can cumulatively assess the effects of imports if they are 
able to determine that: First, the margin of dumping established in relation to the imports from 
each country is more than de minimis and the volume of imports from each country is not 
negligible. Second, a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports is appropriate in 
light of the conditions of competition between the imported products and the conditions of 
competition between the imported products and the like domestic product. Article 5.8 of the 
ADA further clarifies that the de minimis dumping margin shall be more than 2 % of the 
export price, while the volume of dumped imports shall be regarded as negligible if they 
amount less than 3% of total imports of the product under investigation—unless all the 
countries under investigation that individually fall under the 3% threshold together account 
for more than 7 % of total imports.  
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While the general approach of allowing cumulation except for de minimis dumping margin 
and “negligible” volume of imports seems basically sound, the current threshold of 7% for 
determining negligibility is very much disputable. If determining negligibility simply on the 
basis of aggregation of percentage of imports volume, the result can easily show that volume 
and the impact of foreign imports are higher than negligible. This in turn will result in greater 
likelihood of affirmative injury findings.325 In EC-Malleable cast iron or pipe fitting case, the 
Appellate Body held a firm opinion that even declining in imports volume from one or more 
countries can still cause injury if the cumulation has been made in accordance with the 
conditions provided by Article 3.3 of ADA.326 Hence, since the conditions are rather easy to 
meet, regardless of whether one country’s imports are actually competitively harmful for 
domestic producers, a subject country can be easily lumped together with big exporters for 
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“X” to country E at dumped prices with individual share of volume of imports as follow: A - 2.8%, B 1.9%, 
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exceeded the collective threshold of 7%. Although each of those countries fell below the normal 
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countries may be injured by the cumulated effects of those imports, and that those effects may not be 
adequately taken into account in a country-specific analysis of the injurious effects of dumped imports. 
Consistent with the rationale behind cumulation, we consider that changes in import volumes from 
individual countries, and the effect of those country-specific volumes on prices in the importing country's 
market, are of little significance in determining whether injury is being caused to the domestic industry by 




anti-dumping action. Thus, it is probably also the reason for an increasing trend of naming 
multiple countries in the anti-dumping investigation process.327  
Lindsey and Ikenson rightly pointed out that what matters in the cumulation is whether the 
arguably negligible imports are capable of contributing meaningfully to the injury being 
suffered by the domestic industry — that is, whether they can be said to enjoy any real 
competitive advantage relative to the domestic industry.328 Thus, the rights approach for the 
assessment of “negligibility” is probably to evaluate the market share and import volume 
trends of the countries subject to investigation over past years. This approach would better 
address the condition of competition between the imported products and the conditions of 
competition between the imported products and the like domestic product, which is one of the 
conditions required by Article 3.3 of the ADA.  
Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation does not contain any provision on cumulation of injury; 
however Article 2.3 and 2.4 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance have adopted the content of 
Article 5.8 of the ADA. This implies that cumulative assessment of impact of dumping is still 
possible under the Vietnamese anti-dumping system and the cumulation assessment if 
initiated shall take into account the conditions of de minimis dumping margin and negligibility 
of dumping imports. Hence, this status quo in the anti-dumping system creates uncertainty 
and thus is certainly undesirable. The provision on cumulation of injury determination should 
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be added to the national anti-dumping legislation. However, in designing the provision on 
cumulation, it is worth emphasizing the importance of assessment of the consideration for the 
“conditions of the competition”. It is suggested that the anti-dumping legislation should 
require the anti-dumping authority to consider not only the volume of imports but also the 
market share and imports trend of the importing sources as this would help to determine a 
difference in conditions of the competition, and imports trend of the importing sources as this 
would help to determine a difference in conditions of the competition. At this point, the most 
difficult problem is to define the concrete threshold for evaluation of cumulative market share 
of foreign dumped imports. One might suggest the VCAD to refer to the practice used in 
domestic competition law as criteria for determination of market dominance to evaluate the 
injury cumulation, which opt for a 30% of market share.329 Clearly, this threshold is much 
higher than the 7% of total import volume required under the Anti-dumping Ordinance. Such 
a high threshold for injury cumulation test seems impractical because it would be nearly 
impossible to cumulate the negligible dumped imports, the individual volume of which is less 
than 3 % of the total imports, to reach this rate. The result of a too high requirement is that no 
protective measure will be applied to protect domestic industry when they are facing a threat 
of injury from multiple sources of dumping. The concrete threshold for market share of 
foreign dumped imports in injury cumulation should be carefully calculated and tested with 
various economic patterns. Hence, Vietnamese legislation could make a reference to the 
proposal of Lindsey and Ikenson330 in this regards, which use 5% of collective market share 
as the threshold for injury cumulation. 
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A decreasing import trend from one country, whose individual share of imports is negligible, 
while imports from other sources are increasing, should also be a ground to exclude that 
country’s imports from the cumulation. As it was discussed earlier, when assessing the impact 
of dumped imports on domestic industry, the VCAD should be able to evaluate the situation 
in the broad context of competition process. It would be unfair to treat the imports from those 
sources which are actually competitively harmless for domestic industry equally as the one 
that actually or potentially can distort the market order.  
The requirement to include an  additional considerations on market share and trend of imports 
in  injury cumulation test will not only give a fairer assessment of cumulation from the 
competition prospective but discourage abusive approach of domestic industries towards 
cumulation provision, in which they intentionally name multiple exporting countries in the 
anti-dumping petition, many of which are of no competitive concern whatsoever, just for the 
purpose of pushing past the collective negligibility threshold of 7% during the injury 
determination. 
The introduction of this condition for the cumulation provision into the national anti-dumping 
legislation is still consistent with the ADA. It should be noted that although cumulation is 
permitted by the ADA, it is not mandatory.331 By permitting cumulation without more, the 
ADA leaves it up to the individual country member to adopt a more restrictive approach.  
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4.3.4. Threat of Material Injury  
Threat of material injury to domestic industries is the second category of injury against which 
anti-dumping measures may be taken. According to Article 2.8 of the Anti-dumping 
Ordinance, threat of material injury means an imminent, apparent and provable possibility to 
cause material injury to a domestic industry. This provision makes clear that this term refers 
to a particular situation where the industry in the importing country is not suffering injury 
because of dumping, but is likely to start suffering material injury in the near future unless 
anti-dumping measures are taken. As determination of threat of material injury is, by nature, 
speculative there should be conditions for the assessment to ensure that the legal concept is 
not misused in the anti-dumping proceeding as an excuse to justify application of protective 
measure when there is no prospect of material injury being caused to the domestic industry. 
Article 3.7 of the ADA requires straightforwardly that the determination shall be based on 
facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility. Besides the change in 
circumstances which would create a situation in which would create actual injurious dumping 
must be clearly foreseen and imminent.  
Article 2.8 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance has, to a certain extent, addressed the first 
condition, by requiring that that the threat of material injury to domestic industry must be 
“apparent and provable”. Nonetheless, this regulation is quite general and does not clearly 
show that the assessment should be based on factual evidence as required by the ADA. Thus, 
it must certainly be amended to fill the loophole.  
It is worth noting that the requirement of “determination based on the facts” does not actually 




Mexico HFCS 21.5 case, asserted that the "establishment" of facts in determination of threat 
of material injury case can include both affirmative findings of events that took place during 
the period of investigation as well as assumptions relating to such events made by those 
authorities in the course of their analyses. Certain assumption is necessary because the 
determination is related to the possible “occurrence of future events”, which can hardly be 
definitively proven by facts. However, a "proper establishment" of facts in determination of 
threat of material injury must be based on events that, although they have not yet occurred, 
must be "clearly foreseen and imminent" as it is required by Article 3.7 of the ADA.332
Article 3.7 of the ADA also sets forth a non-exclusive list of specific factors to be considered 
in determining whether the domestic industry faces a threat of material injury, including:  
(i) The rate of a increase in dumping imports – a significant rate of increase of dumped 
imports into the domestic market indicating the likelihood of substantially increased 
importation; 
(ii) Capacity - sufficient freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial increase in, 
capacity of the exporter indicating the likelihood of substantially increased dumped 
exports to the importing Member's market, taking into account the availability of 
other export markets to absorb any additional exports; 
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(iii) Price suppressing or depressing effects - whether imports are entering at prices that 
will have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and would 
likely increase demand for further imports; and 
(iv) Inventories - inventories of the product being investigated. 
Vietnamese law-makers should incorporate the above mentioned factors into the national 
legislation as essential criteria for determination of threat of material injury. However, it 
should be also clarified in the legislation that the list of factors is non-exhaustive, thus the 
determination on threat of material injury can not be made solely on the basis of consideration 
of those factors. Rather, it must include consideration of the likely impact of further dumped 
imports on the domestic industry. A threat of injury could also be deduced from such factors 
as an increase of stocks of the dumped products in bonded warehouses, or increase in demand 
of imports, or sudden creation by the exporters of selling agent in Vietnam. 
4.3.5. Causation 
Article 6 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance specifies that the anti-dumping measures shall be 
applied to foreign imports only when the imports are dumped into Vietnam at significant 
dumping margin and thus causing or threatening to cause injury to domestic industry. If there 
is no evidence to show causality the application for anti-dumping measures and the 
investigation must be dismissed.333  
Within the legal framework of the WTO, Article 3.5 of the ADA deals with the issue of 
method of determination of causation, while the corresponding provisions under Vietnamese 
                                                 
 




legislation are found at Articles 28 of Decree 90/CP. Article 3.5 of the ADA specifies that the 
finding of causal link between foreign dumping and injury to domestic industries should be 
based on two levels. First, it has to be established that the dumped imports have a significant 
negative effect on the sales volume and/or prices of the domestic producers and that such 
negative effect had an impact on one or several of factors and indices which were used in 
injury determination. In other words, the effects of the price and/or volume fluctuations of the 
subject imports should be linked to the fluctuations of prices and/or volumes of the domestic 
industry in order to define whether they affect directly the negative state of the domestic 
industry.  
Second, there should be an examination of the impact of factors other than the dumped 
imports, which are also injuring the domestic industry, and if such injury breaks the causal 
link between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the domestic industry. If the 
injury attributed to dumping is not material, then the causal link will be broken. The reasoning 
for this requirement is that the domestic industry may suffer, but due to various factors other 
than dumping. It may happen that the domestic industry is faced with real financial losses 
because of various factors, such as bad unitization of resources or maladaptive to market 
demand, while dumping is taken place at that particular moment. It would be unfair, in this 
situation, to remedy foreign exporters for the events for which they were not responsible. The 
anti-dumping measure should only focus on remedying the injury of domestic industry caused 
by dumping actions of foreign exporters.  
Article 28 of Decree 90/CP also mentions the evaluation of factors, other than that caused by 
dumping imports into Vietnam, which at the same time cause or threaten to cause material 




conduct this test compulsorily but only “when necessary”.334 This provision is not consistent 
with the requirement of Article 3.5 of the ADA, which demands that the assessment of 
“known factors other than dumping” shall be compulsory in the causation finding. Moreover, 
since it is required that the injurious effects of the other known factors are not "attributed" to 
dumped imports, the final determination must involve separating and distinguishing the 
injurious effects of the other factors from the injurious effects of the dumped imports.335 If the 
above provision is not adequately modified in accordance with the requirement of the ADA, 
the practice of VCAD will likely to be challenged at the WTO. 
4.3.6. Public Interest Clause 
The Public interest clause, as it was mentioned earlier in Chapter I, is a useful mechanism in 
which to insert a broad safety valve to avoid the application of anti-dumping duties if it 
appears to be economically undesirable. It gives a legal basis for the anti-dumping authorities 
to consider the anti-dumping complaints in a wider context, taking into account not only the 
interests of the affected domestic industry but also the interests of different operators on the 
market, namely importers, industrial users and consumers, and the cost of anti-dumping 
intervention to the national economy.     
Within the WTO framework, the ADA does not provide any provision on public interest nor 
require Member states to conduct public interest test before applying anti-dumping measure. 
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Therefore, the inclusion of this provision into the national anti-dumping legislation is totally 
based on individual country initiative.  
In international practice, although there are opponents to public interest considerations in anti-
dumping proceeding, such as the US,336 India337, Mexico338, there are increasing number of 
countries in the world, such as Canada, 339  China, 340  European Union, 341  Colombia, 342  
Thailand,343 Malaysia,344 Singapore345 that have introduced ‘public interest test’ provisions in 
their legislation.346  
Vietnam’s anti-dumping system does also recognize the concept of “public interest”, which is 
known as ‘domestic socio-economic interests’ under the Anti-dumping Ordinance. Article 5.4 
of the Anti-dumping Ordinance established a principle that application of anti-dumping 
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measures must not cause harm to domestic socio-economic interests. This principle has been 
further grounded in Article 40 of the Decree 90/CP with the requirements for the Minister to 
consider possible impact of anti-dumping duty on domestic socio-economic (public) interests. 
If the Minister determines imposition of anti-dumping duty is not on the public interests, he 
can decline the application of an anti-dumping duty.  
However, the legislation does not provide further guidelines as to how the Minister should 
assess the situation and evaluate the impacts of anti-dumping measure on the public interests. 
There are no explicit criteria for application of this provision: such as whose economic 
interests should be retained? Which socio-economic considerations should be taken into 
account? How should the inquiry be initiated? How should the test be conducted? Of course, 
balancing conflicting interests is always a difficult thing, which could hardly be efficiently 
done without a clear and reasonable assessment mechanism.  
The author’s contention is that there should be a public inquiry for application of the socio-
economic (public) interest test. This system should include the following elements: first, it 
should allow concerned parties to defend their interests by giving them the opportunity to 
present their arguments to anti-dumping authorities, and have the legal standing to do so; 
second, there should be criteria for public interest inquiry; and third the public interest inquiry 
should be conducted in the stage of anti-dumping proceeding whereby the anti-dumping 
investigation have already obtained enough data and information for an overall and accurate 
evaluation.  
For a “public interest” provision to be effective and truly serve the socio-economic interests, it 




defend their interests. They should be entitled to present their arguments to anti-dumping 
authorities, and have the legal standing to do so. They should have access to the information 
presented by the petitioners (domestic competing industry) seeking protection in making their 
case.  
More importantly, public interest inquiry should come into play at the earlier stage of the anti-
dumping proceeding so that the anti-dumping authorities could have appropriate time to 
evaluate accurately all evidence related to the issues. This author proposes that it could be 
initiated at the same time that injury to producers and the causal link between dumping and 
such injury is established. According to Article 40 of the Decree 90/CP, currently, public 
interest assessment is made by the Minister at the end of anti-dumping proceeding before 
imposition of the final measure. If the public interest test is invoked at the final stage of an 
anti-dumping investigation its impact may be limited for several reasons. First, the anti-
dumping authorities may not be able to evaluate the issue carefully because of the pressure to 
accomplish the investigation within the time frame settled by the anti-dumping law and ADA. 
Secondly, if the concerned parties are required to provide information to counteract by then 
well established evidence they could be in a disadvantageous position and may have 
insufficient time to prepare good arguments. 
The goal of public interest inquiry is to balance conflicting interests. Given the economic 
complexity of the anti-dumping case, the focus of the public interest consideration should be 
taken on a case-by-case basis. Criteria and guidelines for assessment must, however, be in 
place to indicate to the anti-dumping authorities how other interests besides those of domestic 
producers should be considered. From on the analysis of the economic impacts dumping and 




some central issues, namely the impacts of anti-dumping measures on the competition process 
and the impact of anti-dumping dumping measures on the domestic consumers and industrial 
users of the dumped products with particular attention given to the trade-off between lower 
prices and long-term availability of alternative supplies (i.e. the availability of alternative 
suppliers, product substitutability, the existence of barriers to entry and re-entry the particular 
industry). The properly designed assessment criteria can serve as catalysis for a systematic 
application of the public interests provision in anti-dumping proceeding. If the interests of 
other than those of the import-competing domestic industry are considered systematically in 
the anti-dumping proceeding, it would serve as a mean of access to socio-economic justice for 
these adversely affected parties, especially consumers. On the other hand, a properly devised 
public interest test can help the national anti-dumping policy become more competition 
friendly and thus contribute to lessen the possibility of misuse of this trade remedy instrument 
for purpose of protectionism. 
Based on the above consideration, it is suggested that the Vietnamese anti-dumping 
legislation to be added with a new separate provision apart from the current Article 40 of the 
Decree 90/CP, to explicitly regulate the public interest inquiry proceeding as well as the 
relevant criteria for inquiry.  
Under the above mentioned proposal, the Minister should be entitled to initiate the public 
interest inquiry at any point after the VCAD made the primary anti-dumping determination. 
The Minister can come up with that decision based on his personal consideration or based on 
the request of any concerned party, which could have interests affected by the injury findings. 
Once the Minister agrees on the necessity of a public interest inquiry he will direct the VCAD 




The legislation should require the parties interested in a public interest inquiry in anti-
dumping proceedings to submit an application to the Minister within a legitimate time limit 
after the affirmative preliminary determination. It is suggested that the time period for 
submission of such application is 60 days. This timeframe is equivalent to the one given to the 
disputing parties to seek for administrative review under the Article 26 of Anti-dumping 
Ordinance.  
According to Article 11 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance, concerned parties in the 
investigation process comprise of domestic producers (petitioners), foreign 
producers/exporters (respondents), importers and their representative associations as well as 
labor unions, consumer protection organizations, competent state agencies and other parties 
that have rights and interests involved in the investigation process. Except for the first two 
parties who are directly involved in the anti-dumping proceeding as petitioners and 
respondents, other concerned parties only enjoy limited due process rights. Practically, they 
are allowed to submit data and evidence only upon request of the VCAD. The public interest 
provision, therefore, could specify their right to request public interest inquiry.  
There is one important point to be mentioned in this context: Article 11 of the Anti-dumping 
Ordinance does not name domestic downstream users as one of the concerned parties to the 
anti-dumping proceeding. Meanwhile, as it was analyzed earlier in Chapter I, the welfare 
impacts of the anti-dumping measures on the national economy cannot be evaluated 
thoroughly without taking into consideration the interests of domestic downstream producers. 
A legal recognition of the domestic downstream industries as concerned party in the anti-
dumping proceeding will help to improve their status for the public interest inquiry. 




add the Vietnamese user industries into the list of concerned parties in anti-dumping 
proceeding. Once the scope of concerned parties is clearly determined, the legislation can 
provide conditions for them to approach the system for public interest inquiry.   
Since the Minister has discretion to decide whether there are reasonable grounds for 
commencement of a public interest inquiry, concerned parties must address in their 
application all the factors that they consider relevant in assisting the Minister to arrive at his 
opinion. A typical obstacle for this system is that industrial users and consumers may not be 
aware of their rights in the proceeding and thus fail to provide comments to the Minister, 
which is eventually interpreted as implying that anti-dumping measures are not contrary to 
their interests.  To that end, there are opinions that public interest inquiry should be initiated 
by the anti-dumping authorities, acting sua sponte, because they would have enough 
knowledge on legality of the issue.347
However, it is of this author’s opinion that the request for public interest assessment should 
also base on the assertiveness of affected parties because they are the most interested in 
having the public interest provision applied. Under this system, the affected parties will have 
strong incentive to collect the data and arguments to defense the initiation of public interest 
assessment. In addition, for the self-initiation system, the Minister may not have enough 
access to information and data resources so it is difficult for him to collect evidence and facts 
for evaluation.  
The MOT may consider issuing a sample public interest questionnaire to help the affected 
parties (industry users and consumers) to establish their argument and explain better their 
                                                 
 




specific interest in the proceedings. It is suggested that the public interest questionnaire asks 
interested parties to explain how the measures will affect their consumption habits or business 
activities measured in terms such as additional cost of production, loss of employment, 
profitability, reduction of volume in sales, and decreasing market share. 
During the public interest inquiry, the VCAD should be required to take into account a 
combination of factors which reflect the overall national socio-economic interests. To this end 
it is suggested that a non-exhaustive list of factors for public interest determination is 
introduced into the anti-dumping legislation, which include the following test:   
(i)  Whether or not there are commercially substitutable products readily available from 
other sources that are not the subject of the anti-dumping proceeding of which the 
public interest inquiry forms part. 
(ii)  Whether the imposition of anti-dumping measures in the amount determined in an 
investigation or review is likely to substantially lessen or prevent, or has substantially 
lessened or prevented, competition in the domestic market for goods or services. 
(iii) Whether the imposition of the anti-dumping measures is likely to significantly restrict 
or has significantly restricted the choice or availability of products at competitive prices 
for consumers or otherwise cause them significant harm. 
(iv)  Whether the imposition of the anti-dumping measures is likely to cause significant 
damage or has caused damage to domestic producers that use the product under 
investigation in the production of other goods (downstream producers) – reducing their 




The assessment of the last factor is equally important as that of other mentioned factors 
because many Vietnamese manufacturing industries are using imported materials for 
production. Therefore, anti-dumping actions against one imported product can have broad 
potential effects on the operation of various industries. For instance, the level of 
competitiveness of garment industry, one of the most important industries in the Vietnamese 
economy, can be significantly restricted if the high anti-dumping duties are imposed on the 
imported textiles.  
It is also important to emphasize in the legislation that the evaluation of the effects of anti-
dumping measures on domestic consumers, downstream producers and other interested parties 
should be conducted in the same manner as the injury test on the effects of dumping on 
domestic producers. This requirement is significant because the public interest inquiry aims at 
comprehensive assessment of the all socio-economic impacts of the anti-dumping measure on 
the economy so it should warrantee that all affected domestic interests are equally assessed. 
The requirement on comprehensive assessment of the issue, however, does not turn the public 
interest inquiry into a new investigation. In fact, most of the evidence that the VCAD collects 
during the anti-dumping proceeding (as discussed in the earlier session) would continue to be 
useful for the public interest inquiry. The evidence regarding the industry output levels, the 
market shares of the firms that have accurately been determined, measures of productivity that 
suggest how efficiently factors of production are being used, and of course domestic price 
levels, are all significant. Although some data may be less useful, particularly measures 
derived from accounting rates of return, such as profit levels, negative cash flow, and the 




If, as a result of investigation, VCAD comes to conclusion that the imposition of the anti-
dumping measure determined during anti-dumping investigation would  not be in the public 
interest, it must specify it in a written recommendation to the Minister either to issue a 
decision of non-application or discontinue the application of anti-dumping duty or otherwise 
to reduce the rate of anti-dumping duty determined in earlier investigation or review to an 
appropriate level (which can balance best the overall socio-economic welfare). Hence, the 
Minister has full right to accept or ignore the recommendation of the VCAD if it finds that the 
arguments therein are not based on socio-economic interests. 
It is important that the concept of public interest is not used as an excuse for the general 
politicization of the anti-dumping procedure in Vietnam. There will always be ideological 
objection to restraint to trade as well as strong political pressure for protectionism. Thus, there 
is a need to ensure that the procedure is applied in a politically neutral manner. The anti-
dumping authorities should bear in mind that often the effect of anti-dumping measures may 
cause greater damage on the economy than the benefits they bring to the complaining 
domestic industry. The public interest assessment in anti-dumping proceeding, if properly 
applied, will help to prevent these types of situation. With the above proposed regulation on 
implementation of public (socio-economic) interest test, it is believed that the concept of 
public interest will be applied in even-handed manner - balancing efficiently the interests of 












Procedural rules form the second pillar of national anti-dumping system. It related to the 
implication of the anti-dumping rules and principles within the system.  
Based on the framework established by the WTO ADA, anti-dumping procedure can be 
divided into two parts, so called the pre-initiation period of investigation and formal 
investigation period. The pre-initiation period basically relates to the requirement for 
evaluation of the legitimacy of anti-dumping petition. There are rules governing the 
assessment of the evidence provided by the petitioners.  
Once content of the petition is accepted and the decision to initiate antidumping proceedings 
is delivered, the anti-dumping authorities are required to engage in formal investigations. The 
formal investigation procedure than can be divided into two major stages, namely, that from 
the initiation to rendering preliminary determinations, including imposing provisional 
measures, and the period involving further investigations until the final determinations (see 
the chart 1). There are numbers of regulations and rules governing the anti-dumping 
proceedings, including various means of investigation such as sending questionnaires, holding 
hearings, providing consultations, and verifications. There are also procedural safeguards that 




particularly respondents, such as treatment of confidential information, voluntary 
undertakings. Through the anti-dumping proceedings there is a system to supervise the 
conduct of government authorities to ensure the impartiality and efficiency of the proceeding 
– the judicial and administrative review mechanism. 
This chapter of the thesis will outline how Vietnamese anti-dumping regulations implement 
the relevant WTO rules in relation to investigation procedure as well as highlight the 
important issues that the Vietnam shall resolve in order to enhance complex and highly 
technical anti-dumping procedure in light of the spirit of the ADA and Vietnamese Open 
Trade Policy. This chapter consists of three main parts, namely: (1) Initiation of the Anti-










5.2. INITIATION OF THE ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION  
According to general anti-dumping practice, which is also recognized by the WTO, an anti-
dumping investigation can be initiated upon acceptance of anti-dumping authorities on 
petitions by the injured domestic industry or its representatives (private petition) or it can also 
be initiated by the national anti-dumping authorities when they have prima facie evidence on 
elements of dumping, material injury to domestic industry and a causal link between them.348 
Vietnamese legislation also decreed these two conditions as ground for holding anti-dumping 
investigation.349  
Article 8 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance stipulates that anti-dumping proceeding may be 
initiated upon request for application of anti-dumping measures of the organizations or 
individuals representing the domestic industries or when the Minister issues a decision 
[directing the VCAD] to initiate an anti-dumping investigation against particular imported 
products when there are clear evidences that the dumping of products causes or threatens to 
cause material injury to a domestic industry. Hence, even in the case of self-initiation, an 
appropriate petition file still needs to be prepared before the Minister can decide to initiate 
anti-dumping investigation. The procedural law provides that the VCAD must finish 
compiling the file requesting the application of anti-dumping measures within 6 months from 
the date of the Minister’s requirement.350
It is observed from the international anti-dumping practice that involvement of government 
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authorities as initiator of an anti-dumping investigation is quite rare. This phenomenon can be 
explained by the fact that domestic producers, whose economic interests are directly 
threatened by the foreign imports, would be interested more than anyone else in seeking the 
enforcement of anti-dumping measures. On the other hand, the national anti-dumping 
authorities would usually try to keep their ‘neutrality’ in anti-dumping proceeding by 
refraining from self-initiation of the case. It is assumed that a similar situation will also likely 
to happen in Vietnam. Therefore, the main focus of this part of the thesis will be on issues in 
relation with the regulations on the private petition. 
5.2.1.  Standing to File a Private Petition 
The Anti-dumping Ordinance requires that when the petition is submitted, the VCAD must 
determine whether it is made “by” or “on behalf of” the domestic industry in order to proceed 
to initiate an investigation. This determination is based on a numerical level of support by the 
domestic industry producing the like product towards the petition. This process is essentially 
to determine whether or not the petitioner can be considered as representative of the relevant 
domestic industry. In order for applicant to have legitimate “standing” the application must be 
supported by domestic producers of the like product accounting for sufficiently large 
percentage of total domestic production of the product.  
Generally, natural person(s) or legal person(s) are permitted to lodge the written petition the 
anti-dumping authority for the anti-dumping investigation, hence Article 8 of the Anti-
Dumping Ordinance sets forth a test for determining whether the petitioner has sufficient 
support among the producers constituting the domestic industry: firstly, the volume, quantity 




volume, quantity or value of the like products produced by the domestic industry. In addition 
to it, the total volume, quantity or value production of domestic producers who expressly 
support of the petition should be greater of the total volume, quantity or value of like product 
of the domestic producers opposing the request for application of anti-dumping measures.351
This provision is basically derived from the guideline regulation of Article 5.4 of the ADA. 
However, unlike the latter, which clearly states that the anti-dumping application is 
considered to be on behalf of domestic industry if it is expressly supported by those domestic 
producers whose collective output constitutes more that 50 % of the total production of the 
domestic like product, the Anti-Dumping Ordinance only regulates that the production output 
of the supporting producers of the petition is “greater” than that of the opposing sides. It can 
be questioned as to how much greater the production of supporting over the opposing sides 
should be. According the VCAD officials, this term should be understood in the narrow sense, 
meaning a proportion more than a simple majority of 50 % can be considered as adequate 
threshold for domestic production test.352 However, from the legal perspective, such a vague 
provision is not desirable. It is in the interest of the countries, which is developing a new anti-
dumping legislation like Vietnam, to “strengthen rather than weaken the WTO requirements 
of standing for domestic industries to bring antidumping petitions”.353 To that end, it is 
desirable that the content of this regulation to be modified precise to the content of Article 5.4 
of the ADA.  
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In view of the fact that the issue of representative status has been raised in some GATT/WTO 
disputes, the recognition of representative capacity of domestic industries in antidumping 
proceeding Vietnam may require a very careful application. In the U.S. – Imposition of 
Antidumping Duties on Imports of Seamless Stainless Steel Plate From Sweden (US-Stainless 
Steel Plate)354case, the Sweden challenged to the US anti-dumping determination arguing that 
the US Department of Commerce failed to produce any evidence proving that it considered 
the standing of the petitioner as the representative of the domestic industry. In that case, the 
Sweden contested the assertion of the U.S. Department of Commerce that lack of opposition 
on the part of domestic producers at the time of initiation could be taken as an effective 
affirmation of standing of the petitioner. The GATT Dispute Settlement Panel agreed with 
Sweden’s argument and held that U.S. Department of Commerce had not taken sufficient step 
before the initiation of the investigation to ensure that the anti-dumping petition had been 
filed on behalf of the domestic industry. Therefore, the US had to revoke the anti-dumping 
measure and refund the anti-dumping duty collected earlier. 
Similarly, in U.S. - Grey Portland cement and cement clinker from Mexico (US Grey 
Portland Cement) case355, the Panel recommended that US to withdraw the anti-dumping duty 
imposed on grey Portland cement and clinker imported from Mexico and to reimburse the 
anti-dumping duties deposited earlier during the investigation because the US DOC failed to 
observe the requirement of Article 5 of the Anti-dumping Code.356 The Panel in this case also 
held that the remedy actions should not be applied if the requirements on the initiation of the 
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case had not been observed because the purpose of the requirements of the Article 5 was to 
ensure that certain conditions be met before the anti-dumping investigation could be initiated. 
Therefore, to ensure the legitimacy of the anti-dumping proceeding the US should make a 
new initiation in accordance with the requirements of the Agreement. 
Since the establishment of the WTO standing issues have become rare in the anti-dumping 
disputes between countries. However, the Panel and Appellate Body of the WTO occasionally 
still delivered opinions against such violation. One of the most noticeable cases related to this 
issue was the complaint submitted by Japan against the US in regards to the US Anti-dumping 
Act 1916 (US Anti-dumping Act 1916 case).357 The Panel in that case found that the US Act 
1916 violated the ADA in numbers of point, including the requirements of Article 5 of the 
ADA as it did not expressly require a minimum representation of a US industry in 
applications for the initiation of proceedings under the US Anti-dumping Act 1916.358  
The above mentioned cases can be used as a good example to show the importance of the 
accurate assessment of the issue of standing of the petitioners to make the anti-dumping 
application. Thus, the Vietnamese legislators should strengthen the regulation on initiation of 
anti-dumping investigation by clarifying the criteria on threshold of representative domestic 
production to meet the requirements of Article 5 of the ADA. That will help to ensure that the 
anti-dumping cases initiated by the VCAD do not be considered as in violation of the ADA 
because of such an “indirect” and non-substantive legal issue like the standing determination.  
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Since the standing of a petition is determined on the basis of facts available to the anti-
dumping authorities at the time the determination is made, the information about the 
petitioners should be represented in the application itself. However, the VCAD might request 
information from other sources if there is a reasonable ground to suspect that the production 
capacity of the petitioner does not reflect full extent of the domestic production. The 
necessary information can be obtained directly from the manufacturers’ associations or from 
other official sources, i.e. the ministries or government agencies in charge of the relevant 
domestic industry.  
Although, the ADA does not require national anti-dumping authorities to actively seek for 
information or to have exact figures at the pre-initiation stage of anti-dumping proceeding, it 
is suggested that the VCAD provide certain assistance and consultations to the petitioners 
where it believes that the lack of evidence for prove of representativeness in the application is 
due to the petitioner’s limited knowledge and experience in collecting and presenting the anti-
dumping application. This initiative will not affect the state of the VCAD as unbiased 
authority and also not violate of any provision of the ADA.   
5.2.2. Petitions 
The Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation contains the requirements for the petition of anti-
dumping measures, which should include specific evidence to support the petitioner’s 
application for anti-dumping actions. Accordingly, Article 9.1 of the Anti-Dumping 
Ordinance requires that petitions must contain the following information: 
(a) The name, address and other necessary information of the organization or individual 




(b) Description of imports which are requested to be subject to the application of 
antidumping measures, stating names of the products, their basic characteristics and 
main use purpose, their codes according to the current import tariffs, the currently 
applied import tax rates, and the import origins; 
(c) Description of the volume, quantity and value of the concerned imported products 
within the period of twelve months prior to the date of submission of the application 
for antidumping measures;  
(d) Description of the volume, quantity and value of the like domestically produced 
within twelve months before the date of submission of the application for anti-
dumping measures; 
(e) Information on the normal prices (normal value) and export prices of the products at 
the same time of their importation into Vietnam within twelve months before the date 
of submission of the application for anti-dumping measures; 
(f) The dumping margin of the imports requested to be subject to the application of 
antidumping measures; 
(g) Information, data and proofs on the material injury which the products dumped into 
Vietnam cause or threaten to cause the domestic industry in question; 
(h) The name, address and other necessary information of the organization and/or 
individual producing and exporting into Vietnam the products requested to be subject 




(i) The specific request regarding the application of anti-dumping measures, the 
application time limit and extent; 
Generally, the requirements to attach information on identity of petitioners and foreign 
producers/exporters, description of the subject products and evidence concerning the, 
existence of dumping, injury for private petition are similar to those provided under the 
Article 5.2 of the ADA. However, there are also some divergences between Vietnamese anti-
dumping legislation and the ADA.  
The first noticeable difference is that while Article 5.2 of the ADA only requires the petition 
to contain information about the volume and value of domestic production of the like products 
and the export prices of the subject imports, while the Vietnamese petitioners are required to 
attach in their petition description on the volume and value of domestic production and export 
price of the subject products for the last twelve months.359  
The second significant difference is the additional requirement for the petition to include 
information on dumping margin of the subject imports. 360  This requirement under the 
Vietnamese legislation implicitly means the private petitioners in Vietnam must, prior to the 
petition; conduct a comprehensive private investigation to identify normal value and export 
prices of the subject imports, as well as to make comparison and adjustment of prices of on 
the same level of trade.  
The above comparison shows that at some points the petition requirements under the 
Vietnamese legislation have gone beyond the standard requirement in the ADA. Obviously, 
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the WTO does not prohibit Members states from adopting more stringent standards in terms 
of the contents of petitions than they require. A high threshold or more stringent requirement 
as a precondition for the initiation of anti-dumping investigation can help prevent domestic 
producers from using the anti-dumping proceeding as a strategic instrument stop the access of 
foreign imports. However, if the standard is too high or unreasonable it might create an 
obstacle to the domestic industry seeking for administrative protection against foreign 
dumping.  
The problem for Vietnamese authorities here is not just how to find a balancing point on this 
issue but whether it is legitimate to establish a standard differently from the one required 
under the ADA. Legally speaking, the ADA is an international treaty ratified by the National 
Assembly of Vietnam and therefore it should arguably have the special statutory status within 
the national legal framework.361 Thus, it is quite valid to argue that the Vietnamese anti-
dumping procedural rules should not make the requirements of the contents of petitions more 
burdensome to any concerned party than those required by the ADA. Thus, the legal standard 
of the contents of petitions established by Anti-Dumping Ordinance can become a subject of 
legal scrutiny by judicial body in the future. The issue of whether or not the legal standard of 
the petitions content is reasonable will be further discussed in another subsection of this 
chapter. 
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5.2.3.  Acceptance or Rejection of Petitions 
The ADA provides that after examining the content of the petitions, if the petition includes all 
necessary information as required by law, the national anti-dumping authorities can issue a 
decision to approve or disapprove the application for initiation of an anti-dumping 
investigation. Under the Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation, the Minister shall decide 
whether or not to initiate the investigation within 60 days from the date of receipt of the 
petition by the VCAD.362 However, in special circumstances this time-frame can be extended 
but shall not beyond 30 days.363  
The actual review and appraisal of the content of petition file is conducted by the VCAD.364 
During the examination of the petition, if there is any piece of required information of the 
petition file is incomplete or unclear, the VCAD can notify the petitioner to supplement the 
file. This should be done within a time-limit of 15 days from the date of receipt of the petition 
file. This pre-initiation procedure, sometimes called as an informal screening of the petition, 
is not regulated under the ADA. It has been introduced into the anti-dumping regime in 
Vietnam with the intention to minimize the number of deficient applications. The petitioner 
benefits by being informed of any deficiencies in the petition which, if not corrected in time, 
may delay or prevent initiation of the investigation. The petitioners are given 30 days to 
supplement the petition file upon the request of the VCAD. Once the deficiencies have been 
addressed, the application is re-submitted to the authorities for the decision whether of not to 
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initiate investigation. On the contrary if the deficiencies are not satisfactorily addressed the 
petition is dismissed.  
As the ADA does not regulate this procedure, there is no rule with respect to how long the 
national anti-dumping authorities can take after the filing of an application to decide whether 
or not it is properly documented, and whether or not to initiate the requested investigation. In 
other words, the regulation in regards of this pre-initiation procedure is totally under the 
sphere of jurisdiction Vietnamese law. 
The regulations on the procedure to initiate an anti-dumping investigation of Vietnam might 
still raise some issues for consideration: (1) the time limit for making decisions; (2) the 
criteria for determining acceptability of the contents of petitions; and (3) the quantitative and 
qualitative standards of the evidence that the attached evidence should meet. 
5.2.3.1.  Time Limits for Making Decision to Initiate the Investigation  
For any administrative investigation, a clear and reasonable time framework for each stage of 
procedure is highly important for both administrative agencies and parties concerned. As 
mentioned above, the Minister shall issue a decision whether or not to hold the investigation 
within 60 days from the date of receipt of petition, and in special circumstances this time-
frame for can be extended but  shall not beyond 30 days. 
Since the ADA does not set up any specific time frame nor does it establish guidelines for 
determining an appropriate period for delivery the decision to hold investigation, Vietnam has 
flexibility to establish a reasonable period for this purpose. However, comparing to the 




regulations is a bit longer than average. For instance: in United States, the Department of 
Commerce is given 20 days, with an extension of 40 days, to determine whether or not it will 
initiate an investigation;365 in EC, the European Commission has 45 days;366 in China, the 
Ministry of Commerce has 60 days;367 in Korea, the Trade Commission has 2 months (60 
days);368  in Singapore, the Ministry of Trade and Industry has 30 days.369 From a practical 
perspective, the longer the time it takes for delivery the decision to initiate investigation, the 
greater the pressure the domestic industry will be as they have to compete with foreign 
dumping throughout that period. If the reason for a long time frame is to give the anti-
dumping authorities a better appraisal of the information contained in the petition application, 
this may be an exaggerated concern because the ADA, as asserted by the Panel in Mexico-
HFCS case, does not require the national authority to resolve or explain how it has resolve all 
legal or factual issues of the case at the pre-initiation stage.370  Therefore, it is suggested that 
the period for consideration for initiation of anti-dumping investigation be fixed at 60 days 
without any extension. 
5.2.3.2. Acceptable Contents 
The Anti-Dumping Ordinance provides that anti-dumping authorities shall review the 
contents of petitions. At this point the VCAD might be confronted with the divergences in 
regulatory requirement between the ADA and the Anti-Dumping Ordinance, which has 
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already been mentioned in the earlier section.  The ADA only requires that an application 
shall include: “evidence of (a) dumping, (b) injury, (c) a causal link between the dumped 
imports and the alleged injury”.371 It goes on to state that the application shall contain “such 
information as is reasonably available to the applicant”.372 Clearly, there is no requirement 
for inclusion of “dumping margin” information in the petition application as it is required 
under the Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation. WTO Panel reports have demonstrated 
consistently that so long as necessary information concerning the allegations and reasonably 
available evidence has been attached, the petition application by the domestic industry should 
be accepted without any further analysis. For instance, in the Mexico-HFCS case, the Panel 
expressly specified that: 
Article 5.2 [of the ADA] does not require an application to contain analysis, but rather to 
contain information, in the sense of evidence, in support of allegations. While we 
recognize that some analysis linking the information and the allegations would be helpful 
in assessing the merits of an application, we cannot read the text of Article 5.2 as 
requiring such an analysis in the application itself.373
Based on the above Panel explanation regarding the standards established by the ADA, it can 
be concluded that requirements for the contents of petitions in Article 9 of the Anti-Dumping 
Ordinance are excessive and unnecessary. It is important to stress that, at the pre-initiation 
stage, the quantity and quality of the information provided by the parties should not be such as 
would be required in order to make a preliminary determination or final determination.  
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Elsewhere, in the attempt to improve the anti-dumping procedural rules, there are also some 
opinions against the standard requirement for acceptable contents of petitions under the Anti-
Dumping Ordinance, but on the other extreme - advocating for establishment of lower 
standards compared to those required in the ADA.374 It is argued that the related regulation of 
Vietnamese anti-dumping system should be developed in the analogy of the modern pleadings 
in civil litigation, which is in favor of relaxing some formal requirements at the pleading stage 
and leaving more rigorous requirements of evidence and analysis to discovery and trial. This 
opinion probably is inaccurate in the context of antidumping proceedings. It is wrong to 
ignore the clear language in the treaties to require a more formal and structured treatment of 
the petitions than simply containing allegations and supporting information. It is highly 
important to note in this discussion that antidumping proceedings are not adjudication, but 
rather an administrative investigation. Particularly at the pre-initiation stage of the anti-
dumping proceedings when the petition is being reviewed by the VCAD, there is no opposing 
side to fight back the petitioners’ accusation with counter arguments and evidence to allow all 
the relevant issues to be joined for a comprehensive evaluation. Therefore, it is quite essential 
to balance the interest of petitioners to have their complaints heard and those of foreign 
producers or exporters not to be unduly burdened with investigations by establishing a stricter 
standard than providing merely allegations and information. Moreover, it is equally important 
to focus on the harassing effects of allowing domestic competing producers to have the anti-
dumping actions started upon their submission of petitions. Thus, lowering the threshold of 
acceptable petitions is actually to increase the possibility of increase of such harassment.  
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In short, it is a mistake to either to create too high or too low standards in evaluating the 
adequateness of anti-dumping petition. The standard established by the ADA in this regards is 
the most neutral and being able to balance the interests of both petitioning and responding 
parties at the pre-initiation stage Therefore, it is suggested that the Vietnamese anti-dumping 
legislation to be modified to correspond with the requirements on the content of petition 
provided by Article 5.2 of the ADA.  
5.2.3.3. Evidence  
The Anti-Dumping Ordinance prescribes that the VCAD shall review evidence attached to 
petitions in order to consult with the Minister as to whether or not to accept the concerned 
petitions. It should determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an 
investigation. In making the determination on the sufficiency of the information, the VCAD 
has to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the information provided by the petition. Where 
the content of the petition is considered complete in terms of providing necessary information 
of the complaining party and evidence proving the dumping and injury, the VCAD will 
request the petitioner to clarify or to seek information from other reliable sources. However, if 
it is obvious that the evidence submitted is faulty, or has been tampered with, the VCAD has 
to take that fact into the account and reject the evidence.  
Basically this regulation is consistent with the requirement of Article 5.3 of the ADA. The 
main issue here for the VCAD is what evidence is satisfactory for the future investigation as 




evidence.375 In Mexico – HFCS case, 376 the WTO Panel opined that sufficient evidence to 
support petitions for initiating investigations is to examine “whether the evidence relied on by 
the Ministry was sufficient, that is whether an unbiased and objective investigating authority 
evaluating that evidence could properly have determined that sufficient evidence of dumping, 
injury, and causal link existed to justify initiating the investigation”. 377  
The Panel went on to state that: “the quantum and quality of evidence required at the time of 
initiation is less than that required for a preliminary determination of dumping. That is 
evidence which would be insufficient, either in quantity or in quality, to justify a preliminary 
or final determination of dumping ... may well be sufficient to justify initiation of the 
investigation”.378
While this obligation is not discharged by merely attaching information or evidence to 
petitions, it will be wrong to raise the evidentiary standards so high that initiation of 
investigations can not even begin where a strong (or prima facie) case can be shown. 
5.2.3.4.  Other Grounds for Rejecting Petitions 
According to Article 5 of the ADA, the petition shall be rejected based on the following 
grounds: (1) lack of support of domestic industry; (2) inadequate contents of the petition; (3) 
insufficient evidence; (4) de minimis dumping margins; (5) negligible volume of imports or 
injury.  From these grounds, the first three have been already discussed in the earlier part of 
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the thesis, items (4) and (5) need some elaborations.  
The ADA requires that an application should be rejected or terminated if there is evidence of 
either dumping or injury is insufficient to justify the anti-dumping proceeding. Article 5.8 of 
the ADA contains that this situation includes the cases where dumping margin is at the de 
minims rate, which is defined at 2 % of the export price, or where volume of dumped imports 
is negligible, which is below 3 % of the total importation. 379 The exception for the negligible 
import volume is that even if individual countries’ imports are each less than 3 %, they still 
are cumulatively assessed for the initiation of the investigation if the combined volume 
exceeds 7 % of the total importation.380 Article 5.8 of the ADA covers both pre-initiation 
stage and the investigation stage of the anti-dumping proceeding.  
Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation also provides provisions on insignificant dumping, 
which contain similar thresholds like as what provided under Article 5.8 of the ADA.381 
However, it seems that these provisions are not designed to serve as a ground for rejection of 
petitions in the pre-initiation stage, but rather only for the investigations that have already 
been initiated. The Anti-Dumping Ordinance only expressly refers to the application of the 
rules on insignificant dumping conditions once in Article 19.2, when it directs that anti-
dumping authorities to terminate the investigation. Now, if this happens during the pre-
initiation stage, the anti-dumping authorities will have no guidance as to whether or not to 
reject the petition. It is logical to assume that VCAD would refuse the initiation of anti-
dumping investigation where they have a clear evidence that dumping margin of the foreign 
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imports is de minimis or the total volume of foreign imports alleged of dumping is negligible 
because it is obviously a total unproductive exercise for them to initiate an investigation 
which must be terminated at later stage. However, since there is no clear guidance in regards 
to this issue, there is a possibility that the VCAD still decide to initiate the investigation even 
when they have evidence of negligible dumping conditions. This circumstance is clearly a 
harassment against foreign exporters and not desirable for anti-dumping system. To that end, 
it is suggested that Vietnamese legislators should amend the current anti-dumping legislation 
to provide a guidance regarding this circumstance. 
5.3.  ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION 
Once the Minister has accepted petitions or decided to initiate antidumping proceedings, the 
VCAD is required to engage in formal investigations. The investigation can be divided into 
two major stages, namely, that from the initiation to rendering preliminary determinations, 
including imposing provisional measures, and then the period involving further investigations 
until the final determinations. The VCAD has to decide first the period in which 
investigations are supposed to be carried out. Authorities will then notify all known producers 
and exporters and their governments, as well as publish the decision to proceed with the 
investigation for all potential respondents to respond or express their willingness to participate 
in investigations. Once the cooperating parties are identified, authorities will conduct the 
investigation through various means, including sending questionnaires, holding hearings, 
providing consultations, and carrying out on-the-spot investigations or verifications.382 If 
there are numerous respondents, authorities may resort to sampling techniques in order to 
                                                 
 




conclude investigations within the time period allowed by law.383 However, under certain 
circumstances in which authorities cannot complete investigations on time, the investigation 
may be extended but not beyond thirty days.384
Based on initial investigations, the VCAD makes preliminary determinations concerning 
whether dumping, material injury to domestic industry, and a causal link between the two 
exist.385 If the tentative finding is in the affirmative, the VCAD may advise the Minister to 
issue a decision to impose provisional measures against foreign imports under investigation. 
The law, however, requires authorities to continue the investigation until a final determination 
is reached.386  
Certainly, not every investigation shall go through the entire cycle as described. According to 
the Anti-Dumping Ordinance, the investigation can be terminated where the organization or 
business entities representing the domestic industry who lodged the request application of 
anti-dumping measures withdraws the complaint387 or where the VCAD finds that there is no 
dumping, or there is no injury to the domestic industry or the injury is insignificant because 
the dumping margin or the quantity or value of the foreign dumped products is too small.388 
At the same time, once an affirmative preliminary determination has been made, respondents 
may request and authorities may accept voluntary undertakings by which respondents agree to 
export under the conditions entered into with authorities, usually at higher prices to end the 
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5.3.1. Parties to Anti-Dumping Proceeding 
Before starting the discussion the regulations on anti-dumping proceeding in detail, there is a 
need to pay attention to definition of the parties in the anti-dumping proceeding. Essentially, 
there are many parties, who have direct or indirect interests in the anti-dumping measures. 
However, in anti-dumping practice, the national authorities apply two distinct terms to 
address the parties to the anti-dumping proceeding, namely “concerned/interested parties” and 
“parties to anti-dumping proceeding”. Only the concerned parties can become a party to anti-
dumping proceeding. While, only parties to anti-dumping proceeding can be entitled with 
anti-dumping due process rights, such as right submission of information and written views, 
right to be part of the hearings, right access to information, right to request for judicial review 
etc. Other concerned parties in the anti-dumping proceeding have more limited procedural 
rights and they are allowed to participate in the anti-dumping investigation only upon request 
of the national anti-dumping authorities. Thus, it is quite important for individuals and 
organizations, which have interests in the anti-dumping proceeding, to know their status in the 
anti-dumping proceeding so that they can invoke the procedural rights to protect their 
interests. 
This distinction also exists in the Vietnamese anti-dumping system. According to Article 11 
of the Anti-Dumping Ordinance, a concerned party in anti-dumping proceeding includes the 
domestic producers, foreign producers and exporters, importers, domestic and foreign 
business associations, trade union, organizations protecting consumers’ interests, competent 
                                                 
 




government agencies of Vietnam and exporting country. Compared to the relevant regulation 
of the ADA390 and that of other national anti-dumping legislations, the scope of “concerned 
parties” defined in Vietnamese legislation is quite extensive, including most of the parties that 
may have economic interests towards to the anti-dumping proceeding. However, it does not 
list some important concerned parties, namely the domestic industrial users of products 
subject to anti-dumping investigation (downstream producers) and business association 
representing them. The involvement of this group of party, as it was analyzed elsewhere in 
other parts of this thesis, can be highly significant at certain stage of investigation, especially 
for the evaluation of overall socio-economic impacts (public interest clause) of foreign 
dumped imports and anti-dumping measures against the imports. Although, the list provided 
by the Anti-Dumping Ordinance is non-exhaustive, thus the above mentioned parties might 
still be recognized by the VCAD under the catch of “other parties with rights and interests 
affected by the anti-dumping actions”, the fact that they are not named there certainly creates 
uncertainty on their status. Therefore, it is desirable that the legislation also includes this 
group into the list of concerned parties in anti-dumping proceeding. 
Regarding the “party to anti-dumping proceeding”, Article 14 of Decree 90/CP stipulates that 
it includes inter alia (i) Vietnamese organizations and/or individuals lawfully representing 
domestic industry of like products (known as petitioners), (ii) foreign producers/exporters of 
the products subject to investigation (respondents), (iii) lawyers representing interests of 
petitioners and respondents.  
The legislation further regulates that when participating in the anti-dumping proceeding these 
                                                 
 




parties are entitled numbers of due process right, including inter alia (i) the right to access to 
information supplied by other parties to the VCAD, except for the confidential information; 
(ii) the right to request protection of confidential information, to participate in consultation 
meetings; (iii) right to authorize lawyers representing their interests in the anti-dumping 
proceeding; (iv) right to request the VCAD to organize closed-door consultation meetings; 
(vi) right to request an extension of the time period for information supply and for reply to 
investigation questionnaires; (v) right to make complaints or initiate lawsuits against the 
Minister’s decisions.391 The following parts of this chapter will discuss in more details issues 
related to some due process rights in Vietnamese legislation.  
5.3.2. Investigation Techniques and Due Process Rights 
5.3.2.1.  Investigation Periods 
a. Period of Anti-Dumping Investigation 
Similar to the ADA 392  the Anti-Dumping Ordinance requires authorities to conclude 
investigations within 12 months, or in special case, not to exceed 18 months all together.393 
Generally, anti-dumping investigation is a complex and time consuming affairs involving 
fact-finding at the premises of domestic producers and importers as well as foreign producers 
and exporters. Time has also to be allowed to analyze the written and oral presentations made 
by concerned parties and to prepare decisions.  
Actual duration of investigation depends, to some extent, on the number of parties directly 
involved and the staff available to carry out the investigation. Obviously, the more parties 
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involved from different countries the more time is required for anti-dumping authorities to 
obtain and analyze the information. This problem can be even more complex if the products 
under investigation are supplied in wide range of types and categories at prices which varied 
from transaction to transaction.  
It is not hard to predict that the problem of timeframe for the investigation period will be one 
of the challenges before the VCAD during the anti-dumping proceeding because of its lack of 
experience and human resource. The authorities will face tremendous pressure to manage the 
time to complete the process within the deadline. Hence, a consideration to extend the 
duration for anti-dumping investigation is not an appropriate solution for the issue because a 
lengthy investigation period will give adverse impacts on all concerned parties. Besides, the 
period of investigation in Vietnam has to be consistent with the requirement of the ADA.  
A resolution for the problem may be to develop a relatively detailed time schedule, within 
which the anti-dumping authorities have to complete certain stages of the investigation. Some 
countries, such as the US394 and Canada395, have already successfully applied this approach. 
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The inclusion of a detailed schedule for each period of investigation can be beneficial in two 
ways: first of all, investigation authorities will be able to envisage and control the length of 
each stage of the proceeding. In addition, it can also contribute to improvement of 
predictability in anti-dumping system. However, given the shortage of experience and 
knowledge in the area, it is necessary that the anti-dumping authorities should not be given a 
too rigid time schedule because it will create even more pressure for them to fulfill the duty. 
A proper approach is to include reservations in the provision on duration of each stage of 
investigation so that the anti-dumping authorities can apply for extension of investigation time 
when they face complex case.  
b. Period for investigation of dumping and injury  
More important issue during the investigation is the period of time in which investigations are 
made with regard to dumping and injury to domestic industry. The ADA does not stipulate 
any particular time frame in which the investigations should be made, nor does it establish 
guidelines for determining an appropriate period of investigation. Many countries require that 
the period of reference for both dumping and injury investigation must be conducted 
immediately precede the initiation of the investigation in order to ensure relevance of the data 
to the investigation. Normally, the period of investigations on dumping is set from six months 
to one year but a longer period for injury investigation (usually is from three to four years),  as 
the former focuses on trends in data regarding the volume of dumped imports, prices and the 
performance of the domestic industry.396 However, the period of data collection in the case of 
injury investigation always includes the entirety of the period of data collection for dumping 
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In Vietnam, the anti-dumping legislation does not expressly define any period for both 
dumping and injury investigations. However, based on the requirement on the information 
included in the petition file, it can be assumed that the VCAD will accept the reference period 
for dumping investigation of 12 months before the date of submission of the request of 
initiation of anti-dumping investigation or the date of it’s self-compilation the documents 
requesting the initiation of anti-dumping measures in case the anti-dumping proceeding is 
initiated at request of the Minister.397  
Regarding the injury investigation period, a similar approach would show that the anti-
dumping legislation requires the petitioners to submit information related to injury 
determination of 12 months. However, if this provision is applied for reference, 12 months the 
period is too short to adequately reflect the effects of dumped imports on the relevant 
domestic industry, as required by the ADA. It will likely to be challenged by other trading 
partners at the WTO. Therefore, a regulation on the period of injury investigation needs to be 
introduced into Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation. The regulation on the reference period 
for injury investigation is significant in the sense that it will reflect the data to be used in the 
investigation by the investigation authorities and subsequently the assessment to the condition 
of concerned domestic industry.398
It is suggested that the regulation on reference period for injury investigation to be drafted 
such that the period of data collection shall not be less than three years prior to the date of 
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anti-dumping initiation and can be extended to obtain the data relating to a subsequent period 
after the initiation, but it shall include the period of investigation for the dumping 
determination in its entirely (see chart 3). The rationale for this recommended period is that 
injury analysis typically involves identifying trends over time in relevant economic indicators, 
including such factors as import volumes, market share, prices, output levels, inventories, 
capacity, and various measures of financial performance. Such trends generally cannot be 
established over shorter in time periods and thus assessment of injury is commonly based on 
data spanning a longer period of investigation. The three-year reference period for 
determining injury is also supported the WTO. The Committee on Anti-dumping Practices 
(CADP) of the WTO in one of its recommendations suggested that the period of data 
collection in injury investigation “should normally be at least three years, unless a party from 
whom date is being gathered, has existed for a lesser period, and should include the entirety 
of the period of data collection for the dumping investigation”.399
Regarding the reference period for injury determination subsequent to the initiation of the 
investigation, it can be argued that the impacts of dumping on domestic industry reflect only 
sometime after the foreign imports were sold onto Vietnam. Sometimes the overall impacts of 
the sales may only be found in a subsequent period of investigation. Since the anti-dumping 
proceedings may take from one year to 18 months to be resolved, if the anti-dumping 
authorities limit themselves to the pre-initiation data, they loose the opportunity to consider 
most recent data which reflect the condition of the domestic industry at the time the final 
determination is made. In other words, if the VCAD bases its analysis on the data colleted at 
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pre-initiation period of investigation, the result of the analysis will only reflect the condition 
of the domestic industry to that period, which is one year prior to the conclusion of final 
determination. However, the utilization of the data collected subsequent to the initiation of 
investigation should be made with extra care because the data will also reflect certain changes 
in the market due to process of anti-dumping investigation.    
Besides, if at the investigation period the VCAD decides to extend the period of dumping 
determination beyond the one informed earlier, it must be obliged to make it known to all 
concerned parties as soon as the investigation has been initiated. This is to meet the 
requirement of Article 21 (h) of Decree 90/CP regarding the content of the public notice of 
initiation of anti-dumping investigation as well as to correspond provision in Article 6.1 of the 
ADA requiring the national authorities to provide information they require and ample 




In the same context of injury determination, it is also useful to align the period of 




subject to anti-dumping investigation.400 This facilitates obtaining financial performance and 
other industry data that can be more readily compiled, tabulated, and compared to illustrate 
industry trends. Other special circumstances reflecting the data collection in certain specific 
industries shall also be taken into account. For instance, in identifying trends in cyclical or 
seasonal industries, may imply collecting data over a longer or shorter period of time, or for 
different intervals (weekly, monthly and quarterly). Another circumstance which also needs to 
be considered include the business practice of Vietnamese middle and small size companies in 
some industries, such as traditional confectionary production, not keeping accounting or 
financial records in accordance with the required standard. In that case, the VCAD has to 
approach the business associations of that industry to verify information obtained from the 
respondents.  
5.3.2.2. Questionnaires 
One of the most extensively used techniques in the investigation is to collect the information 
required by means of questionnaires. The questionnaires, which are sent the known concerned 
parties to the anti-dumping proceeding, shall contain detailed questions covering all aspects of 
information needed, from the production of the products, its marketing, to the financial 
statements (i.e. the legal structure of the firms concerned, all relevant transactions, production 
process, stock distribution, sales costing, market shares, price development etc.). 401 Some 
countries also routinely send questionnaires to purchaser of the product in the domestic 
market at some point in the investigation. The questionnaires vary depending on whether they 
are for which party of the anti-dumping procedure. 
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Since time frame for analysis is very limited, the anti-dumping authorities should rapidly 
complete the data collection and review the information submitted by concerned parties in the 
anti-dumping proceedings. The practice of most countries is to develop standard or model 
questionnaires covering all categories of information likely to be needed from each category 
of respondent, which is then modified in each case to be appropriate and relevant for the 
particular product, industry and market concerned.  
Up to now, the MOT has not issued the standard questionnaire forms, even though this 
question has been discussed for quite some time.402 The VCAD has initiated the preparation 
of a draft-version of the standard questionnaire forms;403 however, the content of drafted 
questionnaires is too general and does not differentiate much between various categories of 
respondent. The questionnaires directed to domestic producers, foreign producers/exporters, 
importers, and purchasers should elicit information relevant to factors that must be considered 
in an investigation, as well as any other information anticipated to be relevant.404
The assessment of the issues relating to material injury, threat of material injury, and causality 
requires economic analyses that are entirely different from the analyses required in calculation 
and comparison of normal value and export price in dumping determination. Thus, the content 
of the questionnaires to be used for the injury analysis should be different from those relating 
to dumping analysis. It should also be noted that due to different goal of determination, the 
                                                 
 
402  VCAD, “Proposal for development of the standard questionnaire forms for anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
investigations” (Kiến nghị xây dựng bản câu hỏi khung cho thủ tục điều tra chống bán phá giá và chống trợ 
cấp), VQLCT/450, March 2006.   
403  Ibid. 
404  ADA, Article 3.4  “The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry 
concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the 




injury questionnaires and dumping questionnaires are often answered by completely different 
groups of party to anti-dumping proceeding. Therefore, it is common practice among 
countries to use separate standard questionnaires for particular group of respondents in order 
to obtain the most relevant information for injury and dumping analyses. 
For instance, the information to be requested in questionnaires on injury issues must 
correspond with the requirements of Article 3.1 of the ADA, which has been harmonized in 
Vietnamese anti-dumping system under the under Article 2.7 of the Anti-Dumping Ordinance 
and Article 28.1 of Decree 90/CP. The injury questionnaires should aim at receiving 
information for examination of both (i) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of 
the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (ii) the consequent 
impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products.405 The remaining paragraph 
of Article 3 provides further guidance regarding the specific types of information to be 
considered in assessing the volume, price effects, and impact of the subject imports. 
Questionnaires should seek information in each of these areas to ensure that the type of 
“positive evidence” required by Article 3.1 of the ADA is received. This questionnaires are 
mainly targeted at the domestic producers and (unrelated) importers. 
The questionnaire for exporters and foreign producers, on the other hand, should be designed 
in such manner that the duly completed questionnaires responses can help anti-dumping 
authorities to define normal value, export price of the products under investigation and 
calculate the dumping margins in light with the requirement of Article 2 of the ADA. 
                                                 
 




Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation regulates that all parties concerned in the anti-dumping 
proceeding shall supply duly information and necessary documents at the request of the anti-
dumping authorities.406  In regards to the response to questionnaires of the anti-dumping 
authorities, Article 23.2 of Decree 90/CP requires that parties after receiving the questionnaire 
must answer all questions therein and return it to the Vietnamese anti-dumping authorities 
within 30 days. Hence, in case of necessity and if there are written requests from requested 
parties, the VCAD is required to consider and extend the deadline for submission of answers 
of the questionnaires for another 30 days.407 The Decree 90/CP has no guideline as to what 
factors can be considered as legitimate to allow the extension of the related deadlines.  
This issue of deadline for submission of answers to questionnaire, meanwhile, is crucial for 
both requested parties and anti-dumping authorities because the due process rules provided 
under Article 6 of the ADA requires that all interested parties in an anti-dumping 
investigation shall be given an ample opportunity to present in writing all relevance evidence, 
however, the anti-dumping authorities are under pressure due to time constrain in the 
investigation. 
Within the WTO framework, member states have already brought to dispute settlement body 
this issue. In US - Hot-Rolled Steel case, 408  The Appellate Body considered that:  
[…] in the interest of orderly administration investigating authorities must establish such 
deadlines… It is consistent with the requirement of the first sentence of Article 6.1.1 of 
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ADA. However, importance must also be attached to the second sentence of that 
provision […] According to the express wording of the second sentence of Article 6.1.1, 
investigating authorities must extend the time-limit for responses to questionnaires 
"upon  cause shown ", where granting such an extension is "practicable ". This second 
sentence, therefore, indicates that the time-limits imposed by investigating authorities for 
responses to questionnaires are not necessarily absolute and immutable.409
In order words, in the above mentioned circumstance the national anti-dumping authorities 
may impose time-limits for questionnaires response, but in appropriate circumstances these 
limits must be extended. 
In order to thoroughly solve the problem of questionnaire-response deadlines, Vietnamese 
legislation needs to develop certain guideline criteria, to which the anti-dumping authorities 
can refer to when they decide whether or not to reject the request for extension of the 30-day 
deadlines. This guideline can be developed with reference to the Recommendation of the 
WTO CADP in this matter,410 which suggests a non-exhaustive a number factors justifying 
the rejection of the requests for extension of the deadlines for the submission of replies 
questionnaires, including inter alia:  
• The time available for the conduct of the investigation and making the necessary 
determinations, including the time periods established in national legislation, 
regulations, and schedules governing the conduct of the investigation at hand; and 
whether the information can be considered in a subsequent phase of the investigation;  
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• Previous extension(s) of time granted to the same party in the same investigation; 
• The ability of the party from whom information is sought to respond to the request, in 
light of the nature and extent of the information requested, including the party's 
available resources, personnel, and technological capability; 
• Any unusual burdens that will be incurred by the party being asked for information in 
searching for, identifying and/or compiling the information requested; 
• Whether any party requesting the extension has provided a partial response to the 
request, has previously provided information requested in the same investigation, 
although the absent of a partial response alone is not an appropriate basis for denial of 
request;  
• Any unforeseen circumstances affecting the ability of the party to provide the 
information requested within the time limit established; 
• Whether other parties have been granted extension of time for similar reasons during 
the same phase of the same investigation.  
5.3.2.3.  Protection of Confidential Information  
For the purpose of investigation the VCAD is entitled to require all relevant information from 
the concerned parties. The VCAD then will maintain official record of all information 
obtained by or presented to them during the course of proceeding. The record consists of 
confidential and non-confidential documents. All concerned parties, i.e. the complainant and 
the exporters and the importers, may inspect all information made available to the VCAD by 
any party to the investigation provided that the information is relevant to the defense of their 




The confidential documents are those that content either (i) national secret and other secretive 
information in accordance with the law; or (ii) information that concerned parties to anti-
dumping proceeding consider as business secrets, which need to be protected under special 
order. For the second category of information, protection is warranted only when the 
concerned parties submit in written proper request to the VCAD and have it approved by this 
authority.411
The anti-dumping legislation carries provisions on of disclosure of confidential information. 
Parties who are requested to make disclosure may demand nondisclosure of confidential 
information, if they believe that disclosure will seriously compromise their interests. If 
authorities believe that the requests are reasonable, they shall accord data treatment as 
confidential information, except for the required non-confidential summary. 
There are several important requirements regarding the application of this provision. First of 
all, regulations limit confidential information to that which disclosure will cause damages to 
the disclosing parties.412 Second, the request for protection of confidential information must 
be accompanied by non-confidential summaries.413 Finally, if the VCAD do not accept the 
request of retaining confidential information of related parties they shall not use the 
information for their investigation and return to the parties submitting it.414
This regulation on retaining confidentiality of information of Vietnam is established on the 
ground of requirements of Article 6.5 of the ADA. However, if comparing the regulations on 
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protection of confidentiality of information under the Vietnamese legislation with the ADA, 
one can easily conclude that the former are not as detailed as they should be.  
The ADA requires that national anti-dumping authorities must provide protection of 
confidential information or information requested not to be disclosed by showing good cause. 
Authorities must request non-confidential summaries, which can permit a reasonable 
understanding of the substance of the information in confidence, if protection is provided, or 
reasons for not being able to make non-confidential summaries must be given if protection is 
provided, or reasons for not being able to make non-confidential summaries must be given.415 
If the request for protection is not warranted and parties refuse to disclose information at 
issue, authorities may refuse to consider the information [unless they find from other sources 
that the information is correct.416  
Initially, the provision on protection of confidentiality of information of Anti-Dumping 
Ordinance does not regulate a situation where anti-dumping authorities and disclosing parties 
have different opinions regarding confidentiality.417 The Decree 90/CP has supplemented the 
Anti-dumping Ordinance  with a regulation allowing the anti-dumping authorities to disregard 
information, which, they believe, do not warrant for protection or which has not been 
summarized or adequately summarized. 418  However, this regulation virtually gives the 
investigating authorities a high discretionary power to discard the request of the concerned 
parties even if they have provided fair non-confidential summaries and declassified all the 
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confidential information as to the request of the investigating authorities. Article 6.5.2 of the 
ADA also provides that the national anti-dumping authorities can decide to disregard the 
information if they find that a request for confidentiality has not been warranted. However, it 
also contains a notion that a request for confidentiality should not be arbitrary rejected by the 
national anti-dumping authorities. 419  Thus, if the VCAD practice is not based on fair 
assessment of the information provided by the interested parties, it can become a ground for 
other countries to challenge at the WTO dispute settlement system.420   
In the recent Argentina-Floor Tiles case421, WTO Panel considered that national anti-dumping 
authorities do not have the absolute right to discard information. The opinion seems to rely on 
the fact that authorities have never questioned whether it is warranted to give protection or 
whether the content or delivery of information is proper or requested summaries be revised or 
supplemented.422 Eventually, the panel found it was neither justifiable in law nor in fact that 
the anti-dumping authority decided to disregard in large part the information from the 
concerned exporters for reasons relating to the confidentiality of the information without any 
adequate explanation to them. It is important that any conduct of the investigation authorities 
to be fair and transparent at least to the interested parties.  
In order to ensure the fairness in the VCAD practice, given the fact that this agency has high 
discretionary power in deciding the issue, Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation needs to 
improve the transparency element therein. It is therefore proposed that the Vietnamese anti-
                                                 
 
419  ADA, Footnote 18  
420  ADA, Article 6.5.2 
421  WTO,  Argentina - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy 
(Argentina-Floor Tiles case), Panel Report, WT/DS189/R,  28 Sept., 2001. 




dumping legislation should be amended with the requirements that the VCAD (i) to inform 
the party supplying information of the reasons why evidence or information is not accepted; 
(ii) to provide an opportunity to provide further explanations within a reasonable period; and 
(iii) to give, in any published determinations, the reasons for the rejection of evidence or 
information. 
In the same context of discussion, one may find that there is an uncertainty under the current 
anti-dumping system whether or not the concerned parties will have any immediate recourse 
if they do not agree with the decisions of authorities not to accord protection or not to disclose 
certain information provided by other parties. This loophole in anti-dumping regulatory 
system may cause difficulties in applying the regulation on rendering the confidential 
information. The legislation also needs to be supplemented in this regards. It is suggested that 
the MOT takes initiative to issue relevant ministerial level rules based on the model proposed 
by some traditional users of anti-dumping, such as the United States.  
According to the US experience, if the disclosing parties do not agree with disclosure 
according to protective orders, authorities should return the materials and disregard the 
information.423 On the other hand, if authorities refuse to provide information requested under 
the arrangements of protective orders, requesting parties may ask the court to issue protective 
orders and compel disclosure of such confidential information.424 Under protective orders, the 
conditions and persons to whom the information is disclosed usually are very restricted (only 
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to lawyers or legal consultants, for example). 425 The persons who gain access to confidential 
information are subject to severe penalties for violating the orders. 426 In addition, people such 
as lawyers are considered officers of the court and are under strict rules of professional 
conduct that make the system safer and easier to administer. These arrangements may be 
useful to be supplemented into the current Vietnamese legislation. 
5.3.2.4. Inspection of Non-Confidential Information 
During the investigation, concerned parties427 request the VCAD to inspect non-confidential 
files. They must indicate to VCAD the nature and scope of the information to be inspected 
and may record and copy materials. 428
The inspection may be made on all non-confidential information which includes the inter alia 
non-confidential portion of the application, non-confidential portion of the response to 
questionnaires from foreign exporters and producers, non-confidential information provided 
by all concerned parties, request by the concerned parties for extension of period of response 
to questionnaires or price undertakings, VCAD's official replies and comments to said 
requests, summaries of the meetings between VCAD and concerned parties, summaries of 
‘on-the-spot’ investigations, and all other information that should be subject to inspection in 
VCAD opinion. 
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It is, however, uncertain as to what legal recourse concerned parties may have under current 
Vietnamese laws if the requests to inspect files are denied, or if files are only partially 
available or incomplete. In this connection, it must be pointed out, a WTO Panel ruling in 
Guatemala – Cement (from Mexico) II case, 429 in which it was held that failure of national 
anti-dumping authorities to respond to requests from respondents to have copies of material 
and offers to pay for them is a violation of Article 6.4 of the ADA,430 which requires that 
national anti-dumping authorities shall whenever practicable provide timely opportunities for 
all interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases, 
that is not confidential. This regulation is not yet clearly established in current Vietnamese 
anti-dumping legislation. This is also an area which needs to be further developed in the 
future.  
5.3.2.5  Hearings 
Requirement to hold hearings as part of investigation process of Article 6.2 of the ADA is 
regulated under Article 14 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance. Accordingly, the anti-dumping 
authorities shall conduct hearings for the parties concerned as part of the investigation to help 
the concerned parties to present their opinion and to provide essential information.431 
Article 29 of Decree 90/CP has developed some rules on conducting hearings under the anti-
dumping investigation, which comprise the following features: 
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a) The concerned parties to the anti-dumping proceeding (petitioners and respondents) 
must send written registrations of their participation in the hearing to the VCAD, 
clearly stating issues to be consulted and their arguments. This must be done within 30 
days prior to the date of hearing. 
b) Hearings are “inquisitory” in the sense that parties may make statements and answer 
questions from VCAD Committee members. 
c) The Parties make their statements and present their evidence one after another and 
make them-selves available for questioning in between. The time for each party to 
make presentation shall not exceed 90 minutes; 
d) Other concerned parties, other than the petitioners and respondents, also have the right 
to hand over documents on their perspectives on the anti-dumping case to the 
Committee at the Hearing; 
e) The Committee members ask questions and listen to answers of the concerned parties 
(petitioners and respondents). This part of the hearing shall not exceed 60 minutes. 
The whole contents of questions and answers sections shall be inscribed in the records 
of the consultation meeting 
f) The chairman summarizes the contents of the consultation meeting and closes the 
meeting. 
g) All contents of the hearing, including written presentations of the involved parties and 
records of the consultation, shall be publicly announced by the VCAD. 
h) Closed-door hearings may be held upon request of the concerned parties. Parties to the 
closed-door hearing shall be considered and decided by the VCAD based on the 




The rules purport is to facilitate the system to comply with the requirement of the ADA. 
Nonetheless, these rules still fall short in one important aspect, namely the opportunity of 
parties to cross-examine each other’s arguments. Since this right is not stipulated in the rules 
of hearing, it is likely that parties to the hearing will not be allowed to rebut and counter 
directly its opponent’s allegations. Therefore, it is assumed that with the current due process 
rules, the hearing is largely evidentiary, if not ceremonial, and is no way close to adjudicatory 
types in which private parties could play a larger and more effective role. This is very 
different from the mechanism established in many other countries, such as Australia, Canada, 
Korea, Mexico, the United States and European Union, whereby parties to the hearing are 
given full opportunity to provide cross-examine and rebut other parties allegations.  
In defense of the recently established due process rules on the hearing, one may argue that the 
ADA does not provide any procedural requirements as to how national anti-dumping 
authorities should structure the hearings. Article 6.2 of the ADA regulates that “throughout 
the anti-dumping investigation all interested parties shall have a full opportunity for the 
defense of their interests. They, upon request, should be given opportunities to meet those 
parties with adverse interests, so that opposing views may be presented and rebuttal 
arguments offered ... Interested parties shall also have the right, on justification, to present 
other information orally” (ex parte hearing). Each country, therefore, is free to organize its 
own hearings as far as they can ensure the fundamental due process right of Article 6.2 is met.   
Although the current procedural rules at the hearing stage do not violate the Article 6.2 of the 
ADA, they would restrict the right of parties to proceedings to have ample opportunity to 
defend their interests stipulated in Article 6.1 of the ADA. Therefore, it is suggested that the 




counter arguments each other like at the hearing of the court. This development would help to 
make the hearing become more efficient as it allow the concerned parties to better defense 
their legitimate rights and interests.  
5.3.2.6.  Best Available Information 
Generally, anti-dumping cases rely on voluntary cooperation of all concerned parties to the 
proceedings. National anti-dumping authorities have no power to force any party to cooperate. 
However, the law reserves for the anti-dumping authorities a way-out means when concerned 
parties refuse to cooperate or not wholeheartedly cooperate thus impede the course of the 
investigation. Article 6.8 of the ADA regulates that if concerned parties fail to timely provide 
relevant information, or otherwise seriously impede the investigation, national anti-dumping 
authorities may base their determinations on available facts and the best information 
available.  
Theoretically, this provision have double intention: first, to ensure that national anti-dumping 
authorities will always be able to base their determination on the facts432 even “if concerned 
party is unable or unwilling to provide necessary information within reasonable period of 
time.”433 On the other hand, the use of the best available information has its rationale in 
providing incentives for concerned parties to provide necessary information to facilitate the 
investigations.  
However, in practice, it is quite difficult to make a clear cut when the foreign companies do 
not cooperate. In grey situations the facts available may then become a powerful weapon of 
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anti-dumping authorities which can easily be abused. 434  For instance the national anti-
dumping authorities may require foreign exporters and producers to supply huge amount of 
information and data, which the collection itself needs much more than the time given for 
response. As a consequence, the authorities decide that the parties are not cooperative and 
therefore only use the information that they have.  
To prevent such abuse of Article 6.8 of the ADA, supplementary provisions providing more 
detail guidelines for national anti-dumping authorities to comply with use of best available 
information have been introduced in Annex II of to the ADA. Despite that, Article 6.8 and 
Annex II have given rise to extensive WTO disputes. Vermulst observed that in most of these 
cases, Panels and Appellate Bodies were called upon determine whether best information 
available ‘punishment’ meted out fitted the imperfect cooperation ‘crime’.435  
In US-Hot Rolled Steel case, the main issue was about the interpretation of “reasonable 
period” provision. US DOC relied exclusively on the fact that the deadline for response of 
questionnaire expired sometimes before it received the file from two Japanese producers. 
Meanwhile, there were other facts taken place during the investigation, which indicated that 
the information might have been submitted within a reasonable period of time. Particularly, it 
was found that the US DOC had in fact verified the information before subsequently rejecting 
it as out of the time. The Panel and latter the Appellate Body agreed that the approach taken 
by the US DOC excluded the very possibility, recognized by Article 6.1.1 and 6.8 and Annex 
II of the ADA. Thus, the US DOC action did not rest upon permissible interpretation of 
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Article 6.8 of the ADA.436
In Mexico-Rice (from the US) case, the Panel found that use of facts available, based on the 
information provided by the petitioner, with respect to a cooperating producer which did not 
export during the investigation periods, was inconsistent with the requirement of Article 6.8 
and Annex II, paragraph 7 of ADA.437
Vietnam, on its part, has already transformed Article 6.8 of the ADA into the national anti-
dumping legislation. Article 13.2 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance stipulates that if information 
and essential data are not correctly provided as requested, then the anti-dumping authority 
may issue its decision based on the best available information or data.  
Article 22.5 of Decree 90/CP went further to specify that the VCAD may resort to the best 
available information under the following circumstances:  
• The concerned parties to the anti-dumping proceeding failed to supply information 
requested by the anti-dumping authorities;  
• The information and documents supplied by the concerned parties to the proceeding 
are incomplete or inaccurate as shown by the results of expertise, inspection or 
verification;  
• The concerned parties the do not allow the VCAD check and verify the information;  
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• The concerned parties otherwise seriously impede the investigation.438  
Although above mentioned criteria are consistent with Article 6.8 of the ADA, there are 
several points need to be mentioned. First, the it only states that concerned party failed to 
supply the requested information however it does not specify such failure should be evaluate 
from which angle: from the time limits prospective or from content-wise perspective. 
Secondly, it is not clear in case of incomplete or partially inaccurate submission of 
information whether the anti-dumping authorities will reject all submitted information or only 
those which incomplete and inaccurate.  
Overall, there is a necessity to correctly interpret what should be covered by each of the above 
mentioned condition. In addition to understanding of the requirement of the provision, the 
anti-dumping authorities should also know in dept the legal framework that the WTO has 
established to facilitate the application of this provision. It is important that Article 22.5 of 
Decree 90/CP is applied strictly in light with the guidelines of the Annex II of the ADA.  
The VCAD may needs to consider a suggestion of the Appellate Body in United States - Hot 
Rolled Steel case concerning the application of best information available provision, which 
saying that investigating authorities should consider, in the context of a particular case, factors 
including: (i) the nature and quantity of the information submitted; (ii) the difficulties 
encountered by an investigated exporter in obtaining the information; (iii) the verifiability of 
the information and the ease with which it can be used by the investigating authorities in 
making their determination; (iv) whether other interested parties are likely to be prejudiced if 
the information is used; (v) whether acceptance of the information would compromise the 
                                                 
 




ability of the investigating authorities to conduct the investigation expeditiously;  and (vi) the 
numbers of days by which the investigated exporter missed the applicable time-limit.439  
5.3.3. Anti-Dumping Measures 
5.3.3.1. Anti-Dumping Duties 
The main remedy measure in anti-dumping proceeding is imposition of anti-dumping duties 
on the foreign imports. The Vietnam’s anti-dumping legislation recognizes two types of anti-
dumping duties, namely: provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties. 440  Although 
management of tariff and taxation system of Vietnam is under the jurisdiction of the MOF, 
the determination of anti-dumping duties is under exclusive jurisdiction of the Minister of 
Trade (Minister). The tariff rates applied for dumped products should be decided by the 
Minister based on the result of respective anti-dumping investigations.  
Hence, other aspects of customs law, such as classification and valuation of the imported 
merchandise, apply equally to imported dumped products. The product which is covered by 
the anti-dumping duty is generally defined in terms of the national custom nomenclature 
applied by the General Custom Office, which is based on Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System (HS)441 with 6-digit subheadings and detailed at the 8-digit 
subheadings under ASEAN Harmonized Tariff Nomenclature (AHTN).  
The decision on imposition of anti-dumping duties must indicate:  (i) description of the 
products (product covered, custom nomenclature, tariff code, currently applicable import 
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tariff rate, country of origin) (ii) the information on the name of suppliers, if applicable; (iii) 
the reasons on which the decision on imposition of anti-dumping duties is based; (iv) the 
amount and type of anti-dumping duty involved; and (v) the effective date and duration of 
imposition of the anti-dumping duty.442
The anti-dumping duties in Vietnam shall be imposed in accordance with the lesser duty rules, 
meaning that amount of anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the dumping margin.443 This 
lesser duty rule is a very important feature of Vietnamese anti-dumping system which is 
contrary to some other countries’ system, i.e. the US444 and Canada445, whereby the anti-
dumping duty must always be equal to dumping margin. The significance of the rule is 
derived from the fact that it corresponds with the desire of the ADA, which calls member 
countries to accept the anti-dumping duty less than the dumping margin if such lesser duty 
would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.446 Moreover, it would also 
seem to follow from the international principle on anti-dumping measures, which allows the 
imposition of anti-dumping duties only if there is dumping and resulting injury. A logical 
corollary of these requirements would seem to be that if the injury that has been suffered is 
less then the dumping margin, relief should only be allowed to the extent necessary to 
alleviate that injury.447   
As it was elsewhere mentioned in this thesis, the design of the lesser duty rules serves for the 
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broader goal of the Vietnamese anti-dumping policy, namely protecting fair competitive 
environment and balancing socio-economic interests. The policy behind this less duty rules is 
to compensate for injurious dumping, not to give Vietnamese domestic producers a windfall 
whenever the dumping is found. So it would reduce the protectionist element in anti-dumping 
measure. On the other hand, since the calculated dumping duty is based on the level of price 
undercutting, which is always less than the dumping margin, the consequential impacts the 
price of the subject products will be arguably less detrimental to consumers and industrial 
users. 
a. Provisional Anti-dumping Duty 
After anti-dumping investigation is initiated, imports of the products under investigation may 
continue to increase in anticipation of the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty. Such 
sudden increase may cause even higher damage to a domestic industry. Therefore, in order to 
prevent such situation, while not prejudging the final outcome a provisional measure in the 
form of provisional anti-dumping duties can be imposed on foreign imports. 
Article 20 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance provides that on the basis of the preliminary 
determinations [made by the VCAD] the Minister may issue a decision to impose provisional 
anti-dumping duty, the rate of which must not exceed the dumping margin determined in the 
preliminary determinations. 
This regulation conforms to the general requirement of ADA, which requires that the ground 
for imposition of provisional anti-dumping duties is the preliminary finding of existence of 
dumping and sufficient evidence of injury. However, a detailed comparison with Article 7 of 




for applying provisional measures. In addition to preliminary finding of dumping and injury 
(preliminary anti-dumping determination) there are several other conditions to be considered 
before the provisional anti-dumping duties can be applied: (i) a public notice and adequate 
opportunities provided for comments from the concerned parties have been given; (ii) the 
authorities concerned judge such measures necessary to prevent injury being caused during 
the investigation.448 While the first difference is not very significant as it is related to the 
procedural safeguard already provided elsewhere in the anti-dumping legislation (the 
requirement to make public notice on imposition of provisional anti-dumping duty was added 
in Decree 90/CP449), the second divergent point can be truly important. The requirement to 
examine the impact of provisional measure on the situation is significant in the sense that it 
prevent the anti-dumping authorities from making the decision on imposition of anti-dumping 
measures deliberately, routinely and arbitrary. This is particularly necessary where dumping 
margins are low and economic indicators of injury to the domestic industry conflicting. With 
such minimum counterbalancing requirement, the anti-dumping authorities will be more 
careful in making the decision.  
Article 21 of Anti-dumping Ordinance regulates that anti-dumping provisional duties shall not 
be imposed earlier than 60 days from the date the date of issuance of the decision to initiate of 
anti-dumping investigation. This provision is consistent with the requirement of Article 7.3 of 
the ADA. In regards to the duration of the provisional measures, the Ordinance defines that 
application of anti-dumping provisional duties must not exceed 120 days as from the date of 
issuance of decisions to impose the provisional duties by the Minister. Upon request of the 
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exporters of the like products the Minister may extend the applicability of provisional anti-
dumping duty, but not beyond 60 days. To this extent, the duration for imposition of 
provisional anti-dumping duties of the Anti-dumping Ordinance is consistent with the 
requirements of the ADA.450 However, the ADA further prescribes that authorities concerned 
may also decide to extend the imposition of provisional measures up to six or nine months, if 
in the course of an investigation, they examine whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping 
would be sufficient to remove injury. This will not only take provisional measures other than 
tariffs automatically out of the picture, but also impose a positive obligation on authorities to 
consider antidumping tariffs lower than dumping margins and to entertain the requests from 
major exporters. These defects can be corrected only when the provisions in this connection in 
the current anti-dumping legislation is revised. 
b. Definitive Anti-Dumping Duty 
When all relevant information and data have been collected and verified, the VCAD will 
establish final determination of dumping. If the definitive determinations establishing 
dumping and material injury to domestic industry are made the VCAD should make a report 
and send it to the Trade Remedy Council, which in turn will review and make a final 
recommendation for the Minister regarding the application of the definitive anti-dumping duty 
on the subject import products. The decision on imposition of definitive anti-dumping duty 
should be publicly notified on the government official gazette, which is easily accessible on 
the market. Besides, the VCAD has also promised to make the content of all relevant decision 
on anti-dumping measures and policy available on their website (www.vcad.gov.vn). The 
                                                 
 




only problem for foreign concerned counterparts in this context is that the releases available 
from the above mentioned sources are published in Vietnamese Therefore they might have 
some difficulties in studying them. However, this issue is arguably not substantial and easily 
resolvable.   
Generally, the anti-dumping duties in Vietnam only can be applied prospectively, which 
means that they only are applied to imported products that enter for consumption after the 
date the Minister issued decision on imposition of duties. However, due to specificity of the 
anti-dumping proceeding, the law reserves certain situations where duties may be imposed 
retrospectively. According to Article 23 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance, a standard situation 
for retrospective imposition of anti-dumping duties is when final determination confirms that 
there is material injury or a threat to cause material injury to the domestic industries and the 
provisional anti-dumping duties have already been applied before the final conclusions are 
made. In such situation the Minister can consider the date of imposition of definitive anti-
dumping duties starts as from the date of imposition of preliminary anti-dumping duties.  
The anti-dumping duty may also be applied retrospectively to imported products for a period 
up to 90 days prior to the date of imposition of the provisional anti-dumping duties if the two 
following conditions exist: (i) where the imports are dumped and (ii) the volume, quantity or 
value of the products sold at dumping prices into Vietnam increased suddenly causing hardly 
remediable injury to the domestic industries. This provision is comparable with Article 10.6 




therein.451 Thus, in order to avoid any violation of the settled conditions for application of 
anti-dumping duty retrospectively on imported products which enter for consumption prior to 
imposition of provisional anti-dumping measure, the Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation 
needs to provide additional guidance in accordance with the requirement of Article 10.6 of the 
ADA. 
The retroactivity concept of imposition duty shall also be applied for comparison of between 
final and provisional anti-dumping measures. Article 23 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance   
stipulates that where the final determination on dumping matters is negative the provisional 
anti-dumping duties already collected or amounts deposited to secure the payment of 
provisional anti-dumping measures must be refunded to concerned parties. Similarly, if 
according to the final determination, the definitive anti-dumping duty is higher than the provisional 
duty paid or amount estimated for the purpose of the security, the difference should be reimbursed. 
However, the Minister shall not collect any additional duties if the definitive anti-dumping duty rate is 
higher than the provisional anti-dumping duty.  
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Finally, it can be assumed that anti-dumping duties will be applied retrospectively if the 
Minister defines that the concerned parties to the undertaking violate the undertaking 
commitments.452
Anti-dumping measures are considered to be a temporary trade remedy against foreign unfair 
trade practices. Therefore, the Anti-dumping Ordinance establishes that the duration of 
application of anti-dumping duty shall lapse after 5 years from the date on which it entered 
into force or were last modified or confirmed. However, the duty can be extended beyond 
standard maximum time limits if after the sunset review the Minister determined that the 
expiry of the measure would lead again to injury or threat thereof.  
5.3.3.2. Undertakings 
Undertaking is another alternative of anti-dumping measures allowed within the anti-dumping 
framework of Vietnam. The Anti-dumping Ordinance provides that after the preliminary 
determination and prior to the termination of the investigative phase, the foreign exporters 
may provide an undertaking to the Minister in order to avoid the application of anti-dumping 
measures.453 The undertaking can be in the form of voluntarily limiting the volume and 
quantity of export products into Vietnam or revising the export’s price so that the VCAD is 
satisfied that injurious effect of dumping is eliminated. 
Basically, undertakings are agreements between the Vietnamese authorities (Minister of 
Trade) and foreign exporters of dumped products, in which the foreign exporters agreed to 
adjust their sales of the dumped products to the extent that the anti-dumping authorities 
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satisfies that either the dumping or the injurious effect of dumping are eliminated. This 
agreement is absolutely a voluntary agreement between parties and entirely based on offer and 
acceptance concept. Even if the anti-dumping authorities may take initiative to propose the 
undertaking’s terms the foreign exporters or producers are not obliged to enter into the 
agreement.454 Another specific characteristics of undertaking agreement is that although the 
content of the agreement include practice of fixing the price and volume of sales on the 
market, it is not categorized by the law as the same as private voluntary restrain agreement, 
i.e. agreement between industrial producers, which otherwise would be a subject of 
Vietnamese competition law. This approach of interpretation on the nature of the undertakings 
agreement is widely supported by both state authorities and academia in Vietnam.455
The proposal of undertaking can be sent by the foreign producers or exporters to the VCAD 
any point of time after date of issuance preliminary determination and 30 days before the end 
of investigation phase.456 However, in order for undertakings to be effective, they need to be 
detailed, well structured and regularly checked. Article 37.2 of Decree 90/CP requires the 
exporters who commit for undertaking to provide regular reports and to allow verification.457 
In case of a suspected violation of the undertaking, Minister may decide to continue the 
investigation into the application of anti-dumping measures or apply interim measures. 458 If 
the Minister decides to decline the offer for undertaking it should state the reasons for 
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refusing offered undertakings. This regulation is quite important because it help to increase 
the transparency and predictability in the procedure for offering and accepting undertaking in 
Vietnamese anti-dumping system.  
The antidumping investigations will be resumed in the event the agreement of undertaking is 
terminated and provisional measures will be imposed as soon as possible based on the best 
available information, if the termination is due to respondent's withdrawal or violations.459
Consistent with common anti-dumping practice, the Minister is under no legal obligation to 
accept an offer of undertakings from respondents. However, Decree 90/CP requires the 
Minister to consider the following two factors in making the decision: 
(i)  Whether the undertaking will eliminate injury or threat to cause material injury to a 
domestic manufacturing industry; 
(ii)  Whether the acceptance does not entail negative impacts on the implementation of 
national socio-economic policies (public interests). 460
These factors appear to be relevant and reasonable for considering acceptance or rejection of 
undertaking proposals. This regulation is consistent with the requirement of Article 8.3 of the 
ADA. The potential issue is whether respondents will have any recourse when the Minister 
fails to observe its own rules in rejecting the offer, even though the acceptance of 
undertakings is within his discretion. 
Another issue should be considered in this context is that how the anti-dumping authorities 
will assess the impacts of the undertaking from the socio-economic (public) interest’s 
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perspective while there is no single criterion in the law for such assessment. This serves as an 
example that authorities lack of knowledge and expertise in enacting rules and regulations in 
the area by frequently reading into laws additional requirements, desirable as they may be, 
without thinking of preparing grounds for their application. Since the requirement of 
assessment in public interest factors is not mandated under Article 8 of the ADA the legislator 
might either abolish this provision or amend supplementary regulations to facilitate the public 
interest inquiry. Of these two options, the later one can positively contribute to the 
development of the national anti-dumping system.   
Finally, there is also a need to look at criteria for establishment of terms of undertaking under 
the anti-dumping framework of Vietnam. Neither the Anti-dumping Ordinance nor the Decree 
90/CP regulates the basis for evaluation of price undertaking offered in by the foreign 
exporters and producers. Although, in the recent internal document on the interpretation and 
application of anti-dumping legislation, the VCAD has stated that “the price margins of 
undertakings needs to be compared with the dumping margins set by the preliminary 
determination [and] the price margin of the undertakings shall not be higher than the dumping 
margin and should be adequate to eliminate material injury to domestic industry”.461 This 
guideline is consistent with Article 8.1 of the ADA. However, this piece of document is by no 
means a legal document within Vietnamese legal system. Therefore, from legal perspective, it 
does not contribute to the improvement of legal certainty for the system. To that end, the 
national anti-dumping legislation still needs a supplementary provision in this regards.   
According to the Anti-dumping Ordinance, the most straight forward ground for suspension 
                                                 
 




of undertakings is where concerned parties fail to correctly implement their undertaking, 
therefore causing or threatening to cause material injury to domestic industry. However, there 
are also other bases which allowing the VCAD to suspend the undertaking, including inter 
alia: (i) failure to provide information according to the schedule; (ii) refusal to submit of 
verification of information upon request of the Minister; and (iii) serious inaccuracy of figures 
or other information.462  
 
5.4. STANDARD ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEWS 
5.4.1. Standard Administrative Reviews 
Article 11.1 of the ADA lays down the principle that anti-dumping measure shall remain in 
force only as long as, and to the extent that, it is necessary to counter the dumping which is 
causing injury. To address this principle, the Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation offers 
administrative review system. The review may be initiated either on the Minister own 
initiative or at the request of a concerned party, who submits evidence of changed 
circumstances sufficient to justify the need of review and provided that the definitive anti-
dumping dumping measure has already been imposed for one year.463  
The ADA distinguishes between two types of reviews, namely: (i) interim or changed 
circumstances reviews;464 and (ii) sunset or expiry reviews.465 It also authorizes the national 
                                                 
 
462   Decree 90/CP, Article 36 
463  ADO, Article 24.1 
464  ADA, Article 11.2  




anti-dumping authorities to make reviews in regards to the application of price undertaking by 
the foreign firms466 and in case when there are new foreign exporters, who have not exported 
to subject product to the importing country during the period of anti-dumping investigation 
(new comers reviews).467  
Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation also regulates the issue of administrative reviews.468 
However, it only defines the two principle types of reviews, namely the interim and sunset 
reviews. Hence, it provides that the all administrative reviews should be conducted in the 
same procedures as it is applied for original investigation.469 This means that a notice of the 
reviews should be published and all concerned parties are given opportunity to make 
representations. Hence, unlike the original investigation, during the reviews the Minister will 
not impose provisional anti-dumping measure but continue to apply the definitive anti-
dumping duty. 470  The total duration under Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation for the 
administrative review should not exceed a period of is 12 months.471
For interim review, the VCAD will check whether there is any necessity to amend the applied 
anti-dumping measures because of significant changes in the dumping margin of the dumped 
products or changes in the injury caused by the dumped products. The result of the interim 
review may be that the existing anti-dumping duty is adjusted or nullified. However, under 
the Vietnamese anti-dumping system, the VCAD does not have to conduct the interim 
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reviews of anti-dumping measures on the regular annual basis, like it is required in some 
countries, i.e. the US. It is mainly explained by the fact of the lack of human resource within 
the VCAD.472 Hence, this system may lead to a situation where the initiation of the interim 
review is solely relies on the request of concerned parties. The strong reliance on the initiative 
of concerned parties may arguably lead to a situation where anti-dumping duties are imposed 
long beyond the needs of complaining industry. Nonetheless, this issue may be more 
theoretical than practical because similar practices are applied in many countries in the world 
without critique by concerned parties.473
5.4.1.1. Sunset Reviews 
As above mentioned the maximum standard duration of anti-dumping duty and price 
undertakings is 5 years from the date of imposition unless the VCAD determines in a review 
initiated before the end of the 5 year period that the expiry of the duty would likely lead to 
continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. This provision of Vietnamese anti-dumping 
legislation is substantially similar to its counterpart in the ADA. However, it should be noted 
that the provision on sunset is one of the most controversial legal institutions of the ADA.   
Looking at the scope and nature of sunset reviews of dumping, it can easily be found that 
there is a strong difference between the sunset reviews and the original antidumping 
investigations. This is because by the time of the review, measures have been in place for 
several years. At the time of the review, there may not be any dumping margin or injury. And 
if measures have been effective, there should not be any dumping margin tariffs or injury at 
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the time of the review. Therefore, the meaning of “continuation or recurrence” of dumping 
and injury must have different meanings from the existence of dumping. If the measures are 
working, the economic indicators for determining the existence of dumping, and material 
injury must look very different from those in the original investigations. Furthermore, if 
foreign imports are still subject to anti-dumping duty despite the fact that they do not injure 
domestic industry, than the anti-dumping measure cease to be a trade remedy instrument to 
create fair competitive marker but rather becomes an instrument of simple protectionism. 
Countries advocating the sunset reviews mechanism, try to establish a special criteria and 
standard for implementation of the sunset reviews. The EU, for instance, directs the 
Commission to consider evidence of continued dumping and injury, removal of injury is 
partly or solely due to the measures taken, circumstances of the exporters, or market 
conditions. In practice, attention is usually on the production and export capacity of producers 
or exporters, the market conditions (the demand, for example) in importing countries or third 
countries, as well as comparison of prices in the EU and abroad, and the magnitude of the 
dumping duties. 
In the United States, the criteria for finding likelihood of dumping and injury for sun set 
reviews have been laid down in the 1994 amendment to the Tariff Act. According to these 
statutes, the Commissioner shall consider the likely volume, price effect and impact of 
imports of the subject products on the industry if the order is revoked. The factors to be 
considered in volume of imports, for example, are quite similar to the practice in the EU. 
Other factors include the likely increase production capacity or unused existing production 




the production from other products to the products at issue.474Ideally, and this seems to be 
Vietnam should apply the anti-dumping duties without any extension at the end of 5 years. As 
above mentioned, the root of the problems is that fact that the sunset review is flawed and 
counterfactual in its focus. It seeks to define whether dumping will happen in the future when 
the anti-dumping duty is eliminated. It is highly difficult to establish precise criteria and 
standards for a fair assessment in order to control the abuse of administrative discretion if the 
VCAD intends to do so. However, now, the regulation is already in place and it is consistent 
with the requirement of the ADA. Within this condition, it is proposed that the Vietnamese 
anti-dumping legislation to be amended with a strict requirement on the proof of dumping and 
injury. For instance, the VCAD should be required to identify evidence just as in the case of 
determination of threat of injury at a normal anti-dumping proceeding. 
5.4.2. Judicial Reviews 
5.4.2.1. Legal Basis for Judicial Reviews 
According to Article 13 of the ADA, WTO member countries whose national legislation 
contains provisions on anti-dumping measures shall provide prompt review of antidumping 
determinations by judicial or administrative tribunals (or arbitration). The Vietnamese anti-
dumping legislation does not mention much about the availability of judicial review for 
antidumping determinations, except a short provision in Anti-Dumping Ordinance stating that 
parties of the dispute are entitled the rights to institute court proceedings in accordance with 
the law of Vietnam if they disagree with the decision of the Minister.475  
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During the accession to the WTO, Vietnamese government has made a commitment to 
provide judicial review. However, the short history of judicial review of administrative 
decisions in Vietnam,476 at one point in time, has created unclear answers to the questions as 
to whether judicial review is indeed achievable under Vietnamese current laws. Even if it is 
now theoretically available, no definite answers, in many areas, can be discerned as to how it 
will operate in actual. 
Article 26 of the Anti-Dumping Ordinance provides that the concerned parties who not agree 
with the anti-dumping determination of the Minister may lodge a complaint to ask for review. 
However, the authority in charge of the review is the Minister himself. According to the 
guideline of Article 13 of the ADA, although the judicial review can be conducted not by a 
judicial body, the authority reviewing the decision of the anti-dumping authorities must be 
independent of the latter. Thus, the review mechanism provided by the Anti-Dumping 
Ordinance should not be considered as a judicial review as required by the ADA. This author, 
rather calls it is as an administrative review. 
The concerned party is entitled to require a court proceeding in accordance with the law of 
Vietnam if it disagrees with the decision of the Minister resolving the concerned party’s 
(earlier) complaint. To that end, the legal basis for having judicial review is derived the 
LC&D and the ADSO.477 According to the regulations of the LC&D, any concerned parties, 
citizens, legal persons, or other organizations believe that a specific administrative action of 
an agency infringes upon their legal rights; they shall have the right to sue in the People's 
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Court according to the law.478 These rights have also been extended to foreign individuals, 
agencies and organizations in Vietnam.479 The amendment of the Ordinance in April 2006 had 
extended the jurisdiction of the court to cover all WTO related matters, including complaints 
against administrative actions concerning domestic and international trade in goods, and such 
actions in the sector of State management of intellectual property and technology transfers. 
Although in actual practice up to now, the administrative decision made by the Ministry of 
Trade or by any other government agency in regards to the foreign trade issue has never been 
reviewed by any other independent authority, based on the commitment made by the 
Vietnamese government during its WTO accession negotiation, one can assumes that the 
statutory language in law does means what it says. 
5.4.2.2.  Original Jurisdictions and Venues 
The ADSO provides a complex system of courts whose jurisdiction is based on the nature of 
subject matter and level of administrative authority (see Chart 2). Accordingly, the basic 
courts (or district courts) only have the original jurisdiction over disputes concerning 
administrative actions and decision of the government agencies at district level.480 Basically, 
the ADSO excludes those courts from reviewing the anti-dumping issues. 
The intermediate courts (The peoples courts of the provinces and centrally-run cities) are 
entitles to hear the cases related to the actions and decisions of government agencies at 
ministerial level.481 Presumably, their jurisdiction includes anti-dumping decisions made by 
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Minister. However, the ADSO also stipulates that the Supreme Court shall have concurrent 
original jurisdiction with the intermediate court on “important and complicated” 
administrative cases.482 According to the judicial interpretations of the Supreme Court, so-
called “important and complicated” cases include foreign-related disputes or the cases that 
have nation-wide impact. 483  It is probably self-evident that antidumping determinations 
usually affect enterprises all over the country and therefore have a nationwide impact. The 
question arises here is which court should a contest of anti-dumping decisions be lodged?  
Up to now there is no clear answer for this question since there is no official decision or 
regulation has been given on this issue. Hence considering the complex nature and wide 
impact of the anti-dumping cases, it is assumed that the request for judicial review should not 
be submitted to the intermediate court. The reason is clear: the judges of provincial people’s 
court do not have adequate knowledge and expertise to deal with the issue. However, if the 
original jurisdiction is given to the Supreme Court there might be also problems. The judges 
of the Supreme Court might be not used to the issues arising from the fact-finding and 
collecting evidence as they always engage only in reviewing decision of lower court or 
interpreting laws. A proper compromise between the two extremes therefore probably is 
probably to establish a specialized court to deal with all foreign trade laws.   
The author proposes that this specialized court of foreign trade is established at the same level 
as district court, which can deal with all matters of international trade, including anti-
dumping. This court probably needs to be established in Hanoi because the anti-dumping 
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authority (the Ministry of Trade) is located here. It is to correspond with the principle of anti-
dumping settlement proceeding, which contains that the original jurisdiction of the court over 
the case should be based on the location of the respondent.  
In case no specialized court is established the second best solution still to deliver the original 
jurisdiction of judicial review to the Supreme Court. Thus, the Supreme Court should 
establish a specialized trial departments to deal with the highly complex and technical nature 
of trade-related cases. 
 




5.4.2.3.  Standing 
The anti-dumping legislation does not indicate who or which parties may contest the anti-
dumping determinations in the court. It is obvious that some of the parties have the capacity to 
sue. For example, there should not be any question that adversely affected domestic industries 
that have applied for anti-dumping measures should have the right to be reviewed by the court 
or the aggrieved foreign enterprises, which respond to the investigation should have the right 
to be heard in court. However, the extent of the parties who are entitled to judicial review over 
anti-dumping determinations is not easy to define. 
The Anti-Dumping Ordinance employs the term “concerned parties” to designate parties who 
may be affected by the investigations. The term is very broad and includes numbers of 
party484 The Supreme People's Court goes even further by stating that citizens, legal persons, 
or organizations whose legal right of fair competition or whose legal interests are affected 
because of the change or dismissal of the specific administrative act, shall be entitled to bring 
suit.485 As a consequence, affiliated businesses, joint ventures, parties to the association may 
also bring law suits against the Minister’s anti-dumping determination. It can be assumed that 
those parties who have not participated in the proceedings should be excluded from the list of 
legitimate petitioners.  
Another issue, which also should be clarified in this context, is the right of industrial users to 
seek judicial review of administrative decisions. Lack of a specific provision in both the Anti-
Dumping Ordinance and Decree 90/CP not withstanding those industrial users (downstream 
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industry) arguably contest the determination if they are not satisfied with the MOT decision? 
It is likely that they will not be entitled to contest anti-dumping determinations in court 
because they may not be even asked for opinion during the anti-dumping investigation. If the 
industrial users are added to the list of the concerned parties in anti-dumping proceeding as 
recommended earlier by this author, 486 their standing for judicial review petition would be 
much better. It is important to note that the inclusion of industrial users as a legitimate party 
to judicial review proceeding does not violate any WTO requirements. The ADA for instance 
does not prevent member countries from in extending the rights to the parties other than those 
whose rights are not specifically mentioned in the treaties. Meanwhile, this approach would 
further strengthen the concept of public interest consideration in the anti-dumping system of 
Vietnam. 
5.4.2.4. Standards of Judicial Reviews 
What should be the standard of judicial review for disputes or determinations? This question 
is of highly significant for the anti-dumping procedural laws because it related to the court 
may check the administrative actions of the anti-dumping authorities. If the court is 
empowered with a broad reviewing power and subjective standards for compliance, it may 
unduly restrain the exercise of administrative power. However, if the power to review of the 
court is too weak and the standards too narrow judicial review system may become ineffective 
and it may contribute nothing to the development of the system.  
According to the ADSC, the administrative court can review the review five aspects of the 
administrative decisions, namely (i) evidence; (ii) application of laws and regulations; (iii) 
                                                 
 




compliance with the procedure; (iv) absence of power; and (v) abuse of executive power. At 
the moment, since Vietnam has only started developing the judicial system the formation of 
standard of judicial review is only budding. How the court handles highly technical 
administrative determinations such as anti-dumping determinations will be an interesting and 
important issue in the future. 
This author envisages that in order to make the judicial review truly effective the standard of 
review of the first three aspects should be well developed. For the development review 
standard of evidence, the judicial branch in Vietnam may consider two different approaches 
involving collection and evaluation of evidence. The first one named de novo review - the 
court takes initiative to collect its own evidence to reach its own decision. The second 
approach generally named a review on the records - the court will not be engaged in taking 
new evidence. It will instead review only whether or not the administrative decisions contain 
evidence to support their conclusions. 
Of course, this is not to suggest that it is not possible to conceive any number of combinations 
in between the two extremes mentioned above. The WTO, for instance, has come up with a 
review standard called neither de novo nor total deference to national authorities. 
Accordingly, both the Panels and the Appellate Body will not be prevented from reviewing 
whether national decisions have properly established the facts and have objectively evaluated 
the information.487
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In the most jurisdictions, including the most advanced in the world such as the US and EU, 
the judicial branch usually does not review administrative decisions de novo. In the United 
States, for instance, the court follows the “substantial evidence rule” in reviewing anti-
dumping agencies determinations. Under this rule, if the DOC or ITC decisions are supported 
by substantial evidence, the court will defer the expertise of those agencies and will not 
substitute its own judgment for the executive branch. In the European Union, the court has 
also stated that it would not scrutiny the Commission on complicated economic matters such 
as anti-dumping, if its conclusions have been supported by sufficient evidence.488 Similar 
rules have been applied in the US and Canada under the framework of the NAFTA. 
In Vietnam, it is very difficult to determine how extensive the administrative court would 
utilize its power to collect or to allow the introduction of new evidence based simply on the 
legal documents because of absence of actual relevant practice. It is also unclear whether the 
court will arrive at its conclusion by examining administrative records alone or by relying on 
its own newly discovered evidence. It is too early to make any conclusion. But following the 
above mentioned judicial practices probably is good solution for Vietnam based on its legal 
tradition.  
The judicial review on the issue of application of law is another important aspect to be 
developed in Vietnamese legal system. As it was analyzed in Chapter II of this thesis, one the 
weaknesses of the “rule of law” system in Vietnam at the moment is the limitation of the 
review power of the judicial branch on this matter. In those jurisdictions, where the judicial 
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branch enjoys the review power of the constitutionality of the statutes or the legality of 
regulations, the court may set aside not only the specific determination but may also void the 
regulations or statutes which are in conflict with higher laws such as the constitution. Under 
the Vietnamese legal system, the reviewing power of the judicial branch is considerably 
narrow. In its interpretation of laws and regulations and review of correct application of laws 
and regulations, most of the commentators believe that the court lacks the power to review the 
legality of the regulations, let alone legislation. Therefore, when the ADSO authorizes the 
court to remand administrative determinations due to error in the application of law, the court 
cannot actually nullify legislation or regulations. It only can have opinion over the legality of 
the specific administrative act. 
Thus, in requesting court view of anti-dumping determinations, it seems that parties should 
not expect to prevail on the issue of consistency of the anti-dumping regulations with other 
legislation, let alone their compliance with WTO treaty obligations. Even if it is conceptually 
possible to segregate the interpretation of the anti-dumping regulations from that of other laws 
or WTO treaties, it may be difficult in practice to come to correct interpretation and 
application of administrative rules without referring to other laws. Hence, if a judicial system 
provides judicial review with very limited in scope it may be argued that the system fulfills 
the WTO treaty requirement only in name, not in reality, 
Reviewing the anti-dumping procedural laws is another important aspect of the judicial 
review. There are many procedural requirements in the anti-dumping regulations. The anti-
dumping authorities have extensive obligation to notify concerned parties in the proceeding, 
particularly the respondents; many decisions, such as the formal initiation of the investigation, 




copying; hearings must be provided; and opportunities must be provided for parties to express 
their views and rebut positions of the opponents. 
Procedural irregularities are among the reasons that the court shall rectify administrative 
determinations according to the ADSO. 489  According to the contemporary practice, the 
administrative court usually would annul the administrative determinations based on the facts 
that subject agencies did not explain to individuals or organizations the factual and legal basis 
for the determination, did not advise them of their legal rights, and did not properly serve the 
determinations. If this experience is applied into the anti-dumping judicial review, the court 
can apply the requirement of procedural regularity to review antidumping determinations. 
However, review of procedural irregularities sometimes involves the application of open-
ended concepts such as “due process”, “good faith”, “good conscience”, “fairness”, 
“fundamental rights” and justice in general, rather than just examining procedural 
technicalities. In practice, these concepts are often exerted as guiding principles in 
determining procedural fairness.  
In US Hot-Rolled Steel case, the WTO Panel has supported the concepts of procedural 
fairness by giving the opinion that access of interested parties to relevant information in the 
course of the investigation, in addition to access to the disclosed factual basis and reasoning 
supporting an affirmative determination at least from the time of the determination enables an 
interested WTO Member to exercise its judgment as to whether action under [the DSU] 
would be fruitful.490
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Again would be premature to conclude whether or not the Vietnamese courts will apply the 
above mentioned concepts in reviewing lawfulness of procedure because the Vietnam’s 
judicial review system is only in its early stage of development. However, the current judicial 
practice seems to preclude courts from examining the “rationality” of administrative 
determinations. 
One of the most serious procedural defects involving judicial and administrative decisions in 
Vietnam consists of failing to provide reasoned conclusions. It is quite frequently that 
administrative court decisions simply give legal conclusions without adequate analysis of 
facts and laws. Such practices violate not only legal requirements in the ADA, but also the 
concepts of due process and fundamental procedural fairness. If the court in Vietnam 
continues failing to effectively review and correct this practice or if court decisions do not 
observe this procedural requirement, they will be challenged at the WTO dispute settlement 
process.  
Another unsettled issue concerning procedural regularities has been made more complicated 
by the fact that the MOT is entitled to promulgate implementation regulations for Anti-
Dumping Ordinance. Would courts consider it a procedural violation in judicial review of 
agency's determinations when those regulations have not been strictly observed by the 
agencies themselves? Current Vietnamese law and practice provide no clear answers to this 
question. 
5.4.2.5.  Some Legal Implications 
Although the Anti-Dumping Ordinance does not contain a clear provision on judicial review, 




in the anti-dumping disputes can approach the courts to request judicial reviews of 
administrative reviewed determinations.491 Article 2 of the ADSO expressly prescribes that 
individuals and organizations are entitled to request the administrative court to review the 
administrative decisions of state administrative agencies and/or competent persons regarding 
earlier their complain on the administrative misconducts, if they do not agree with the 
decisions and also do not want to complaint to their superior agencies.   
At this point one may raise a question whether or not aggrieved parties should consider 
requesting for judicial reviews, as a part of strategy in defending their interests in anti-
dumping case. The answer might be controversial since there is no precedent for analysis. 
However, given the short history of judicial review of administrative actions in Vietnam, it 
may be an exaggerated hope to expect the court to exert fierce independence any time soon or 
often. This is not to say that judicial check on a new and highly sensitive legal area like anti-
dumping remedies will need to be conducted with high prudence the judges. It takes time to 
establish this system and make it eventually operational.  
Therefore, a more practical approach for concerned parties to the anti-dumping proceeding is 
probably to seek for administrative review. Although the administrative review mechanism 
has certain inherent problems as mentioned earlier, for the time being its creditability and 
efficiency is arguably still higher than the judicial review mechanism because of numbers of 
reason. First of all, because both administrative and judicial reviews can be equally subject to 
scrutiny under the WTO dispute settlement process. So the Minister should be very careful at 
evaluating the complaints by the concerned parties regarding the legality of the anti-dumping 
                                                 
 




determinations. In addition, administrative review may be a great deal faster than judicial 
review since the former being required to be completed within sixty days.492 Finally, as it was 
analyzed, the court may be reluctant to make the decision in some sensitive issues, such as the 
















                                                 
 





CONCLUSION: MAIN FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
The last two decades have been an extraordinary period for Vietnam. The country has 
undergone a dramatic transformation from a centrally planned economy to a “socialist-
oriented” market economy under the umbrella of the Doi Moi Policy. The transformation has 
helped the country to achieve rapid economic growth for nearly two decades. The 
development of market economy together with proactive economic integration has resulted in 
significant structural change in the Vietnamese economy. The legal system therefore has been 
also developed to support the transition process and help market forces operate  
The country is heading toward the establishment of more market-based institutions that 
protect economic rights as well as provide a level playing field for all businesses regardless of 
the form of ownership. The Vietnamese government has also brought about significant policy 
improvements to make the foreign trade regime become more open and transparent in order to 
meet the requirements of economic integration, especially in light of the accession to the 
WTO.  
With better access to Vietnamese market, foreign products have started to flood into Vietnam 
and thus create a new competition environment on the national market. During the last 
decade, there is an increasing voice from domestic firms that they are being subjected to 




advantage of financial resources and market position. In response to that, the government of 
Vietnam should establish a trade remedy regime to protect the legitimate interests of domestic 
against competition from foreign firms. However, this regime should not be misused as a 
protectionist tool to hide the domestic firms from international competition. It is because the 
impact of protectionism is clear – it would lead to misallocation of resources. There is thus a 
need to design a workable anti-dumping framework that would help to address this emerging 
issue.  
The aim of this thesis is to study the anti-dumping regime from the economic efficiency and 
competition perspectives so as to suggest to the Vietnamese government an appropriate policy 
to remedy foreign unfair trade practices. The actual and contemplated Vietnam’s anti-
dumping law system are described and analyzed in light of the country’s political, economic 
and legal specific conditions. In particular, the analyses of the anti-dumping regulatory system 
of Vietnam are made in the context of the country’s recent accession to the WTO. Based on 
the findings in each chapter of the thesis, a number of recommendations are made to either 
change the law or how it is to be administered. 
 
6.1. FINDINGS 
An anti-dumping regime is a commonly accepted element of national foreign trade policy. It 
helps a country to counter foreign unfair trade strategy of selling products at dumped prices, 
which distorts price order and competition in the national market. However, from the analysis 
of the welfare effects of dumping in Chapter I, it would appear that dumping, which is defined 




importing country as it is often claimed. An analysis based on three evaluation criteria, 
namely the distribution of income, level of output and competition process, shows that 
dumping is clearly negative for domestic competing producers while it can be progressive for 
domestic consumers and downstream producers in most of the cases.  
From the economic efficiency point of view, there are two instances in which foreign dumped 
imports may be considered clearly injurious: the predatory dumping and intermittent 
(sporadic) dumping. However, the current antidumping laws in many jurisdictions in the 
world, including Vietnam, do not clearly cover this issue. They allow the application of the 
trade remedy measures against foreign dumping, which cause or threaten to cause injury to a 
domestic like product (competing) industry. Thus, actions can be taken against foreign 
imported products by trade authorities without considering whether or not they harm the net 
national welfare and competition process. The abuse of the anti-dumping policy towards 
protectionism thus can adversely affect the effective resource allocation of the country and 
corrupt the original function of these trade remedy instruments. 
Many critics of anti-dumping laws base on the position of the claim that anti-dumping laws 
are an extension of competition laws and thus they should operate in conformity to the rules 
and concepts of competition laws. However, the author considers that this argument is 
inaccurate. Analysis in Chapter I has concluded that these two sets of law are independent 
although they share the same general objective of establishing rules for a competitive 
marketplace. Anti-dumping laws target primarily on protection of the national economy from 
harms caused by foreign unfair trade practices, with a clear focus on the interests of domestic 
competing industries and their workers. Competition laws meanwhile are consumer protection 




domestic businesses (e.g. collusion, price-fixing and abuse of monopoly position) within the 
national boundary. This difference explains many of the operational differences between 
competition and anti-dumping laws. The competition laws appear to be more effective 
instrument in dealing with anti-competitive behaviors of firms and maintaining the fair 
competitive market order.  
However, the possibility of application of competition laws to tackle problems in international 
context is very limited given the current economic integration level of the international 
community. Meanwhile, despite certain drawbacks, anti-dumping laws still can deal with 
problem of private unfair trade practices. Therefore, a national anti-dumping instrument is 
desirable for the benefit of the national economy because it would send a false message to 
foreign exporters that nothing is available to prevent them from dumping and possibly 
destroying domestic industry. This consequently would diminish significantly the political 
supports on the trade liberalization policy of the state. It is not in the interest of any 
government to let this happen. On the other hand, in order to minimize negative effect of the 
current problem of anti-dumping abuse, the author is of the opinion that the current national 
anti-dumping system should be maintained with more strengthened anti-dumping rules while 
more weight shall be put on public interest analysis before the imposition of certain duties. 
Complete elimination of this foreign trade discipline does not serve the said purpose, let alone 
it may be harmful to the national economy as it has been earlier discussed.  
This implication can be significant for Vietnam. The entire legal system of Vietnam has 
undergone a fast and robust development since the government adopted the Doi Moi policy in 




process. There is a serious lack of knowledge, experience and legal expertise on the subject 
within the society, including the lawyers and policy makers.  
On the eve of joining the WTO, the Anti-dumping Ordinance was hastily adopted with the 
hope that it would strengthen the economic law regime and at the same time to accommodate 
the requirements of the multilateral trading system. However, a strong theoretical foundation 
for the law is currently unavailable. It has been demonstrated in chapter IV and V that 
although the Vietnamese government has made tremendous efforts to harmonize rules and 
principles of the ADA, there are still many problems associated with the current rules of anti-
dumping action. From determination of normal value and export price, calculation of 
dumping margin to determination of injury and application of anti-dumping measures, each of 
these major headings of the Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation raises questions as to how it 
would be implemented. The general framework settled by the current anti-dumping legislation 
cannot guarantee a fair implementation of the rules. Without further progressive development, 
the system could hardly function efficiently as with the set objective.  
 
6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the above mentioned findings, author proposes a set of strategies and measures for 
improvement of the Vietnamese anti-dumping system. Those measures can be summarized 
and categorized in two groups: (i) the measures related to general anti-dumping policy and (ii) 





6.2.1. General Anti-dumping Policy 
As a full member of the multilateral trading system of the WTO, Vietnamese government 
should ensure that the design and application of the national anti-dumping system is fully 
consistent with the WTO ADA. That is to comply with its international commitments upon 
accessing the WTO multilateral trading system. However, since the legislative and political 
purpose of the establishment of the national anti-dumping system is also to promote trade 
liberalization and economic development, the Vietnamese anti-dumping policy also needs to 
be applied in a manner, which is beneficial to the overall social-economic interests of wealth 
creation through competition in a contestable market environment. The national anti-dumping 
measure should be applied when it is truly warranted but not when it is convenient to hide the 
domestic producers from international competition. The incidence of protection across 
industries in the past has shown that protectionism created barriers to entry and has led to high 
concentration in the affected sectors. As a consequence, that has adversely affected the 
domestic consumers because the inelasticity of the market allowed the protected industries to 
raise the price of commodities without being fear of losing market. Nonetheless, the strong 
protection did not help the development of the domestic industries. Some heavily protected 
industries, such as cement and sugar, appear to be inefficient and uncompetitive when the 
trade barriers have been eliminated by the government.  
In short, the anti-dumping policy should take into account the competition policy 
considerations in order to ensure that the impacts of the applied trade remedy measures are to 





Recommendation I: Promoting competition advocacy and transparency 
Since both anti-dumping and competition regimes are newly established in Vietnam,  there is 
a need to carry out wide-ranging competition advocacy activities to promote the idea of 
economic efficiency and competition value to all the key stakeholders in the anti-dumping 
proceedings, including the policy makers and anti-dumping agency’s officials, domestic 
business community and consumers, academics and media. Each group should understand and 
believe in the importance of: maintaining competition in the market. Specifically, it is very 
important to raise the awareness as well as to change the mindset the government agency in 
charge of administering anti-dumping policy. This factor is of highly significance for a 
transitional economy like Vietnam because the idea of necessity of nurturing market 
competition, in both domestic and international levels, has only started to take root in the 
society. 
The establishment of the VCAD, which is in charge of administration of both domestic 
competition and anti-dumping policies is a sign that Vietnamese government has an initial 
will to promote the competition policy consideration in anti-dumping regime. It is assumed 
that competition authorities would be more likely to advocate the benefits of competition and 
economic efficiency upon deciding the application of anti-dumping duty on foreign dumped 
imports. However, it merely marks the first miles in the journey of promotion of competition 
advocacy in the national anti-dumping regime). The establishment of the VCAD itself cannot 
guarantee a pro-competition anti-dumping system. Additional conditions, including but not 
limited to supportive academic infrastructure to undertake research and educate officials and 
lawyers; strong business associations and consumers’ groups to demand the reinforcement of 




convinced of the importance of the welfare impacts of pro-competitive measures, are 
necessary to inhibit the successful adoption of such policy. 
Government agencies (e.g. VCAD, MOJ) and other social-economic organizations (e.g. 
Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry), therefore, should take an initiative to make 
publicity campaigns to promote pro-competition anti-dumping policy. It can be done through 
various ways, such as publicizing the works on the issues and holding formal/informal 
educative conference or training course for businesses community, consumer groups, trade 
associations and officials, in order to make the case for pro-competitive policies directed to 
them. 
It is also important to improve the transparency in the anti-dumping proceeding so that 
interested parties have more opportunity to assess information and present their arguments to 
protect their interest. The current closed-door proceeding would subject the works of anti-
dumping authorities to interference and various lobbying pressures. This makes it hard for 
them to maintain the neutrality and objectivity, and which can derail the proceedings and 
eventual outcome of the relevant case. Improvement of transparency in anti-dumping 
procedure can also support the competition advocacy activities.  
Recommendation II: Strengthening the organizational structure 
The design of an efficient anti-dumping regime and the institutional architecture to implement 
policy and to enforce the law in newly adopting countries is a matter of highly importance as 




Anti-dumping enforcement is conducted by huge bureaucracies like almost everything else in 
Vietnam. Although the task of conducting anti-dumping investigations is vested into the hand 
of the VCAD, the law still entitles another agency, the TRC, to participate in the final stage of 
the proceeding to give opinion on the reports of the VCAD on the issue. More importantly, 
the TRC is also required to decide whether there is a dumping that cause or threaten to cause 
injury to the domestic industry. The philosophy behind this system is to establish a “double 
check” mechanism over the implementation of anti-dumping regulations. However, this re-
examination is a kind of redundancy of the works which have already been done by the 
VCAD. It is also questionable whether assessment of the TRC can be independent since it 
intervenes the anti-dumping proceeding when the VCAD has already accomplished the 
investigation and is presenting a comprehensive argument on the issue. The problem may be 
more critical if these agencies have divergent opinions on the issue. Therefore, it is suggested 
that the legislation reconsiders the role and the operation of the TRC to allow it participate 
more actively as an advisory agency for the MOT throughout the anti-dumping proceeding. 
Besides, in order to improve the efficiency and impartiality of the anti-dumping system, there 
is also a need to develop an effective judicial review mechanism over anti-dumping cases. 
The current regulations on judicial review are very indirect and hardly can serve as an 
effective ground for such review mechanism. It is suggested that Vietnam should develop a 
more elaborate rules on the judicial review system for trade remedy measures as well as to 
establish a special trade remedy division under the administrative court, which can effectively 





6.2.2. Regulatory Design 
Recommendation III: Determination of like product with the emphasis on the criteria of direct 
competition between subject products  
Determination of like product is a critical element in any anti-dumping investigation, as it 
serves two purposes: (i) it determines which product to fall within the scope of the injury 
analysis, and therefore determines which domestic industry allegedly suffering injury from 
foreign imports, and (ii) it can be used in determining which product in the domestic market 
of the exporting country to be used to determine the normal value of the subject imported 
products. The accuracy in the definition of the likeness of products is highly important as it 
provides the parameters for the whole anti-dumping investigation and therefore also affects 
the scope of the application of anti-dumping measures.  However, the Vietnamese anti-
dumping legislation does not provide detailed regulations in regards of this issue. Without the 
proper criteria for categorization of goods, the VCAD may have to refer to the import/export 
products classification rules of Custom Office, which mainly concentrate on physical 
characteristics of products, for definition of like products. However, the outcome of this 
approach might not be desirable for the purpose anti-dumping proceeding. Thus, the author 
proposes a set of guideline criteria for determination of like product, including the “physical 
characteristics”, “market substitutability”, “customer expectations”, “channels of distribution” 
and “direct competition between products”. The VCAD might use different criteria to 
determine the like products on the case-by-case basis; however, if there is a strong conflict 
between the applied criteria the “direct competition between products” should have more 




  6.2.2.1. Normal Value and Export Price  
At the stage of dumping determination, the most worrisome problem is the issue of abuse of 
constructed value methodology because it will lead to the establishment of higher value and 
consequently high dumping margin. To a certain extent the rules on fair comparison of normal 
value and export price also play a quite critical role. In order to ensure a fair comparison of 
those values, the legislation should make special emphasis on the factors reflecting the 
commercial reality. 
Recommendation IV: Clarification and amendment to the regulation on low domestic sales  
According to Article 3 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance, the construction of normal value is 
allowed in case of no sale of like products in domestic market of exporting country or such 
sales are at insignificant volume. The current regulation of Vietnamese legislation is silent 
about the threshold of the volume of the said sale/transaction, thus it gives VCAD wide 
discretion in deciding what is representative volume of domestic sales of like products. This 
matter is already regulated under the article 2.2 of the ADA, in which such a threshold is fixed 
at “5% of the sales of the product under consideration to the importing country”. Anti-
dumping regulation of Vietnam should be amended to provide 5% viability test to ensure the 
clarity certainty in the national anti-dumping system. Moreover, it should also consider 
clarifying the method of assessment of 5% viability so that the result of the test will not be 
manipulated to give a greater chance for the use of constructed normal value. The Vietnamese 
anti-dumping legislation needs to require the VCAD to base the 5% viability test primarily on 
the total like product comparison. If VCAD officials choose to apply the model/type 




as to the reason of such a preference and whether such approach would better reflect the 
commercial reality.  
Recommendation V: Detailed regulation on normal value calculation with more 
concentration on the business reality in the exporting country.  
The constructed normal value, according to Article 3.3 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance, 
should be based on constructed production cost plus reasonable expenses and reasonable 
profits determined at each stage of the production circulation on the market of the exporting 
country or that of a third country. However, it does not provide any further detailed regulation 
as to how those values should be calculated. Therefore, it is suggested that the Vietnamese 
legislation should first be amended to correspond with the guidelines of Article 2.2.2 of the 
ADA. In addition, it should also emphasize that the assessment should take into consideration 
the business culture and environment of the exporting country. Accordingly, the VCAD 
should be required to base its determination of constructed normal value primarily on the 
records kept by the foreign producers, provided they are consistent with the accounting rules 
principles of the exporting country. The cost must be adjusted appropriately to take into 
consideration non-recurring costs that benefit the production and start-up costs which might 
affect the costs during the period of investigation. With respect to the cost allocation 
adjustment, the evidence on the allocation of cost should be considered only when such 
allocation has been historically utilized by the exporters.  
For the calculation of reasonable expenses and reasonable profits, it is proposed that VCAD 
should be required to base its calculation either on the actual amount incurred in the 




the weighted average of the actual amounts incurred by other exporters or producers 
investigated exporters or producers subject to investigation in respect of production and sales 
of the like product in the exporting country. However, for the later approach VCAD should 
take into account all of "the actual amounts incurred and realized" by all producers or 
exporters regardless of whether they are incurred and realized on production and sales in the 
ordinary course of trade or not. Moreover, in order to minimize the possible discretion in 
determination of reasonable profit margin, the anti-dumping regulation should require that the 
constructed profit margin by the VCAD should not exceed profits normally realized by sales 
of producers in the same general category of products on the exporting country. 
6.2.2.2. The Dumping Margin 
The Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation only provides some general principles in computing 
the anti-dumping margin. The absence of detailed regulations addressing this issue will 
provide confers on the VCAD high degree of discretion when choosing the method of 
establishing the margin of dumping. The Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation should focus 
on developing the rules of dumping margin determination.  
ADA has laid down three methods of calculation of dumping margin, which can be 
summarized as (i) the comparison on basis of weighted average – to - weighted average; (ii) 
comparison on the basis of transaction - to - transaction and the (iii) comparison of the 
weighted average to individual export transaction. The methods might be adopted into 
Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation to fill the current loophole.  
Hence, in considering the merits of each of these methods, the question of zeroing arises. The 




violate the current ADA. The weighted average – to - weighted average method does not 
distinguish between cases of positive and negative dumping, so the question of zeroing does 
not arise in this case. Neither does the transaction - to - transaction method. Only comparison 
of individual export transactions to weighted average normal value can create a high 
possibility of application of zeroing to calculation of the dumping margin.  
Recommendation VI: disciplining the use of the zeroing method of comparison  
The legislation should be amended to require that in both original investigation and 
administrative reviews, dumping margin must be calculated on the basis of comparing 
weighted average normal value with a weighted average price of all comparable export 
transactions or on the basis of comparing of transaction specific normal value to transaction 
specific export price. The comparison of individual export prices to weight average normal 
values should be allowed only where there is a strong base for justification. When the 
weighted average – to - weighted average method is employed, the VCAD should not break 
out products groups separately and use zeroing (negative dumping) for particular product 
groups.  
6.2.2.3. Determination of Injury 
As was pointed out in Chapter IV, the determination whether the relevant industry in the 
importing country has been injured raises a number of problems. In addition, the 
determination that only part of any injuries found has been caused by dumping raises yet more 
problems. There is, however, no solution to this situation, other than for the investigating 




conditions in importing countries may stimulate anti-dumping action rather than any actual 
dumping by exporters, and this needs to be borne in mind in injury investigations.  
Recommendation VII: the VCAD should be required to take into account the effect on 
capacity utilization in the injured industry when deciding on the level of duties to be imposed. 
Recommendation VIII: A provision on cumulation of injury should be added into the 
Vietnamese legislation in order to fill up the current legislative loophole of the anti-dumping 
system. There should be a requirement for the VCAD to consider not only the volume of 
imports but also the market share and imports trend of the importing sources as this would 
help to determine a difference in conditions of the competition.  
6.2.2.4. Public Interest Considerations 
Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation has expressly provided that the anti-dumping measure 
should be applied in light of the socio-economic (public) interests’ considerations. This 
simple requirement may include many subtle issues and would allow anti-dumping authorities 
to bring together a number of potentially conflicting interests, such as consumer and 
downstream industry welfares. As way of implementing public interest considerations 
systematically and effectively the Vietnamese anti-dumping legislation should establish a 
mechanism, which is able to force the anti-dumping authorities to undertake an additional 
series of investigations to evaluate properly the impacts of the remedy measures on the 
society as a whole.   
It is of author’s opinion that the term “public interest” should receive the same treatment as 




if domestic competing producers’ interests are harmed as a result of a range of factors. A 
similar procedure of assessment needs also to be applied for public interest test to identify the 
possible effects of anti-dumping measures on the net welfare of the society. It is suggested, 
therefore, to include a separate provision for “public interest” investigation in the Vietnamese 
legislation. For this purpose, a non-exhaustive list of concrete criteria has been proposed in 
Chapter 4, which include inter alia the (i) availability of alternative supplies (product 
substitutability, alternative suppliers); (ii) possible effects of anti-dumping measures on the 
competition process; (iii) possible effects of anti-dumping measures on the domestic 
consumers of the dumped products and (iv) industrial users of the dumped products. These 
criteria would guide the VCAD on whether and how to conduct an inquiry on the ground of 
public interest.  
The public interest assessment regime is administratively workable and can be highly 
effective in balancing the interests of the domestic producers and interests of consumers.  
 
6.3. SOME COMPETITION POLICY CONSIDERATIONS TO CHANGE THE 
SYSTEM IN THE FUTURE 
During the research author have thought about some competition policy considerations, which 
could be included into the anti-dumping legislation to make the system more pro-competition. 
The first such change that might be considered is to concentrate anti-dumping action against 
what have been called cases of predatory intent. Based on the economic analyses on dumping, 




establishment of international monopoly and that harms the importing country in long-term. 
The anti-dumping rules should concentrate on identification of predatory intent on the part of 
the exporting country and the anti-dumping actions would be taken primarily against 
predatory dumping.  
The problem with the suggestion is the inherent difficulty of proving the presence or absence 
of predatory intent in the dumping practice of foreign exporters. To prove injury, for example, 
involves some study of the relevant statistics, even though controversial conclusions may be 
drawn from these. But predatory intent cannot be proved merely from statistics. It can only be 
inferred from behavior, and behavior can be subject to many interpretations. 
However, this may not be a hopeless cause, because determination of the criterion of 
predatory behavior would bear some relation to the problem of determination of the abuse of a 
dominant position in competition policy. In addition, the predatory intent could be also 
assessed based on the direct comparison of the production cost and export price. Accordingly, 
if exports are being made at prices which cover variable costs only, or which leave only a 
small margin above variable costs then the anti-dumping authorities could consider the 
existence of predatory intention. Hence, the most difficult obstacle here is related to the 
difficulty in identifying whether dumpers aim at short term or long-term aggression. If the 
answer for this issue can be done in the future research, it will definitely contribute to the 
substantial change for the entire anti-dumping system. 
Another suggestion to improve the economic efficiency of the anti-dumping system is to base 





At the moment the WTO has already settled in its anti-dumping framework certain statistic 
test for this purpose. Article 5.8 of the ADA requires that national anti-dumping authorities 
shall not take action against the foreign imports if its dumping margin is insignificant, which 
is account for less than 2% of the export price. In the same context, the volume of dumped 
imports should also be regarded as negligible if the volume of imports from a particular 
country is found to account for less than 3% of imports of the like product in the importing 
country (unless countries which individually account for less than 3% collectively account for 
more than 7% of imports of the like product).  
These provisions could possibly be widened. For instance, to include the use of the market’s 
share of the imported products as a base to identify the impact of dumping on the domestic 
industry. Even if the volume of dumped imports increases, but their share on the market 
remains the same then it can be assumed that dumping is likely to be irrelevant to the 
declining health of the domestic industry. The increase of the volume of sale of dumped 
imports can be attributed to the expansion of the domestic market. When domestic market is 
expanding both domestic producers and importers should be given the opportunity to expand 
with it. In such a case, dumping by an exporter might be treated leniently. The market share 
criterion might be also useful for the injury cumulation assessment.  
There is, however, an obvious problem if statistical tests were to be applied more widely. This 
is that it would probably be difficult to reach general agreement on what changes in import or 
market shares which should be ignored for anti-dumping purposes. A different test might 
therefore be more likely acceptable. Such a test might concern not only import or market 
shares but also the level of import barriers in exporting countries. From the economic analysis 




not elastic due to some import barriers. So if import barriers in a country are low there will 
not be the opportunity to keep out low-priced imports in order to maintain high domestic 
prices. It is therefore may be reasonable to consider to add a provision in the anti-dumping 
regulation requiring an investigation of the level of tariffs on the product concerned in the 
exporting country. If the level of tariffs (or other barriers to imports) is relatively low, and no 
subsidies have been involved, the presumption should be that both domestic and export prices 
are likely to be 'fair', and should therefore be exempt from anti-dumping measures. If the rules 
were amended in this way, there would of course have to be a definition of a tariff which was 
“low”. A common understanding of the low tariff at this moment is any rate of less than 10 %. 
However, this threshold may change over time and probably needs to be carefully assessed in 
the context of anti-dumping action. 
It is no doubt unrealistic to hope that this particular suggestion, or indeed any of the other 
proposals for change outlined above, will be incorporated in the anti-dumping rules in the 
foreseeable future. But even if they are not, the arguments that have been adduced in favor of 
the various changes might be useful to be borne in mind when the anti-dumping investigations 
are taking place. In particular, for both political and diplomatic reasons, it is desirable that 
anti-dumping action be approached with high caution with the consideration of net impacts on 
the economy. Moreover, it could be a ground for research on the subject in the future.   
 
6.4. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The analysis of this study shows that establishment of the national anti-dumping system, 




tasks that is necessary if Vietnam is to complete its transformation from a centrally planned 
economy to a market oriented one. This is also relevant to the commitment of the Vietnamese 
government to advance the cause of the rule of law and to honor the spirit of its market-
opening commitments made in its WTO accession agreement. What the country does not need 
is an anti-dumping system that fails to address the potential conflicts between anti-dumping 
and competition policies, and that lacks an effective institution to properly implement the 
primary objectives of the law.  
In light of the proposed recommendations, a number of useful amendments might be made for 
the improvement of the Vietnamese anti-dumping system in that direction. This development 
can help to make the young anti-dumping system of Vietnam become fully consistent with the 
ADA. More importantly it will force the anti-dumping determination to reflect better the 
commercial reality. It is particularly relevant to the proposal on development of a public 
interest clause. However, it should be admitted also that due to various objective restrains, 
some ideas related to inclusion certain competition policy considerations into the anti-
dumping legislation could not be turned into concrete recommendations at this point of the 











Ministry of Trade and Industry 
Just as this thesis is finalized, the National Assembly of Vietnam approved the request of 
Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng to reorganize some governmental institutions and agencies, 
under which the Ministry of Trade (MOT) and the Ministry of Industry (MOI) would be 
merged into the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). The newly established MTI acquires 
all the administrative functions of the two former ministries, including administration of 
competition and trade remedy measures. In this regards, the National Assembly simply 
decreed that the name of MOT or MOI contained in all laws and regulations shall be changed 
to MTI, without making other revisions in those laws and regulations. The above mentioned 
development does not make any significant impact on the analyses presented in this thesis in 
regards to the Vietnamese anti-dumping system, except that the reference to the MOT should 














Akie Ishida (ed.) “Regional Economic Integration and Vietnam – The Current Stage of 
Development”, Institute of Developing Economies, Chiba, (2003) 
Besseler, J. and Williams, A., “Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Law”, Hutchison, 
London, (1986).  
Bhala, R., and Kennedy, K., “World Trade Law: the GATT-WTO System, Regional 
Arrangements, and U.S. Law”, Lexis Law Pub., Charlottesville, (1998). 
Bierwagen, R., “GATT Article VI and the Protectionist Bias in Anti-Dumping Laws”, 
Kluwer Law Int., The Hague, (1990).  
Conrad, C., “Improvement International Competition Order: An Institutional 
Approach”, Palgrave Mac Millan, NY, (2005). 
Dale, R., “Anti-dumping Law: In a Liberal Trade Order”, Trade Policy Center, 
London, (1980). 
Dam, K., “The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization”, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, (1970) 
Finger, M., “Antidumping: How It Works and Who Gets Hurt”, The University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor, (1993)  
Hindley, B. and Messerlin, P., “Anti-dumping Industrial Policy Legalized 
Protectionism in the WTO and What to Do About It”, AIE Press, Washington D.C., 
(1996). 
Huang, T., W., “Trade Remedies Law of Dumping, Subsidies and Safeguards in 
China”, Kluwer Law Int’l, The Hague, (2003) 
Jackson, J., and Vermulst, E., (eds.) “The Multilateral Trading System”, (1989). 
Jackson, J., “The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic 
Relations”, The MIT Press, 2nd Ed., MA, Cambridge, (1997). 
Kester, K., “Japanese Takeovers: The Global Contest for Corporate Control”, Harvard 
Business School Press, MA, Boston, (1991). 
Lawrence, R., (Ed), “Brookings Trade Forum: 1998”, Brooking Institution Press, 
(1998). 
Leycegui et al. (Eds.), “Trading Punches: Trade Remedy Law Disputes under 
NAFTA”, National Planning Association, Washington D.C. (1995). 
Marceau, G., “Anti-dumping and Anti-trust Issues in Free Trade Areas”, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, (1994). 
Mastel, G., “Anti-dumping Laws and the US Economy”, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 
(1998). 
Muller, W., Khan, N., Neuman, H., “EC Anti-dumping Law – A Commentary on 




Pattison, J., “Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Laws”, St. Paul: West Group, 
(2000). 
Stanbrook, C., and Bentley, P., “Dumping and Subsidies: The Law and Procedures 
Governing the Imposition of Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties in the European 
Community”, Kluwer Law Int’l, 3rd ed., London, (1996). 
Steele, K. (Eds.), “Anti-Dumping Under the WTO: A Comparative Review”, IBAS, 
Kluwer Law International, London, (1996). 
Stern, ed., “The Multilateral Trading System: Analysis and Options for Change”, Ann 
Arbor, University of Michigan Press, (1993). 
Stewart, T., et al., “Rules in a Rules-based WTO: Key to Growth; The Challenge 
Ahead”, Transnational Publishers, NY, (2002). 
 Schererer, F., M., “Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy”, 
Brookings, Washington, (1994).  
Steward, T., et al, “The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992)”, 
Vol. II: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Denveter, (1993). 
Steele, K. (Ed.), “Anti-Dumping Under the WTO: A Comparative Review”, IBAS, 
Kluwer Law International, London, (1996). 
Trebilcock M., and Howse, R., “The Regulation of International Trade”, Routledge, 
London, (1995). 
Viner, J., “Dumping: A Problem in International Trade”, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, (1923).  
Vermulst, E., “The WTO Anti-dumping Agreement – A Commentary”, Oxford 
University Press, (2005). 
Vermulst, E. and Waer, P., “EC Anti-Dumping Law and Practice”, Sweet & Maswell, 
London (1996). 
Vermulst, E., “Anti-dumping and Practice in the United States and European 
Communities”, North-Holland, Amsterdam, (1987). 
Vermulst, E., and Graafsma, F., “WTO Disputes: Anti-dumping, Subsidies and 
Safeguards”, Cameron May, London, (2002). 
Williams, M., “Competition Policy And Law In China, Hong Kong And Taiwan”, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (2005). 
Whitwell, R., “The Application of anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures by 
Australia”, Central Queensland University Press, Queensland, Rockhampton, (1997). 
Zach, R., “Towards WTO Competition Rules”, Kluwert Law Int’l, The Hague, (1999). 
 
 
PAPERS AND ARTICLES 
 
Adamantopoulos, K. and Notaris, D., “The Future of the WTO and the Reform of the 





Auffret, P, “Trade Reform In Vietnam: Opportunities With Emerging Challenge”, World 
Bank, (2003). 
Bhala, R., “Rethinking Anti-dumping Law”, Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ., Vol. 29 (1), 
(1995) 
Barcelo III, J., “Anti-dumping Laws as Barriers to Trade - The United States and the 
International Anti-dumping Code”, Cornell L. Rev., 57, (1972).  
Boltuck, R., “An Economic Analysis of Dumping”, J. World Trade L., Vol. 21, (1987). 
Boltuck, R., Reply to Professor Lazar's Comment on "An Economic Analysis of 
Dumping”, J. World Trade L., Vol. 22 (5), (1987).  
Campbell, K. & Lee, P.Y., “Canadian & International Use of Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Measures: Data Update, 1988-1994”, Canadian International Trade 
Tribunal Research Branch Staff Working Paper, (06/1996) 
Cartland, M., “Antidumping and Competition Policy”, Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus, Vol. 28 (1), 
(1996). 
Clough, M., “Conflicts Between ECC Anti-Dumping And Competition Law”, European 
Competition Law Review, Vol. 13 (5) (1992). 
Devault, J., “The Administration of US Anti-dumping Duties: Some Empirical 
Observation”, World Economy, Vol. 13 (1), (1990). 
Denton, R., “(Why) Should Nations Should Utilize Anti-Dumping Measures”, Mich. J. Int'l L., 
Vol. 11, (1989). 
Didier, P., “The WTO Anti-dumping code and EC practice, Issues for review in trade 
negotiations”, J.W.T., Vol. 35(1), (2001). 
Diep Thai, “Does Free Trade Mean Freely Trade To Developing Countries? A Case Study 
of Catfish Dispute between the US Vietnam”, final thesis, Graduate Program, Geography 
Department, University at Buffalo, NY, (2002). 
Durling, J., “Defence, But Only When Due: WTO Review of Anti-dumping Measures”, J. 
Int’l Economic L., Vol. 6 (1), (2003). 
Engering, F., Brabander, H., and Vermulst, E., “EC Anti-dumping Policy in Globalizing 
World: A Dutch Prospective”, J.W.T., Vol. 32 (6), (1998). 
Godoy, S. and Stiglitz, J., “Growth, initial conditions, law and speed of privatization in 
transition countries: 11 years later”, NBER Working Paper No 11992. (2006). 
Gonzalez, E. and Mendoza, M., “Governance in Southeast Asia: Issues and Options”, 
Philippine Institute for Development Studies, Manila, 2002. 
Gupta, P., “Injury Investigations in Anti-dumping and the Super-Additivity Effect: A 
Theoretical Explanation”, Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), 
Vol. 142 (1), (2006). 
 Harald, W., “EC Antidumping System – a salient features”, J.W.T., 39(4), (2005). 
Hoekman, B. and Holmes, P., “Competition Policy, Developing Countries and the WTO”, 
World Economy, Vol. 22 (6), (1999). 
Hoekman, B. and Mavroidis, P., “Dumping, Anti-dumping and Anti-trust”, J.W.T 30 (1), 
(1996). 
Horlick, G. and Shea, E. “The World Trade Organization Anti-dumping Agreement”, 




Huang, T., W., “The Gathering Storm of the Anti-dumping Enforcement in China”, 
J.W.T., Vol. 36 (3), (2002). 
Hutton, S., and Trebilcock, M.,“An Empirical Study of the Application of Canadian Anti-
Dumping Laws: A Search for Normative Rationales”, J. W.T., Vol. 24, (3), (1990), 
[http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/downloads/Index2007.pdf] (last visited 
10/11/2007).  
Hsu L., “The New Singapore Law on Antidumping and Countervailing Duties”, J.W.T., 
Vol. 32 (1), 1998, 
Kane, T., Holmes, K. et al, “2007 Index of Economic Freedom”, The Wall Street 
Journal and The Heritage Foundation, New York, (2007). 
Killion, U., “Quest For Legal Safeguards For Foreign Exporters Under China's Anti-
Dumping Regime”, North Carolina J. Int’l Law & Com. Reg., Vol. 29 (3), (2004). 
Landes, W., and Posner, R., "The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study," 
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 36, (1993). 
Lazar, F., Structural/Strategic Dumping: A Comment on Richard Boltuck's "An Economic 
Analysis of Dumping", J. World Trade L., Vol. 22, (1988). 
Le Dang Doanh, “Foreign Direct Investment in Viet Nam: Results, Achievements, 
Challenges and Prospect”, Conference Paper for IMF Conference on Foreign Direct 
Investment, Hanoi , August 16-17, 2002 
Lindsey, B. and Ikenson, D., “Reforming the Anti-dumping Agreement: Roadmap for 
WTO negotiations”, CATO Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies, 11 Dec., 2002.  
Lowenfield, A., “Fair or Unfair Trade: Does it Matter?”, Cornell Int’l Law Journal, Vol. 
13, (1980). 
Messerlin, P. “China in the WTO: Antidumping and Safeguards”, World Bank occasional 
paper, (2002). [http://www.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/Pubs/wto.htm] (last visited: 
20/08/2006) 
Mirinda, J., “Should Anti-dumping Laws Be Dumped?”, Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus, Vol. 28 
(1), (1996). 
Morgan, C., "Competition Policy and Anti-dumping - Overview of Basic Issues", 
Conference Paper, presented at the Conference on Anti-dumping and Competition Policy, 
Center for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, Geneva, 11-12 July, 1996.  
Neils, G., “Anti-dumping in liberalizing country: Mexico Anti-dumping Policy and 
Practice”, World Economy, Vol. 7, (2004). 
Neufeld, I.N., “Anti-Dumping And Countervailing Procedures – Use Or Abuse?: 
Implications For Developing Countries”, Working Paper, UNCTAD Policy Issues In 
International Trade And Commodities Study No.9, UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/10, (2001). 
Ngo Gia Tu, Conversation with Ngo Gia Tu – Deputy Minister of Trade, Chief WTO 
negotiator, interview by Hoang Lam, Thanh Nien News Paper, 10 Jan., 2007. 
Nguyen, Tri Hung. “The Inflation of Vietnam in Transition”, Centre for ASEAN Studies, 
Discussion Paper No. 22, Ho Chi Minh City, 1999. 
Nguyễn Ngọc Sơn, “Pháp luật chống bán phá giá hàng nhập khẩu: những vấn đề lý luận 
và thực tiễn” (Legislation against dumping import goods in Vietnam: theoretical issues 





Nguyễn Văn Linh, “Những việc cần làm ngay” (Things that must be done immediately), 
Nhân Dân Newspapers, 15 Nov.,1987. 
Notes and comments, “The Anti-dumping Act: Tariff or Antitrust Law?” Yale Law 
Journal, Vol. 74 (4), (1965). 
Ohara Moriki et al., “The Overseas Moves of Chinese Local Manufactures ─ the Export 
and FDI of Chongqing’s Motorcycle Makers in Vietnam”, Discussion Paper No.04-E-08, 
Taiwan, (2003). 
Phong Tran, “Vietnam's Economic Liberalization and Outreach: Legal Reform”, Law & 
Business Review of Americas, Vol. 9, (2003). 
Slayton, P., “Canadian Anti-Dumping Tribunal”, a study prepared for the Law Reform 
Commission, Ottawa, (1979). 
Steward, T., "Why Anti-dumping Laws Need Not Be Cloned After Competition Laws Nor 
Replaced By Such Laws", Paper for Conference: Anti-dumping and Competition Policy, 
Center for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, Geneva, 11-12 July, 1996. 
Petersen, C., “African Dumping Grounds: South Africa's Struggle Against Unfair Trade”, 
Boston University Int'l L.J., Vol. 14, (1996).
Prusa, T., “Cumulation and Anti-dumping: A Challenge to Competition”, Journal of 
World Economy, Vol. 21 (8), (1998). 
Prusa, T., “Why Are So Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn?”, Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 33, (1992). 
Tavares de Araujo, J., Jr., “Legal and Economic Interfaces between Anti-dumping and 
Competition Policy”, Foreign Trade Information System, (Dec. 2001). 
Thai Bao Anh, “So sánh pháp luật va thực tiễn chống bán phá giá trong thương mại quốc 
tế” (Comparison of the anti-dumping law and practice in international trade), Paper for 
Conference “Vietnam integration into the World Economy – Capacity Building for Anti-
dumping”, 20-21 August 2004. 
Tharakan, P.K.M., Greenaway, D. and Tharakan, J., “Cumulation and injury 
determinationof the European Community in anti-dumping cases”, Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv, Vol. 134 (2), (1998). 
Tharakan, P.K.M., Vermulst, E., Tharakan, J. “Interface between anti-dumping and 
competition policy: a case study, J. World Economy, Vol. 21 (8),(1998).
Tharakan P.K , “Is Anti-dumping here to stay?”, World Economy, Vol. 22 (2), (1999) 
Tran Duc Luong, Judicial Reforms for the Rule of Law, Nhan Dan Newspaper, (15 Dec., 
2002).  
Tran Van Nam, “Un-free Trade with Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Current 
Catfish Dispute between US and Vietnam”, Conference Paper, South East Asia Center, 
University of  Washington, USA, (14/05/2003). 
Vermulst, E., “10 major problems with Anti-dumping system”, J.W.T., Vol.39 (1), (2005). 
Vermulst, E., “Adopting and Implementing Anti-dumping Laws – Some Suggestions for 
Developing Countries”, J.W.T., Vol.31 (2), (1997). 
Vermulst, E. and Hindley, B., “Zeroing In On Zeroing: Anti-Dumping in WTO Dispute 




Vu Khoan, “Vietnam wants to join the World Trade Organization” – a conversation with 
Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan, Interview by Nhu Anh, Vietnam Investment Review, 
18 August 2004. 
Vũ Thái Hà, “Góp ý pháp lệnh chống bán phá giá với hang hóa nhập khẩu vào Việt Nam” 
(Recommendations for the Ordinance on Anti-Dumping of Imports into Vietnam), 
Legislative Study Journal, 9/2004. 
Wang, L., “China’s New Anti-dumping Regulations: Improvements to comply with WTO 
Rules”, J.W.T., Vol. 36(5),(2002). 
Wang, X., “The Rule Of Rules: An Inquiry Into Administrative Rules In China Rule Of 
Law Context”, in the Rule of Law Perspective From Pacific Rim, Mansfield Center for 
Pacific Affairs, 2000. 
Warner, P., “Canada-United States Free Trade: The Case for Replacing Anti-dumping 
with Antitrust”, Law & Policy in Int. Business, Vol. 23 (4), (1992. 
Wooton, I. and Zanardi, M., “Trade and Competition Policy: Anti-dumping versus Anti-
trust”, Discussion Paper in Economics No 02-06, University of Glasgow, (2002). 
Zanardi, M., “Anti-dumping Law as a Collusive Device”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 37 (1), (2004) 
Zanardi, M., “Anti-dumping: a problem in international trade”, Conference Paper for the 
Conference of  “100th Annivesary of Anti-dumping Regulations”, Leverhulme Center for 
Research on the Globalization and Economic Policy (GEP), University of Nottingham, 
June, 2004. 
Zanardi, M., “Anti-dumping Law as a Collusive Device”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 37 (1), (2004). 
Zeng, D., and Liu, Y., “Public Interest’s Constitutive Factors and Their Logic Sequence in 
China anti-dumping Law”, US-China Law Review, Vol. 3 (4), (2006). 
 
 
COLLECTIVE PAPERS AND REPORTS 
Action Aid, “Báo cáo kết quả nghiên cứu nhanh các ảnh hưởng của Vụ CFA kiện các 
doanh nghiệp thành viên VASEP đối với nghề nuôi cá tra và basa tại một số tỉnh Đồng 
bằng sông Cửu Long” (Quick study report: Effects of the CFA‘s dumping allegation 
towards VASEP members on tra and basa farming in the Mekong Delta), Hanoi, 
(08/2003). 
GATT, “Minutes of the Meeting of 31 January – 2 February and 19-20 February 1990”, 
GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG8/15, (19 March, 1990). 
GATT, “Principle and Purpose of Anti-dumping Code” by Hong Kong, GATT Doc. 
MTN.GNG/NG8/W/46, (3 July, 1989). 
GATT, “Aspect of the Code Proposed by Korea for Negotiation” by Korea, GATT Doc. 
MTN.GNG/NG8/W/7, (11 August, 1987). 
Institute of Developing Economies, (2003); China Automotive Technology & Research 





MOF, “Danh mục và thuế suất đối với hàng hóa xuất, nhập khẩu 2005” (List tariff and 
tariff rates on import, export commodities in 2005), Finance Publishing House, Hanoi, 
2006. 
MOT, “Cơ sở khoa học cho việc áp dụng thuế chống bán phá giá đối với hang nhập khẩu 
vào Việt Nam trong bối cảnh hội nhập kinh tế” (Scientific basis for application anti-
dumping duties on imported products in Vietnam in light of its economic integration”(in 
Vietnamese), Project Code No: 2001-78-030, Hanoi, (2002), Project Code No: 2001-78-
030, Hanoi, 2002. 
MOT, Statement of purpose for the Project “Development of Ordinance against Dumping 
of Imported Goods in Vietnam”, Hanoi (02/04/2003). 
MOT, “Báo cáo tổng kết của Ban pháp chế Bộ Thương mại về vụ việc Ủy ban Châu Âu 
và Ùy ban thương mại Hàn Quốc điều tra các doanh  nghiệp Việt Nam bán phá giá bật lửa 
gas” (Report of the Department of Justice regarding the decisions of European 
Commission and Korean Trade Commission in their investigations on the gas lighter 
imported from Vietnam), Hanoi , (26/9/2003). 
VCP, Nghị quyết Đại hội Đảng lần thứ VII (Resolution of the VII Party Congress), (1996)
  
[http://cpv.org.vn/tiengviet/tulieuvankien/vankiendang/?topic=191&subtopic=8&leader_t
opic=225/] (last visited: 20/10/2007) 
VCP, “Phương hướng, nhiệm vụ kế hoạch phát triển kinh tế - xã hội 5 năm 2001 – 2005” 
(Orientation, Tasks and Plans for Socio-Economic Development for Five Years from 
2001-2005), Nghị quyết Đại hội Đảng IX (Resolution of the IX Party Congress), 22 April, 
2001.   
[http://cpv.org.vn/tiengviet/tulieuvankien/vankiendang/details.asp?topic=191&subtopic=8
&leader_topic=226&id=BT2280560851] (last visited: 20/10/2007).  
VCP, “Nghị quyết Trung ương Đảng 07/NQ-TW/2001 về vấn đề hội nhập kinh tế” 
(Politburo’s Resolution 07/NQ-TW on the international economic integration), 27 
November, 2001.  
[http://cpv.org.vn/tiengviet/tulieuvankien/vankiendang/details.asp?topic=191&subtopic=2
79&leader_topic=688&id=BT3150660211]. (last visited: 20/10/2007) 
UNCTAD, “Closer multilateral cooperation on competition policy: The development 
dimension”, Consolidated Report at the Post-Doha Seminars on Competition Policy, (21-
26/03/2002). 
UNCTAD, “World Investment Prospect Survey 2007-2009”, New York, 2007 
(http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//wips2007_en.pdf) (last visited: 15/11/2007) 
U.S. - Vietnam Trade Council (USVTC), Catalog Of Legal Updates: Vietnam Trade 
Policy Regime 2007, 15 Jan., 2007.  
[http://www.usvtc.org/updates/legal/Catalog/CatalogJan07.pdf], (last visited 10/11/2007) 
USVTC, “US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement: A survey of US Companies on 
implementation issues”, 3 Feb., 2004.  [http://www.usvtc.org/trade/bta/survey.pdf] (last 
visited: 10/08/2007). 





UNDP, Completion of Vietnam's Legal Framework for Economic Development, Hanoi, 
(1999). 
World Bank, “Vietnam’ Export Policies and Performance: Challenges and Opportunities”, 
(2002). 
World Bank, “Vietnam Development Report 2006”, N.Y., (2006). 
World Bank, “Saving Fish and Fishers - Toward Sustainable and Equitable Governance of 
the Global Fishing Sector”,  Report 29090-GLB, May 2004. 
WTO Committee on Anti-dumping Practices, “Recommendation Concerning Indicative 
List of Elements Relevant to a Decision on A Request for Extension of Time to Provide 
Information”, G/ADP/7, (26/04/2001). 
WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices. Report, G/L/340, 1 Nov., 1999 (99-4715); 
(http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/L/340.doc) (last visited 12/10/2005). 
WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices. Report, G/L/340/Corr.1, 26 November 
1999 (99-5123) (http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/L/340C1.doc). 
WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Report, G/L/581, 29 Oct., 2002 (02-5942); 
November 2002 (02-6180) (http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/L/581.doc) 
(last visited: 12/10/2005). 
WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Report, G/L/581/Corr.1, 11 
(http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/L/581C1.doc) (last visited: 12/10/2005) 
WTO, Vietnam’s WTO Commitments, Records of the Working Party on the Accession of 
Viet Nam, WT/ACC/VNM/48/Add.2, 27 Oct., 2006. 
WTO, Vietnam’s Accession, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Vietnam, 
WT/ACC/VNM/48, 27 Oct. 2006. 
 
 




Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement). 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994 (GATT). 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), 
1994. 




Administrative Settlement Procedures Ordinance, dated 25 Dec. 1998 (Ordinance 
No. 10/1998/PL-UBTVQH10). 
Circular No 226/VPCP/PC of the Government Office regarding the instruction of the 




Ordinance and assign the Minister of Trade to establish Legislative Committee on drafting 
Anti-dumping Ordinance, dated 14 January, 2002. 
Circular No. 106/2005/TT-BTC of the Ministry of Finance providing guidelines for 
collecting, paying and returning anti-dumping duty, anti-subsidy duty and collecting, 
paying and returning anti-dumping duty,  dated 05 Dec., 2005. 
Competition Law, (Law No. 27/2004/QH11, dated December 3, 2004). 
Constitution of Vietnam, 1992. 
Decree No 90-2005-ND-CP of the Government providing detail guidelines for 
implementation of some provisions of the Ordinance against dumping of imported goods 
in Vietnam, dated 11th July 2005. 
Decree No 06/2006/ND-CP of the Government defining the functions, tasks, powers and 
organizational structure of the Vietnam Competition Administration Department, dated 09 
Jan., 2006. 
Decree 04/2006/ND-CP of the Government  setting up the Council for handling of anti-
dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard cases and defining its functions, tasks, powers and 
organizational structure, dated 09 Jan., 2006. 
Law on Complaints and Denunciation, issued (Law No. 26/2004/QH11, dated 25 
February, 2004). 
Official Letter 1273-CP-QHQT of the Government Office announcing legislative action 
plan to submit to the WTO Working Party, dated 19 September 2003. 
Ordinance 41/2002/PL-UBTVQH issued by the Standing Committee of the National 
Assembly on most-favored-nation treatment and national treatment, dated 25 May 2002. 
Law on Promulgation of Legal Documents, (Law No 02/2002/QH11, dated 16 Dec., 
2002). 
Official Letter 6172/VPCP-TCQT of the Government Office instructing ministries, 
branches and people's committees to continue to check the legal instruments within the 
sectors for which they are responsible and the instruments, dated 18/12/2001. 
Resolution 48/2001/NQ-QH10 adopted by the National Assembly on the Ratification of 
Vietnam-U.S. Bilateral Trade Agreement, 2001 
 
Other jurisdictions 
India:  Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and Collection of Anti-dumping 
Duty on Dumped Articles and for Determination Injury) Rules, 1995. 
Mexico:  Foreign Trade Act, 1993. 
China:  The Anti-Dumping Regulation of the People's Republic of China, 2001. 
  Decision of The State Council on Amendments to Anti-dumping 




Colombia:  Decree No 299 Regulating the Application of Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (1995). 
EC:  EC Regulation 384/96 on Protection against Dumped Imports from Countries 
Not Members of the European Community (1995). 
Canada:  Special Import Act 1984 (SIMA). 
Malaysia:  Countervailing and Ant-Dumping Duties (Amendment) Act (1998). 
Thailand:  The Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Act (1999). 
Singapore:  Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties Act (1996). 
US:  - Anti-dumping Act 1916, (15 U.S.C., Sec. 72). 
- US Tariff Act 1930, (19 U.S.C., Chapter IV, Sec. 1673, 1677).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
334
  
 
335
 
 
336
 
 
 
 
337
  
 
338
  
 
339
  
 
340
 
 
 
341
  
 
342
  
 
343
  
 
344
 
 
 
345
